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    You are at:Home»Syria: Trouble in Damascus

    Syria: Trouble in Damascus

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    By Sarah Akel on 15 March 2008 Uncategorized

    Stratfor Global Intelligence

    Summary

    Syria’s ruling al-Assad family is experiencing an internal struggle, as the Feb. 12 assassination of top Hezbollah commander Imad Mughniyah in Damascus revealed. Syrian allies Iran and Lebanon’s Hezbollah seem to have growing suspicions that certain elements of the Syrian regime might
    have been involved in Mughniyah’s death, and Syrian President Bashar al Assad appears to be building a case against his brother-in-law, the director-general of Syrian intelligence, Asef Shawkat.

    Analysis

    The Feb. 12 assassination of Hezbollah top commander Imad Mughniyah in Damascus has exposed what appears to be a massive power struggle afflicting Syria’s ruling al Assad family. Since the assassination, Stratfor has received reports from a variety of sources that indicate the death of Hezbollah’s most seasoned operative might not have been a surprise to certain elements of the Syrian regime. These suspicions appear to be shared by Syria’s allies Hezbollah and Iran.

    As Stratfor has discussed previously, even if the Israeli Mossad orchestrated the operation to take out Mughniyah, it likely had an inside source – perhaps in Syria’s security apparatus – that facilitated the operation.

    And Hezbollah does not appear to be taking any chances. A reliable source revealed to Stratfor that, in the past week, Hezbollah forces apprehended a group of Syrian concierges working in Beirut’s southern suburbs. The
    concierges were blindfolded, interrogated and released the following morning after they and their families were threatened and told to keep quiet about the incident.

    Hezbollah was supposedly seeking to find out if the concierges knew any details about Mughniyah’s travel to Damascus the night of Feb. 10 – two days before his assassination. According to the source, Hezbollah is highly
    suspicious that elements of Syrian intelligence either assisted in or acquiesced to Mughniyah’s liquidation.

    The extent of Syrian intelligence’s involvement in the Mughniyah assassination could even reach up to the highest echelons of the al Assad family, with Syrian Director-General of Intelligence Assef Shawkat at the
    center of the conspiracy. The stability of the Syrian regime rests upon a delicate balance of close-knit clan relations within the al Assad family, the Alawite religious minority and the underlying rule of the Baath party. Any
    blows to this power structure could spell doom for the government, making it all the more critical for Syrian President Bashar al Assad to adroitly navigate the Byzantine maze of Syrian family politics.

    Shawkat became a part of the al Assad clan through a marriage to Bashar’s sister, Bushra al Assad. Though Bushra and Shawkat faced heavy resistance from the al Assad family when the two eloped, they have since amassed a great deal of power and influence in the al Assad regime, making them a force to be reckoned with in any major family dispute. In
    addition to being a prime suspect in the 2005 assassination of former Lebanese Prime Minister Rafik al-Hariri, Shawkat could have had something to do with the Mughniyah assassination, several signs indicate. Shawkat apparently felt threatened by Mughniyah’s influence within the
    Syrian security apparatus and came to blows with his long-time foe, Maher al Assad, the president’s brother and head of the Republican Guard, over the issue.

    There is an unverified rumor circulating that, prior to his assassination, Mughniyah had informed the Syrian president of meetings held between Shawkat and a CIA officer in a European city, where the two supposedly discussed a strategy for Shawkat to seize control of the regime.
    Al Assad then apparently confronted Bushra about Mughniyah’s allegations, which then prompted Shawkat to organize an operation to take out the Hezbollah commander. Another source claims that Bushra has now moved with her children to Paris and is seeking to relocate to the
    United Arab Emirates for a long sojourn, a possible indication that the major female power broker of the al Assad clan has lost her bid to spare her husband’s political and intelligence career within the ranks of the
    Syrian ruling elite.

    Though the details of these rumors cannot be verified, there appears to be a case building against Shawkat behind the palace walls in Damascus. Stratfor has already learned of rumors of an impending military reshuffle that could very well remove Shawkat and wash the regime’s hands of the
    al-Hariri assassination.

    But Shawkat is unlikely to go quietly into the night, and any attempt to remove him from the Syrian political scene could further complicate the regime’s already intensely bitter power struggle. Similar rifts emerged in the wake of the al-Hariri assassination when former Syrian Vice President Abdul Halim Khaddam and former Interior Minister Ghazi Kenaan schemed to topple the regime. The Syrian president managed to wade his way through that crisis rather adeptly, but this current power struggle reaches
    deep into the al Assad clan. And with Israel signaling that it is readying itself for another showdown with Hezbollah, the clock is ticking for al Assad to get his house in order.

    Syria: Reshuffling its Security Apparatus ?

    Summary

    Syria plans to make major changes in its entire security apparatus soon, Stratfor sources reported Feb. 28. The decision comes after the Feb. 12 assassination of key Hezbollah commander Imad Mughniyah in Damascus— an event that embarrassed Syrian President Bashar al Assad’s regime.
    With pressure coming from several fronts on Syria’s involvement in Lebanon, al Assad might benefit from cleaning house.

    Analysis

    Stratfor sources reported Feb. 28 that Syria plans to reshuffle its entire security apparatus soon in the wake of the Feb. 12 assassination of Hezbollah chief commander Imad Mughniyah. The Syrian regime, which is mightily embarrassed by the Mughniyah hit on Syrian soil, could use the event as an excuse to eliminate several key members of its security
    apparatus, including former head of Syrian intelligence in Lebanon Gen. Rustom Ghazaleh and Jamii Jamii, one of his key assistants — both of whom were likely involved in the February 2005 assassination of former Lebanese Prime Minister Rafik al-Hariri.

    With pressure building on Syria to cut a deal over Lebanon, Syrian President Bashar al Assad might benefit from cleaning house. Syria, Hezbollah and Iran are fighting anaggressive battle in Lebanon to expand Hezbollah’s political power in the Cabinet, ensure the next Lebanese
    president is favorable to Syrian interests and give Syria a clean break from the tribunal for the al-Hariri assassination. A formal removal of figures like Ghazaleh and his deputy could allow al Assad to demonstrate to the West and his regional rivals that his regime is taking concrete action against suspects involved in the murder, potentially paving the way for a broader agreement on the makeup of the Lebanese government.

    Removing Ghazaleh would be largely for show, however. After the Syrian army pulled out of Lebanon in April 2005, the position of chief of intelligence in Lebanon was eliminated. After that, Ghazaleh was essentially put under house arrest and has been running a security office in the town of Rif Dimashq that holds little to no significance.

    Depending on how far this military reshuffle goes, certain complications could arise that could threaten the stability of the al Assad regime. The big question is whether the regime will dare to dismiss Asef Shawkat, the director-general of Syrian military intelligence, who also happens to be the president’s brother-in-law. Shawkat has long butted heads with Maher al Assad, the president’s brother and head of the Republican Guard. Though this information has not been verified, a rumor is circulating that Shawkat could have had something to do with the Mughniyah assassination.

    According to a source, Shawkat was on bad terms with Mughniyah and resented his influence on the Syrian army. Maher, on the other hand, had a very strong relationship with the Hezbollah commander and reportedly had an altercation with Shawkat prior to the assassination. If these rumors are true, the al Assad regime would have an interest in removing Shawkat to shore up the regime’s alliance with Iran and Hezbollah following the Mughniyah assassination.

    But Shawkat is a highly influential member of the Alawite-Baathist regime,and certain factions would not take his removal lightly. Family politics cannot be underestimated in a country like Syria; the al Assad clan is a subset of the Alawite sect, which in turn is a subset of the Syrian branch of the Baath Party. A rupture of any of the major fault lines in the regime could cause serious trouble on the home front. For this very reason, the
    Syrian president will probably not cause any major upsets within the security apparatus. U.S. warships are already parked off the Syrian coast, Saudi Arabia is taking the lead among the Gulf Arabs to isolate the Syrian regime diplomatically, and Israel is giving strong hints that it is looking for a fight with Hezbollah. With so many issues at stake, the Syrian president will need to err on the side of caution in managing family politics.

    Stratfor Global Intelligence

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