It’s Monday, May 18, and both the Israeli government and the IDF are hinting, through statements and actions, that they are preparing for the renewal of American strikes in Iran. Tehran has just submitted its latest diplomatic proposal: a commitment of highly questionable value to refrain from producing nuclear weapons. Conspicuously absent from the document is any mention of halting uranium enrichment or opening of the Strait of Hormuz.
Diplomacy appears to be faltering, but before the next Lion-themed operation, it is worth assessing the success of the last campaign.
Yesterday, Maj. Gen. (res.) Tamir Hayman, executive director of the Institute for National Security Studies and a former head of the Military Intelligence Directorate, published an article with several previously unknown details about the course of the war. Along with the revelations, Hayman gives an assessment: “Despite tactical achievements, the campaign’s two main centers of gravity—the Iranian regime and the nuclear project—remain without fundamental change.”
According to Hayman, Operation Rising Lion in June 2025 “did not pave the way for a permanent solution, and Iran demonstrated a rapid and dangerous recovery capability.” In the nuclear arena, the Iranians rehabilitated the Fordow nuclear facility and accelerated the construction of “Pickaxe Mountain,” which is (allegedly) immune to airstrikes. In the missile domain, they reached a production rate of about 125 ballistic missiles per month and had accumulated a large stockpile of about 2,500 by the start of Roaring Lion. Tehran also led a rapid rehabilitation of Hezbollah by doubling its budget and renewing supply routes through Syria, despite the fall of the Assad regime.
Hayman notes a significant disconnect between the political and military echelons at the outbreak of the war. Israel’s political ambition was the overthrow of the Iranian regime, whereas the IDF’s stated military objective was limited to the attrition of its capabilities. Despite this gap, the first stage of the campaign—spanning from the initial decapitation strikes against senior leadership to the eventual cancellation of the Kurdish incursion—focused heavily on the political aspiration of regime change. The decisive factor of this phase was meant to be an incursion by Kurdish fighters, designed to inflame interethnic tensions, destabilize the government and pave the way for a new, moderate leadership. This maneuver was also intended to serve as the keystone for a broader series of covert operations with similar objectives.
However, the plan was derailed when the Kurdish operation was canceled, likely due to pressure from Turkish and Arab allies. As Hayman puts it, “Once the covert operations were removed from the equation, the primary mechanism for destabilizing the regime’s stability was eliminated.”
Following the high-level assassinations, the campaign’s second phase pivoted to degrading Iranian capabilities. A central objective here was “the destruction of the nuclear project through an innovative and unique approach”—likely requiring a widespread ground maneuver. However, Iran had anticipated the decapitation strikes and proactively decentralized its military command structure before the war. Field officers were granted preauthorization to launch ballistic missiles and close the Strait of Hormuz without waiting for top-down orders. Furthermore, a governing vacuum was averted when Mojtaba Khamenei was appointed supreme leader at the behest of the IRGC.
This decentralized authority allowed Iran to successfully close the Strait of Hormuz, securing global leverage that altered American priorities and redirected attention toward the energy markets. Meanwhile, the campaign exposed the limitations of airpower; by Hayman’s assessment, most of Iran’s nuclear and missile assets survived by being housed in deep-underground bunkers. Consequently, the ultimate “crown jewel” of the military campaign—the destruction of the nuclear program—was not fully realized before the first ceasefire took effect.
Assessing this new reality, Hayman warns that Mojtaba Khamenei is more radical than his father and is no longer bound by the previous religious decree prohibiting the production of nuclear weapons. Because the Iranian leadership will likely conclude that “only nuclear deterrence can prevent the next war,” Hayman asserts that the defense establishment must operate under the working assumption that a clandestine Iranian nuclear weapons project is already underway.
Hayman’s article also reveals that it took Iran a full 40 hours of aggressive pressure to compel Hezbollah to enter the current campaign. Initially, Hezbollah attempted to deceive both Israel and the Lebanese public into believing their strikes were purely “symbolic.” To create the illusion of compliance with demilitarization agreements, the group intentionally withheld fire from south of the Litani River until March 5. However, Hayman notes that Hezbollah had secretly maintained combat infrastructure and fighters in that southern zone the entire time.
Although Hezbollah has been significantly degraded militarily, Hayman warns that retaining just 10 percent of its pre-November 2024 capabilities still leaves it with a formidable arsenal of approximately 15,000 rockets and missiles.
This looming threat is compounded by a frustrating tactical reality on the ground. Late last week, the U.S. announced a 45-day extension of the ceasefire in Lebanon. Yet, despite this truce on paper, the conflict continues; now the IDF operates under severe American constraints, with President Trump largely prohibiting strikes in Beirut and the Beqaa Valley.
Meanwhile, over the past two weeks, drone attacks and cross-border incidents have killed seven Israeli soldiers and civilians, wounding dozens more. While the establishment of the “Yellow Line” buffer zone in southern Lebanon has mitigated some direct fire, holding this territory places IDF forces on the ground at significant risk.
Hayman concludes with stark recommendations for the path forward. If diplomacy is the chosen route, an airtight, highly stringent nuclear agreement is an absolute necessity. Conversely, if the decision is to resume the war, it must be explicitly defined as a campaign to eliminate threats—with the Iranian nuclear program targeted first. While President Trump currently appears to be leaning toward the military option, Hayman issues a clear warning regarding any future operation: “Aerial strikes alone will not be enough.”