Twelfth Semi-Annual Report of the Secretary-General to the Security Council on the Implementation of Security Council Resolution 1559 (2004) for the information of the members of the Security Council.
This report will be issued as a document of the Security Council under the symbol S/2010/538.
18 October 2010
I. Background
1. The current report is my twelfth semi-annual report on the implementation of Security Council resolution 1559 (2004). It assesses progress in the implementation of the resolution since my previous report issued on 19 April 2010 (S/2010/193). It highlights the remaining concerns that continue to impede efforts to strengthen Lebanon’s sovereignty, territorial integrity and political independence as called for by the resolution.
2. Municipal elections were held in the country throughout the month of May. They took place in a generally calm and peaceful atmosphere, despite minor security incidents.
3. On 31 July, President Sleiman hosted a joint summit in Beirut with the King of Saudi Arabia and the President of the Syrian Arab Republic. The Emir of Qatar paid an official visit to Lebanon from 31 July to 2 August, which included a tour of villages in the South of the country. These visits signalled a strong Arab commitment to the maintenance of stability in Lebanon in the context of increased domestic tension generated by speculation, rumours and allegations regarding potential indictments by the Special Tribunal for Lebanon. Against this background, there have been lately some public exchanges of sharp statements between Lebanese leaders which have worsened the political climate.
4. On 13 and 14 October, the President of the Islamic Republic of Iran conducted an official visit to Lebanon, including a tour of villages in the South of the country, during which he expressed strong support for Hizbullah.
II. Implementation of Resolution 1559 (2004)
5. I recall that since the adoption of Security Council Resolution 1559 on 2 September 2004, several of its provisions have now been implemented. Presidential and parliamentary elections took place in a free and fair manner. Syria withdrew its troops and military assets from Lebanon in April 2005. Lebanon and Syria established full diplomatic relations and have engaged in high level talks on matters of relevance to Lebanon’s sovereignty, political independence and territorial integrity such as the delineation of their common border.
6. However, the delineation of their common border itself, which, was strongly encouraged by the Security Council in its resolution 1680 (2006), has not yet taken place. In addition, the presence of Lebanese and non-Lebanese militias and a worrying pattern of armed incidents continue to pose a threat to the stability of the country and the region, and highlights the need for the Government of Lebanon and the Lebanese Armed Forces to exercise a monopoly on the use of force throughout Lebanon. Therefore, more needs to be done to achieve the full implementation of resolution 1559 (2004), and to maintain the achievements already accomplished.
7. I took careful note that in his address to the 65session of the General Assembly, President Sleiman affirmed that Lebanon was striving to maintain internal stability through dialogue, by completing the implementation of the Taif Accord and by resorting to legal institutions to resolve any dispute, and by its commitment to the resolutions of the Security Council.
8. During the reporting period, I have remained in regular and close contact with all parties in Lebanon, as well as with relevant regional and international leaders. I received Prime Minister Hariri during his visit to United Nations Headquarters on 25 May 2010. I met with President Sleiman in New York on 24 September on the margins of the General Assembly. On these occasions, I expressed the United Nations’ full support for the sovereignty, independence, and territorial integrity of Lebanon, without foreign interference. I also urged my interlocutors to make progress towards the full implementation of this and all other resolutions pertaining to Lebanon in the best interest of the stability and prosperity of the country.
A. Sovereignty, Territorial Integrity, Unity, and Political Independence of Lebanon
9. Resolution 1559 (2004) aims at strengthening the sovereignty, territorial integrity, unity, and political independence of Lebanon under the sole and exclusive authority of the Government of Lebanon throughout Lebanon, consistent with the Taif Accord of 1989 to which all the political parties in Lebanon have committed themselves, and to which the Security Council has given its support in numerous presidential statements since then.
10. I have maintained my efforts to encourage Syria and Lebanon to achieve the full delineation of their common border, which is key to a number of explicit operational requirements of resolution 1680 (2006), derived from resolution 1559 (2004). The delineation and demarcation of Lebanon’s boundaries is a critical element to guarantee the country’s territorial integrity and to allow for proper border control. Given the improvement in Lebanese-Syrian relations, there appears to be a renewed consensus on the need for the two countries to take tangible measures in this regard. However, despite concrete steps by Lebanon and numerous pledges by Syria, no tangible progress has been made. While acknowledging that border delineation is a bilateral issue, the Security Council has strongly encouraged the two countries, in its resolution 1680 (2006), to delineate their common border as a significant step towards affirming Lebanon’s sovereignty and territorial integrity.
11. The continued occupation by the Israel Defense Forces of the northern part of the village of Ghajar and an adjacent area north of the Blue Line stands in violation of Lebanon’s sovereignty, resolution 1701 (2006) and other relevant Security Council resolutions. I have raised this matter repeatedly with Israeli officials over the reporting period. I will report in more detail on this important matter in my upcoming report to the Security Council on the implementation of Resolution 1701 (2006). Further, diplomatic efforts in relation to the issue of the Shab’a Farms area have not yielded any results.
12. Over the reporting period, intrusions into Lebanese airspace by Israeli aircraft and unmanned aerial vehicles have continued on an almost daily basis, constituting a violation of Lebanese sovereignty and resolutions 1559 (2004) and 1701 (2006) and raising tension. The Government of Lebanon has repeatedly protested these violations. I have discussed this matter on
numerous occasions with the Israeli authorities at the highest level, which claim in turn that these overflights are carried out for security reasons, citing alleged breaches to the arms embargo enforced pursuant to resolution 1701 (2006).
13. The Government of Lebanon sent to me and to the Security Council a letter (S/2010/460) regarding alleged Israeli espionage networks in the country, asserting that it constituted a blatant aggression against Lebanon and its sovereignty. Lebanese security agencies have continued their investigations into these networks. Several new individuals have been arrested during the reporting period. Some have already been convicted in court.
B. Extension of Lebanese Government Control over All Lebanese Territory
14. The Government of Lebanon has re-affirmed to the United Nations its intention to extend the State’s authority over all Lebanese territory, so that it is eventually the sole armed force in the country as called for by the resolution. For this purpose, the Lebanese Armed Forces and the Internal Security Forces play a crucial role in strengthening Lebanon’s sovereignty and control over the entire country, although they have continued to face several challenges.
15. I am concerned by an increased number of security incidents involving the use of heavy weapons in populated areas over the reporting period. The most serious such incident took place on 24 August 2010 when supporters of Hizbullah and Al-Ahbash clashed in Borj Abi Haidar, West Beirut. Rocket-propelled grenades and machine guns were used in the fighting. Three deaths were reported in street battles, which rapidly spread to the surrounding areas. These occurrences confirm the possession of lethal weapons by non-State actors in populated areas. They also demonstrate a complete disregard for the safety of Lebanon’s civilian population and for Lebanese law by armed groups. Following the 24 August 2010 incident, Prime Minister Hariri called for the capital to become an area free of weapons. Members of Hizbullah expressed reservations to this initiative. Meanwhile, the Lebanese Cabinet announced the reinforcement of the presence of the Lebanese Armed Forces and the Internal Security Forced in Beirut.
16. Over the last six months, security sources in Lebanon have reported some shootings and explosions in and around para-military facilities in the Eastern Beka’a Valley belonging to the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine – General Command and Fatah al-Intifadah. The permanent presence of such facilities alongside the Syrian-Lebanese border adds to the general porosity of parts of the land border and poses a challenge for the control of the border by the Lebanese security forces. It also makes the delineation of the border more difficult.
17. As I reported elsewhere to the Security Council in more detail, over the reporting period, on several instances, UNIFIL was denied its freedom of movement in its area of operations. Some of these incidents were serious and seemed to be organized in nature. In this respect, I welcome the statement made by the Council of Ministers last July in which it announced its decision to reinforce the presence of the Lebanese Armed Forces in southern Lebanon, and the subsequent action taken in this regard.
18. Given the above mentioned concerns and continued existence and activities of militias in Lebanon, improving the management and control of Lebanon’s land borders is critical to prevent the flow of weapons to armed groups. Several Member States have expressed concern over the
illegal transfer of weapons across the land borders. Government officials in Lebanon acknowledge the porous nature of the border and the possibility that arms smuggling occurs. I take these reports seriously but the United Nations does not have the means to verify them independently. I have raised this matter with Lebanese officials and with several regional leaders and requested their assistance in this regard. All states must take the necessary measures in order to prevent the transfer of arms to groups outside the control of the Government of Lebanon. This is a key factor for stability in Lebanon and the region.
19. In this context, the Lebanese authorities reaffirmed to me their commitment to improve the monitoring of land borders to prevent the unauthorized flow of weapons, munitions and personnel into the country. The work of the Common Border Force is commendable. Yet, current efforts need to be increased and become more systematic in line with the recommendations of the LIBAT reports. Also, the effective management of the border obviously requires cooperation from neighbouring countries and the delineation of Lebanon’s boundaries.
C. Disbanding and Disarmament of Lebanese and non-Lebanese Militias
20. In resolution 1559, the Security Council calls for the disarming and disbanding of all Lebanese and non-Lebanese militias, which is merely reflecting and re-affirming a decision that all Lebanese committed themselves to in the Taif Accord in 1989, in the aftermath of the civil war. This understanding led at the time to Lebanese militias -with the exception of Hizbullah -giving up their weapons.
21. Regrettably, Lebanese and non-Lebanese militias continue to operate in the country outside of the Government’s control in serious violation of resolution 1559 (2004). While several groups across the political spectrum in Lebanon possess weapons outside Government control – as recent security incidents have demonstrated -the armed component of Hizbullah remains the most significant and most heavily armed Lebanese militia in the country. In addition, there are a series of Palestinian armed groups operating in the country inside and outside the refugee camps.
22. Over the reporting period, there has been no tangible progress towards the disbanding and disarming of Lebanese and non-Lebanese militias as called for in the Taif Accord and resolution 1559 (2004).
23. Indeed, in spite of the provisions of the resolution, Hizbullah maintains a substantial para-military capacity that remains distinct from and may exceed the capabilities of the Lebanese Armed Forces. In addition, the United Nations continued to receive regular reports that Hizbullah upgrades and expands its arsenal and military capabilities. In several public pronouncements during the reporting period, senior officials of Hizbullah neither denied nor confirmed that arms transfers are taking place, but acknowledged maintaining a considerable arsenal including strategic capabilities. The group considers silence on the specifics of its military capabilities as an integral part of its strategy of deterrence. The United Nations is not in a position to verify independently the assertions that are made, but takes them very seriously.
24. Hizbullah’s maintenance of a substantial arsenal outside Government control has continued to be a central issue in the public debate. It remains my firm conviction that the disarmament of Hizbullah and other militias can best be achieved through a Lebanese-led political process. So far, this political process has taken the form of the Lebanese National Dialogue, gathering Lebanon’s main political leaders.
25. Since its re-convening after the May 2008 events, the National Dialogue, chaired by President Sleiman, has helped to preserve stability in the country and contain public rhetoric. To address the questions of arms outside of Government control, the participants in this forum were requested to present their position on the national defense strategy, and to seek, through a committee of experts, commonalities among the proposals presented by participants. To date, not all participants have nominated their members to the committee of experts, which regrettably does not convene on a regular basis.
26. During the current reporting period, the National Dialogue was convened by President Sleiman on two occasions: on 17 June 2010 and 19 August 2010. Discussions at the last session reflected once again both the centrality of the issue of the weapons of Hizbullah with regards to the development of a National Strategy and the strong opposition to discussing this issue among Hizbullah and its political allies. As a result of the last discussion, the participants agreed inter alia (a) to continue studying the national defence strategy; (b) to confirm the importance of national consensus, consolidating political and security stability and committing to the decisions approved by the national dialogue, particularly those related to illegal Palestinian weapons outside the camps; (c) to pursue the national campaign aiming at ensuring the right of return for the Palestinian refugees and rejecting their naturalization. The National Dialogue agreed to reconvene on 4 November.
27. With respect to the situation of Palestinians in Lebanon, I am pleased to report that the leadership of the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) has reiterated both to me and publicly its call on the Palestinians in Lebanon to respect the sovereignty and political independence of Lebanon, as well as Lebanese law and security requirements.
28. While the situation in most of the 12 Palestinian refugee camps remains relatively stable, the threat of internal violence that could potentially spill over into surrounding areas still exists in a number of camps. Some of the refugee camps continue to provide safe haven for those who seek to escape the authority of the State. Over the reporting period, security sources have registered several incidents in and around refugee camps involving the use of weapons.
29. Notwithstanding these incidents, closer cooperation between Palestinian camp authorities and Lebanese authorities has improved camp security. Meanwhile, Lebanese authorities do not maintain a permanent presence inside the camps, despite the fact that the Cairo agreement of 1969 – which permitted the presence of Palestinian armed forces in the refugees’ camps -was annulled by the Lebanese parliament in 1987. More will need to be done to contain potential tension in the camps.
30. The situation of Palestinians refugees living in Lebanon remains by and large dire. For many years, the United Nations has urged the Government of Lebanon to improve the conditions in which Palestinian refugees live in Lebanon, without prejudice to the eventual resolution of the Palestinian refugee question in the context of a comprehensive peace agreement in the region, in particular given the detrimental effects of dismal living conditions on the wider security situation.
Prime Minister Hariri has reassured me that his Government remains committed to addressing the social and economic conditions of Palestinian refugees.
31. In a significant effort to improve the situation of Palestinian refugees, Lebanon’s Parliament adopted on 17 August 2010 amendments to the Labour Code and the Social Security Law, lifting restrictions to work for Palestinian refugees in the country, based on a draft proposal originally tabled by MP Walid Jumblatt in June 2010. The new legislation will facilitate inter alia the hiring process of Palestinian refuges by Lebanese employers. It will also extend a number of legal protections to Palestinian employees.
IV. Observations
32. The functioning of the national unity Government in Lebanon has been the best guarantee to maintain calm and promote dialogue in the country, pursuant to the commitments made by all Lebanese leaders in Doha in May 2008. I am very concerned by rising political tensions in the country lately, manifested inter alia by acrimonious statements and acts of defiance. Lebanon is currently experiencing a domestic climate of uncertainty and fragility. It is therefore imperative that the spirit of entente and respect for the principles of security prevail. The political leaders of the country must focus on strengthening the sovereignty and independence of their country and its institutions. I urge all political leaders to transcend sectarian and individual interests and genuinely promote the future and the interests of the Nation.
33. Over the past six months, Lebanon has maintained the achievements already made towards the implementation of the resolution. However, there has been little further tangible progress, as the remaining issues to be addressed are the thorniest.
34. The existence of militias outside the control of the Government of Lebanon constitutes a challenge to the ability of the State to exercise its full sovereignty and control over its territory. It remains a fundamental and dangerous anomaly that stands against the democratic aspirations of Lebanon and threatens domestic peace. Disbanding and disarming militias is of vital importance to strengthen Lebanon’s sovereignty and political independence. I deplore the use by non-state actors of heavy weapons in populated areas, which resulted in injuries and death. For this reason, I appeal to all parties, inside and outside of Lebanon, to immediately halt all efforts to transfer, acquire weapons and build para-military capacities outside the authority of the State.
35. I am mindful that the maintenance by Hizbullah of an independent paramilitary capacity continues to be at the centre of the political debate in Lebanon and the ongoing process of post-civil war reconciliation. Its significant military arsenal creates an atmosphere of intimidation and poses a key challenge to the safety of Lebanese civilians and to the Government’s monopoly on the legitimate use of force. I call upon the leaders of Hizbullah to complete the transformation of the group into a solely Lebanese political party and disarm, consistent with the requirements of the Taif Accord. Regional parties that maintain close ties with Hizbullah must encourage it in the same direction.
36. I note with satisfaction that in his address to the General Assembly a month ago, President Sleiman reiterated his country’s commitment to the implementation of the Taif Accord. This agreement must be preserved and implemented by all in order to avoid the spectre of a renewed confrontation amongst the Lebanese.
37. The National Dialogue remains an important tool to maintain calm and stability in the country and to address the critical issues of weapons outside the control of the state. Yet, the process of development of a national defence strategy faces significant obstacles of a political rather than a technical nature. Indeed, while recognizing the merits of this process, the overall gains of the National Dialogue so far have remained limited.
38. I commend President Sleiman for his leadership in steering this difficult process, which has contributed significantly to reducing domestic tension in Lebanon, particularly after the serious clashes of May 2008. At the same time, the National Dialogue also needs to make tangible progress on its stated objective of developing a national defence strategy. This, in turn, will necessitate addressing the question of arms outside the control of the state. A credible process needs to be established in this respect, with clear benchmarks against which progress can be measured, and with greater institutional anchoring. I emphasize again that the main goal of this Dialogue should clearly be to bring all arms in Lebanon under the sole control of the Government of Lebanon. I urge the participants in the National Dialogue to demonstrate seriousness in addressing these critical questions of sovereignty and national defense
39. I hope that the rapprochement between Lebanon and the Syrian Arab Republic will pave the way for addressing important pending bilateral issues such as the delineation of the Lebanese-Syrian border. I welcome the renewed intention of the two governments to move forward on this issue, which will allow for enhanced border control, and encourage them to begin the work of delineation rapidly.
40. The continued presence of paramilitary infrastructures outside the refugee camps by the PFLP-GC and Fatah Al-Intifadah continues to be of great concern to me. I regret that my repeated encouragements to the Government of Lebanon to address this long-standing issue have not been heeded, despite the consensual agreement by the National Dialogue to do so, already in 2006. I urge the national unity Government of Lebanon to implement the decisions previously agreed upon and reiterated in the Government’s Ministerial Declaration of December 2009, related to provisions concerning the disarmament of Palestinian military outposts outside the refugee camps and addressing the issue of arms inside the camps. Mindful that these two militias maintain close regional ties, I renew my call upon the Government of the Syrian Arab Republic to assist in this process.
41. I commend the Government of Lebanon and Lebanese parliamentarians for the important first legislative steps they have taken towards improving the living conditions of Palestinian refugees in Lebanon, without prejudice to an overall resolution of the Palestinian refugee question in the framework of a comprehensive peace agreement. I look forward to their implementation under the supervision of the Ministry of Labour and the support of the Lebanese-Palestinian Dialogue Committee (LPDC) in the coming period. I hope that more steps in this direction will be taken soon, as I am convinced that addressing the difficult conditions of Palestinian refugees will have a positive impact on the coexistence of Lebanese and Palestinians and hence, on national security and stability.
42. Recent security incidents highlight the need for Lebanese security forces to do more to prevent and respond to acts of violence, and for the Government of Lebanon and all relevant political leaders to make clear that such acts will not be tolerated. While the Lebanese security forces are careful not to inflame sectarian tensions by appearing to take sides in armed clashes, they have a clear duty to enforce Lebanese law and to protect Lebanon’s civilian population from harm.
43. The Lebanese Armed Forces are playing a crucial role in strengthening Lebanon’s sovereignty and control over all the country, thereby promoting stability in Lebanon. The Lebanese Armed Forces also represent a strong symbol of Lebanese sovereignty and unity that show strong commitment and resolve. The multiple security responsibilities of the LAF, compounded by the fact that it still lacks adequate military equipment, have an impact on its capacity to meet its obligations under relevant Security Council resolutions. I therefore call on donor countries to continue to come forward and assist the LAF to improve its logistical and operational capabilities.
44. I deplore the continued Israeli violations of Lebanon’s sovereignty and territorial integrity. I call upon Israel to adhere to its obligations under relevant Security Council resolutions and withdraw from the northern part of the village of Ghajar and cease its overflights of Lebanese airspace.
45. In sum, I remain keenly aware that the combination of mistrust among the parties and the continued presence of militias could lead to tensions and possible insecurity and instability in Lebanon and beyond. The country should not be used as a staging ground to further regional aspirations or to promote conflict. It is therefore imperative that Lebanon preserve its comprehensive political framework of co-existence in mutual respect, as set out in the Taif Accord. I urge all the friends and neighbors of Lebanon to play a constructive role in supporting the national unity Government of Lebanon in good faith, bearing in mind all the sacrifices Lebanon has made to enhance its sovereignty and political independence.
46. I, therefore, call on all parties and actors to fully abide by resolutions 1559 (2004), 1680 (2006) and 1701 (2006). I will continue my efforts for the purpose of the full implementation of these and all other relevant Security Council resolutions concerning the restoration of the territorial integrity, full sovereignty and political independence of Lebanon.
Courtesy of WCCRMEDIA