LAHORE: The 26/11 Mumbai terror attacks were first conceived on the third floor of the Inter Services Intelligence (ISI) headquarters at the Zero Point in the garrison town of Rawalpindi, claims a recently released book “Investigating the Mumbai Conspiracy”, published by the Delhi-based Pentagon Press, adding that the head of the ISI directorate sits on the third floor of the headquarters, overseeing a shadowy empire of spies and jehadis which today poses a greater threat to global security than the al-Qaeda.
The book makes sensational claims – that the Mumbai terror attack was planned and executed by the Pakistan Army and its different agencies including the Inter Services Intelligence and the Special Services Group (SSG) and that the Pakistani Army Chief General Ashfaq Pervez Kayani was not only in the know of the attack but had planned every detail of the assault with his close confidants in the Pakistan Army’s top leadership. The book claims that the Pakistan army top brass including former President General (retd) Pervez Musharraf had been playing one of the deadliest games in recent history to provoke a disastrous war among the two nuclear armed nations. Containing documents like the Mumbai charge sheet confessional statements of the lone surviving attacker Ajmal Amir Kasab and other details, the book lays bare the tale of the Mumbai attacks and warns of the coming wave of terrorist assaults on India from across the border in Pakistan.
The thrilling book has hit the news stands at a time when Pakistan has handed over a 36-page fresh dossier on its probe into the Mumbai terror attacks to New Delhi, giving an update on the investigations. The dossier confirms what India has been insisting all along – top operatives of Lashkar-e-Toiba were responsible for carrying out the Mumbai terror attacks. This is the first official admission from Pakistan that its citizens were involved in the November 26, 2008 terror attacks. The deadly assault was carried out with by ten heavily armed jehadis who came via ship and boats from Pakistan and held India hostage in Mumbai for over 60 hours.
It was the most audacious terror onslaught since the 9/11 terror attack on the US. Over 180 persons were killed and two nuclear armed nations almost came to war over the attack that shook the world. Who masterminded such an attack? From the evidence gathered by the various intelligence and security agencies, claims the book published by the Pentagon Press [wned by Rajan Arya], it is quite clear that Lashkar-e-Toiba, an al-Qaeda affiliated Lahore based terrorist organisation which trained and dispatched the attackers, do not have the ability to plan and execute such a major armed assault across the seas. It then adds: “Operations like the Mumbai terror attack are never discussed in official meetings [of the ISI]. Such meetings remain unlisted and no minutes are kept. Nor are they planned in a day. Only a handful of the senior officers decide the details, over a period of time, going back and forth over details and more details.
Co-authored by Wilson john, a senior fellow with Observer Research Foundation and Vishwas Kumar, a senior Indian journalist with special interest in crime and terrorism, states that a highly classified operation like Mumbai could not have been shared among more than four people would have known about the plan besides the Chief of Army Staff, who at the time of the planning was President General Pervez Musharraf. “The DG ISI was Lt General Ashfaq Pervez Kayani. Among General Kayani’s close confidants were four Major Generals — Sikander Afzal, Asif Akhtar, Muhammad Mustafa and Tahir Mahmood — all of whom played major roles behind 26/11”.
The book adds: “Akhtar headed ISI’s Operations Wing which handled terrorist groups operating in Jammu & Kashmir and other parts of India. Afzal was the Deputy Director General External and headed all sections which dealt with terrorist groups and India. One of his close confidants was Brigadier Riazullah Khan Chibb, one of the key masterminds of the Mumbai attack. Mustafa was in charge of the Evaluation wing and Tahir Mahmood was General Officer Commanding. Special Services Group (SSG), which sometimes acted as the armed wing of the intelligence agency. Tahir Mahmood, as the Brigade commander of Brigade 62 at Skardu, had launched terrorists from LeT and other Army supported groups across Indian territory to camouflage the movement of regular troops.
The book claims that a whole lot of homework had gone into before the Pakistani jehadi Generals laid out the plan for the Mumbai attacks. “They knew which terrorist group they could rely on to carry out the task. They had notes on previous attacks, the modus operandi used, the local support network and they knew the names of Brigadiers who could control the operation through satellite phones. According to the book, three retired Pakistan Army Brigadiers who had played a key role in the Mumbai terror attacks are Riazullah Khan Chibb, Ijaz Shah and Haji.
“Though names of other Brigadiers and other retired officers have time and again emerged during various investigations – Major Wajahatullah and Colonel Kayani – there are fewer details in open source about their past and present activities. There are, however, some details about Shah and Chibb, largely thanks to the emails which former Prime Minister Benazir Bhutto wrote before her assassination in 2007. Both Shah and Chibb had retired from ISI a few years ago and have vast experience in running and handling terrorist groups targeting India. They are also confidants of Musharraf”.
“Generally, no serving officer is given control of terrorist operations as the discovery of such links, run the risk of attracting sanctions from international donors. Terrorist operations are always left to the ‘irregulars’. These are retired officers who are reemployed on contracts for specific missions for the Army which can be easily denied. They operate out of private offices in different locations in Pakistan, have access to weapons and equipment and are paid through slush funds maintained by the Inter Services Intelligence”.
Going by the book, it was a motley crowd of committed trainers, cartographers, communications experts and ideologues who worked on the front end of the mission. “The principal trainers were Zaki-ur-Rehman Lakhvi (alias Abu Wahed Irshad Ahmad); Muzammil (aka Yousuf aka Abu Gurera aka Abu Mohammad); Faheem Ahmad Ansari (alias Abu Jarar). Apart from them, Azzam Cheema, better known as ‘Babaji’, taught recruits how to spot vital installations on the map and uses satellite phones to keep in touch. Another Abu Qahafa, an expert commando trainer who joined the group in 2006, was the chief instructor for the Mumbai attackers. A confidante of Muzammil, he is an expert commando trainer and led the select recruits through the toughest training schedule at LeT’s Maskar Aksa camp. Abu al Qama, an old hand at training new recruits, and was in charge of LeT’s training camp, Ibn-e-Tamia, PoK, which received the Indian recruits across the Kashmir border”.
The book claims that the ideologue behind the operation was Abdur Rahman Makki, who is actually the LeT’s supremo Hafiz Saeed’s cousin and brother-in- law. “He is second only to Saeed in the hierarchy and is known as a firebrand proponent of suicide missions, having penned a highly popular book called Tehrik-e-Islam ke fidayeen dastay (The suicide squads of the Islamic movement). Another relative of Saeed, Ibrahim (aka Ali), a computer expert and fund distributor, put together the assault team. He recruited Faheem Ahmed Ansari (aka Abu Jarar), who trained under Muzammil, and was briefed extensively about the targets subsequently and selected for the attack in November 2008. Ansari was made to go through Google Map and other maps to pinpoint targets like the Chhatrapati Shivaji Terminus and the Taj Hotel. Ansari drew maps for Muzammil and was later tasked to extensively videotape and photograph the locations after he returned to India. Abu Hamza (aka Ramzan aka Aamir) was one of the trainers at Baitul Mujahideen. Hamza and had a role in previous terror strikes in India like the ISI (Bangalore) attack of 2004. His inputs about making entry, traveling and then exiting the target areas were critical to the success of the Mumbai attack”.
The book claims that while Lakhvi and Abu Qahaf remained in touch with the terrorists from Karachi, it was Muzammil who was coordinating the attack pattern from Lahore, most probably from an ISI Forward Detachment Lahore at 7, Lawrence Road, Lahore. “Muzammil’s satellite phone conversations with the Mumbai attackers after they had set sail from Karachi was intercepted by the US electronic and communication intelligence service, NSA (National Security Agency) and passed on to the Indian intelligence agencies on November 18, 2008, six days before the attack took place. Zarar Shah (aka Abdul Wajid), LeT’s communications expert and urban combat trainer, confessed later of his involvement and said he had stayed with the attackers in Karachi for a few weeks to train them in urban combat skills. US agencies had intercepted his telephone calls to the attackers at the Taj Mahal Palace and tower. Shah, the intercepts showed, was directing the attackers almost minute-to-minute”.
The authors have claimed that once the plan was finalized by the ISI, the LeT supreme Hafiz Saeed was contacted and his two key operational commanders Zaki Lakhvi and Abdur Rehman Makki were briefed about the requirements of the Mumbai operation. “They wanted some two dozen men all fresh recruits, to be trained intensively in commando operations hostage taking and mass killing. These men had to be new; the handlers did not want to risk renegades or freelancers among the attackers. They wanted men who would obey them to the tee. They wanted martyrs. They knew none of them would come back alive. The LeT heads were told they had a year to train these recruits”.
The book states that during the training, the Mumbai attack team was briefed extensively about the movement of ships in the sea. “They were told to use boats similar to Indian fishing boats to avoid suspicion and detection. They knew that fishing boats traveled in groups of 50 to 100 and it would be easy to dodge the India Coast Guard and the Indian Navy if enough precautions were taken during the journey. More than 10000 fishing boats travel across the Arabian Sea in a day”, the book concludes.