The numbers suggest the “absolute nullity” ruling may have achieved the opposite of what its supporters expected
The Ankara Regional Court of Appeals’ 36th Civil Chamber may have intended to settle a legal dispute within Türkiye’s main opposition Republican People’s Party (CHP) when it issued its controversial “absolute nullity” verdict on May 21, 2026. Instead, it appears to have triggered a nationwide debate about political legitimacy, judicial intervention, democratic competition, and the limits of court involvement in party politics.
The ruling, which effectively invalidated CHP’s 38th Ordinary Congress and temporarily transferred party leadership back to former chairman Kemal Kılıçdaroğlu, immediately transformed what had been a largely internal opposition matter into one of the most consequential political crises of recent years.
The subsequent police operation against CHP headquarters, the dramatic images of riot police entering the party’s Ankara compound, the use of tear gas and rubber bullets, Özgür Özel’s refusal to leave the building, his subsequent march to parliament, and days of highly visible confrontation dramatically altered public perceptions of the crisis.
The central political question quickly became clear:
Would voters recognize the authority of the court-installed Kılıçdaroğlu, or would they continue to support Özgür Özel, who had been elected by party delegates at the November 2023 congress?
The answer emerging from virtually every major survey conducted after the crisis appears remarkably consistent.
Not only do CHP voters overwhelmingly continue to recognize Özgür Özel’s leadership, but the broader political impact of the intervention may have strengthened both his legitimacy and his political standing.
The political landscape before the verdict
To understand the significance of the post-verdict polling, it is necessary to examine where Turkish politics stood before May 21.
Throughout the spring of 2026, most major polling companies, including MetroPOLL, SONAR, ASAL, ORC and Türkiye Raporu, were reporting broadly similar findings.
After redistributing undecided voters, CHP generally appeared to be polling between 31.5 and 33.5 percent.
The ruling AK Party was averaging between 30 and 31.5 percent.
DEM Party remained relatively stable around 8.5 to 9.5 percent.
MHP was largely holding its traditional support base in the 8 to 9.5 percent range.
Smaller parties such as Yeniden Refah, Zafer Party and İYİ Party continued competing for protest votes and dissatisfied voters on the margins.
The most important characteristic of the political environment, however, was not the narrow CHP lead.
It was the unusually high proportion of undecided voters.
Many surveys found that as many as one-quarter to one-third of respondents either remained undecided or expressed dissatisfaction with all available political alternatives.
This indicated that voter loyalties were less rigid than raw party figures suggested.
At the same time, CHP itself was experiencing a period of consolidation following its historic local election victory in March 2024.
While the party remained the country’s leading political force in most polls, its momentum had begun to plateau.
Some opposition supporters questioned whether the “change” movement that brought Özgür Özel to power had fully delivered on its promise.
Others criticized the party’s handling of key political confrontations, particularly those surrounding Istanbul Mayor Ekrem İmamoğlu.
Within this context, CHP remained competitive but was not experiencing the kind of dramatic upward trajectory that often accompanies major political breakthroughs.
The party was leading. It was not surging.
Then the court intervened.
A judicial decision becomes a political event
Initially, supporters of the verdict framed it as a technical legal matter. They argued that procedural irregularities surrounding the 2023 congress required judicial correction.
However, events quickly moved beyond legal arguments. The ruling did not simply call for another congress or administrative review.
Instead, it effectively reversed the outcome of a congress that had taken place nearly two and a half years earlier.
That distinction proved politically important. Many voters appeared willing to debate whether procedural mistakes had occurred.
Far fewer appeared willing to accept that a court should determine who leads the country’s largest opposition party.
As the crisis intensified and police became involved, public attention shifted away from technical legal questions and toward broader issues of democratic legitimacy.
The images were powerful.
For many voters, the spectacle of police entering the headquarters of the republic’s founding party carried symbolic weight far beyond the legal details of the case itself.
Political scientists often note that voters rarely react to constitutional arguments.
They react to symbols.
In this case, the symbols were unmistakable.
ORC: CHP voters close ranks
The first major indication of public reaction came from ORC Research.
Conducted on May 23-24 across 18 provinces with 2,160 respondents, the survey focused heavily on CHP voters and immediate political reactions to the crisis.
The results were striking.
Asked how the court ruling would affect their voting preferences:
Equally significant was the response to a second question:
“What should Özgür Özel and his team do now?”
An overwhelming 92.2 percent answered that they should remain within CHP and continue fighting politically.
Only 7.8 percent favored leaving the party and creating a new political movement.
These numbers suggest that the intervention failed to create the kind of fragmentation that many observers anticipated.
Instead of dividing the CHP electorate, the ruling appears to have encouraged party supporters to rally around existing leadership.
KONDA: The legitimacy question
The most politically sensitive findings emerged from KONDA.
Long regarded as one of Türkiye’s most respected polling organizations, KONDA’s post-crisis measurements focused heavily on perceptions of legitimacy.
Its findings suggest that a majority of the broader electorate viewed the ruling skeptically.
Approximately 52 percent of respondents reportedly described the verdict as either wrong or politically motivated.
But the most remarkable figure emerged from within CHP itself.
Only 5 percent of CHP voters expressed support for Kemal Kılıçdaroğlu returning as permanent party leader.
For a politician who led the opposition for thirteen years and came within a few percentage points of winning the 2023 presidential election, such a figure is extraordinary.
The result does not necessarily reflect hostility toward Kılıçdaroğlu as an individual.
Rather, it suggests widespread opposition to the mechanism through which he returned.
Many voters who once supported Kılıçdaroğlu appear unwilling to endorse a leadership change imposed through judicial intervention.
The distinction is crucial.
The polling indicates that opposition voters are separating their personal assessment of Kılıçdaroğlu from their assessment of the process that restored him.
Areda Survey: The intervention narrative
The findings of Areda Survey are particularly interesting because the company is often viewed as closer to government perspectives than many opposition-oriented pollsters.
Yet even Areda’s data points toward significant public skepticism.
According to its findings:
This is arguably the most important finding of the entire post-crisis polling cycle.
Political legitimacy in modern democracies often depends less on legal authority than on public acceptance.
Courts can issue rulings.
Governments can implement them.
But if voters broadly perceive an action as politically motivated, legitimacy becomes harder to establish.
The polling suggests precisely such a problem may now exist.
The Özel effect
Perhaps the greatest political beneficiary of the crisis appears to be Özgür Özel himself.
Before the verdict, public assessments of his leadership were mixed.
Supporters praised his efforts to modernize CHP and broaden its appeal.
Critics questioned whether he possessed the charisma or political instincts necessary to challenge President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan effectively.
The crisis appears to have altered those perceptions.
Areda Survey found that 58.1 percent of respondents approved of Özel’s response to the intervention.
Among CHP voters, approval reportedly reached approximately 88.5 percent.
The dramatic images of confrontation with police, speeches outside party headquarters, and the symbolic march toward parliament created an entirely different public image than the one many voters previously associated with him.
Political leadership is often forged during crises rather than routine periods.
The available evidence suggests that many voters now view Özel differently than they did before May 21.
What happened to Kılıçdaroğlu?
Perhaps the most unexpected consequence of the intervention concerns Kemal Kılıçdaroğlu himself.
Before the ruling, he remained a respected elder statesman among many opposition voters despite losing the 2023 presidential election.
The court’s decision was arguably intended to restore his authority.
Instead, it appears to have placed him in a politically uncomfortable position.
Across multiple surveys, support for his return remains limited.
Polling averages among CHP supporters indicate:
These figures suggest that Kılıçdaroğlu now faces a legitimacy deficit that would be difficult for any political leader to overcome.
Even if he possesses formal authority under the court ruling, he appears to lack broad political authority among the party’s own electorate.
In democratic politics, the latter often matters more.
Did the ruling change voting intentions?
The final question concerns electoral consequences.
Has the crisis altered party support?
Early indications suggest modest but measurable movement.
Before the ruling, CHP was averaging approximately 31.5 to 33.5 percent.
Post-crisis measurements indicate support moving toward roughly 33.8 percent.
The increase is not dramatic.
But it is politically significant because it runs in the opposite direction from what many expected.
Rather than weakening CHP, the intervention appears to have strengthened party cohesion.
Rather than producing confusion, it appears to have clarified leadership preferences.
Rather than creating fragmentation, it appears to have encouraged consolidation.
Political scientists often describe this phenomenon as a “rally-around-the-flag effect,” where supporters temporarily unite around a leader or institution perceived to be under external attack.
The current polling strongly suggests that such a dynamic is unfolding.
The verdict of public opinion
It remains far too early to know how this crisis will ultimately reshape Turkish politics.
Court proceedings continue.
Political tensions remain high.
Future polling may reveal different trends.
Yet the first wave of public opinion data delivers a surprisingly consistent message.
The intervention has not generated significant support for a court-engineered leadership change.
The Turkish public remains divided over many issues.
CHP supporters remain divided over policy questions.
But on the question of who legitimately leads the opposition, the evidence is remarkably clear.
At least for now, voters appear to recognize the authority of the leader elected by delegates rather than the authority granted by judges.
If the objective of the intervention was to weaken Özgür Özel and rehabilitate Kemal Kılıçdaroğlu’s leadership, the early polling suggests the opposite may have occurred.
The legal battle continues.
But in the court of public opinion, the initial verdict appears already to have been delivered.