The ‘Response Equation’ Between Israel and Hezbollah Is Stretched to Its Limits, but Isn’t Torn Yet

The deadly attack in Majdal Shams isn’t a turning point that justifies an all-out war, but it obliges the sides to respond, even with no strategic benefit. Hezbollah’s response also depends on internal developments in Lebanon, where its own interests and those of Iran lie.

The scope of the Israeli strike at the heart of the Dahiya neighborhood in southern Beirut and the announcement that it targeted the person who planned the attack on Majdal Shams stretches the boundaries of the so-called “response equation” between the two sides, without breaking Israel’s commitment to it.

By the logic of this equation, the deadly attack on Saturday in the northern Israeli Druze village, in which 12 children and teenagers were killed, isn’t considered a strategic turning point that justifies an all-out war. The problem with it is that it compels each side to respond even if it won’t bring any strategic value, and even if it undermines the reason for the equation’s very existence by leading to the war both parties seek to avoid.

For this reason, the discussion over Israel’s response to the attack no longer revolves around whether or not it is even necessary, but only around its appropriate and desired scope.

As a result of these developments, both sides have been engaged in speculation in the last two days, lashing mutual threats and indirectly and unofficially making public their bank of targets. “Commentators” on behalf of Hezbollah have been talking about the group’s ability to strike the city of Haifa, the Golan Heights and the Ramat David military base, while in Israel, there’s talk about the intention and need to hit civilian infrastructure in Lebanon. Some mention Beirut, particularly the Dahiya neighborhood, and Lebanon’s international airport.

At the same time, unprecedented diplomatic pressure was exerted on both Israel and Hezbollah, with intermediaries striving to limit the scope of both sides’ military response.

For instance, Lebanese Foreign Minister Abdallah Bou Habib said that he had held talks with Arab League Secretary-General Ahmed Aboul Gheit, and the foreign ministers of Morocco, Egypt and the European Union, and had received “assurances from international parties that the Israeli response would be limited and wouldn’t affect the Dahiya neighborhood and the Beirut airport.”

Bou Habib didn’t specify who these international parties were, and it’s now clear that he was mistaken, at least concerning the attack on Al-Dahiya. However, by publicly expressing these international assurances, Bou Habib intended to hint at the expected parameters of the Israeli response before it happened.

At the same time, and as part of the same response equation, Iran is creating a declarative “security belt” around Hezbollah aimed at counterbalancing American support of Israel. On Tuesday, Kamal Kharazi, Khamenei’s political advisor, warned of “serious consequences” following the Israeli strike in Beirut, while Iran’s newly sworn-in president Masoud Pezeshkian pledged before Hezbollah’s Deputy Secretary-General Naim Qassem and Islamic Jihad leader Ziad Nakhaleh, both of whom arrived in Tehran for his inauguration, that Iran would continue to support the resistance to Israel and its different arms.

More importantly, however, was the report of Bou Habib’s unusual meeting with Hezbollah’s head of Arab and International Relations, Ammar Al-Moussawi. In the meeting, Bou Habib relayed a demand to the group that it limit the scope of its response following the expected Israeli strike. According to the report, Moussawi responded that Hezbollah’s position is “non-negotiable,” and that the group will “respond according to the nature of the Israeli strike.” In other words, Hezbollah remains committed to the response equation, but has no intention of severing the tie between Gaza and Lebanon and starting its own war with Israel.

This assessment may indicate how Hezbollah will frame Tuesday’s strike: whether it’ll be perceived as yet another escalation requiring a limited response, or as a pretext for a significant expansion of the military campaign against Israel, turning it into an all-out war.

At this point, it’s still unclear whether senior Hezbollah commander Fuad Shukr – also known as Hajj Muhassin – a member of the group’s Jihad Council who was responsible for the group’s military activities, was indeed killed in the strike on Beirut. However, even if Shukr was killed and the Israeli retaliation ends with that, Hezbollah may simply add his name to the list of other senior figures Israel has killed this year.

These include Wissam al-Tawil, the former head of the group’s Radwan Force, and Taleb Sami Abdallah, commander of Hezbollah’s central sector in southern Lebanon, who was described as the highest-ranking commander Israel targeted. Their killings saw intense rocket fire at Israel in retaliation, but it was restricted both in time and scope.

Hezbollah’s expected response is closely related to developments in Lebanon’s internal arena where the group’s political and strategic interests, as well as Iran’s, lie. Earlier this week, the group scored an important win when Lebanese Druze leader Walid Jumblatt – who many expected would express his solidarity with the residents of Majdal Shams by condemning the attack that killed 12 of the village’s children – did the opposite and adopted Hezbollah’s version that denies the group’s involvement in the launch.

Jumblatt warned of “being dragged into the enemy’s destructive mission which seeks to ignite a civil war and divide the region,” adding that “We’ve thwarted the Israeli project in the past, and we’re on guard alongside the resistance [movement]and all who oppose Israel.”

Jumblatt received a special letter of acknowledgment from Hasan Nasrallah following these statements, praising him for his firm stand “against attempts to bring about a civil war” in Lebanon, and thanking him for being “the Arab leader he is” and for “his patriotism and responsibility.”

Jumblatt, who has repeatedly switched his political allegiances throughout his long and variegated career, intends however to extract a double political price for his support of Nasrallah. Jumblatt’s son, Taymour, who has been appointed instead of his father to lead the Progressive Socialist Party – the main political body of the Druze community in Lebanon – has been trying in recent weeks to bring about a political reconciliation that will lead to the appointment of a consensus president. Jumblatt Sr. is seeking an influential role in this process through his connection with Hezbollah.

Jonblatt’s support of Hezbollah is like a poisoned arrow shot in the direction of his bitter rival Wiam Wahab, who is considered Nasrallah’s main Druze ally. Surprisingly it was Wahab who demanded two days ago to thoroughly investigate who was responsible for the rocket launch that resulted in the deaths in Majdal Shams, and didn’t adopt Hezbollah’s version of events. Nasrallah is also well aware that Jonblatt’s support has an expiration date.

The Druze aren’t Hezbollah’s natural supporters, but the group is engaged in a struggle for Lebanese public opinion against the harsh criticism levied at it mainly by Christian and Sunni Muslim leadership. Nasrallah will need to consider Jumblatt’s positions and weigh the extent of the retaliation for Tuesday’s Israeli attack, especially given that the context for it involves the Druze community in the Golan Heights.

Amos Hochstein, President Biden’s special envoy to Lebanon, is also aware of these political complexities. He quickly contacted Jumblatt to warn him about the potential outbreak of a wide-scale war and asked him to try and convince Hezbollah of the need for a limited retaliation. Jumblatt said in an interview with Al-Jazeera, with a certain degree of smugness, that he “knows Hochstein as a mediator and not as someone who threatens.”

The patchwork quilt that fails to conceal the rifts within the Druze community was also revealed in the Golan Heights, when in response to calls in Israel for revenge against Hezbollah following Saturday’s attack, the Druze High Religious Council of the Occupied Syrian Golan issued a harsh statement clarifying that it “rejects the shedding of even a single drop of blood in the name of revenge for the death of our children.”

This isn’t just a humanitarian plea. It reflects the fear that an Israeli attack in Lebanon – which might very well result in the death of innocent people – could be used as a political pretext to act against the Druze community in Lebanon. These are the influential factors involved in Hezbollah’s decision-making processes, and they will play an important role in maintaining the so-called response equation.