By its nature, war is a formative event. Often when war begins, various processes come to an end and are replaced by new ones. The Second Lebanon War is no exception. The campaign that took place in Lebanon and on the Israeli home front had a profound impact on the Israeli and Lebanese sides. The national, political, military, and social consequences of the campaign are evident in both Israel and on the other side of the border. This essay analyzes the effect of the war on Hizbollah’s military doctrine and reviews its rehabilitation process over the last year. In addition, it attempts to identify the characteristics of the next campaign in the Lebanese theater and their significance for the Israel Defense Forces (IDF) and Israel.
Hizbollah’s Military Doctrine before the War
From the end of Operation Grapes of Wrath in April 1996 to the outbreak of the war in July 2006, Hizbollah, assisted closely by Iran, prepared for its next confrontation with Israel. Hizbollah constructed its military power based on several assumptions that were derived from the previous campaigns, as well as from various military and political developments that took place over the years. The organization’s operational doctrine rested on the assumption that Israeli society was weak and incapable of absorbing a large number of casualties. Hizbollah believed that this weakness led to the IDF’s withdrawal from the security zone in May 2000, as expressed by Nasrallah in his victory speech on May 26, 2000 in Bint Jabil, where he compared the strength of Israeli society and the IDF to a spider web.
In order to exploit this perceived weak point, Hizbollah’s main operational goal was to conduct a war of attrition against the Israeli home front. Hizbollah believed that undermining Israel’s resilience would perforce lead to an end to the fighting on terms favorable to the organization. It appears that the main working assumption of the Hizbollah leadership, formulated during previous rounds of fighting against the IDF, was that Israel would confine itself to massive use of airpower and limited ground operations in order to combat the threat of Hizbollah’s rockets. This assumption in turn shaped the design of the organization’s military force. Hizbollah invested most of its efforts in assembling an extensive missile system, including rockets with ranges of over 100 km, under the assumption that Israel would not conduct significant ground operations south of the Litani River. Most of the organization’s operational mass, including an underground system of tunnels and bunkers and relatively limited infantry and anti-tank systems – in addition to the rocket arrays – was concentrated in this area.
Hizbollah’s Military Doctrine in Practice
The Second Lebanon War put Hizbollah’s operational doctrine and its underlying assumptions to the test. From various statements by Nasrallah, it is clear that the timing and intensity of the fighting came as a surprise to the organization’s leadership. At the same time, the operational logic that directed Hizbollah proved militarily correct. From the very beginning of the fighting, Hizbollah maintained a continuous bombardment of Israeli territory in order to wear down the Israeli home front. As Hizbollah had predicted, the IDF countered with massive airpower. Only a few ground-based operations were conducted, and primarily close to the border. The organization’s operational deployment south of the Litani also proved itself, since except for a few cases the IDF did not conduct ground operations beyond this area. At the end of the fighting, Hizbollah was exposed to a large scale operation that included numerous ground and other forces transported by air near the Litani. Nevertheless, this occurred too late to wield any real effect on the organization’s campaign.
It is clear that Hizbollah’s balance statement at the end of the fighting was mixed. Politically, despite its efforts to portray the campaign as a “divine victory,” the organization incurred severe criticism at home. Furthermore, much of its military infrastructure was damaged. Its system of underground tunnels in the border area was exposed and in part destroyed. The organization’s array of defensive outposts on the border and its grip on the area were almost completely eradicated. A large portion of its medium range rocket system (Fadjr rockets and 220 mm and 320 mm rockets) was also destroyed. Above all, the Dahiya quarter in Beirut, the organization’s organizational, military, and political nerve center, was razed. As if that were not enough, Hizbollah’s mass of supporters, most of whom are concentrated in southern Lebanon, suffered heavy losses in property and personnel. It is likely that elements in the Iranian leadership also criticized Hizbollah once it was dragged into a premature violent confrontation with Israel that exposed its strategic capabilities, particularly with regard to rocket launches deep into Israel.
On the other hand, the organization can claim success for its operational doctrine. Its forces inflicted many losses on the IDF in local combat, and above all, Hizbollah never ceased its bombardment of the Israeli home front, even in the face of massive air activity. The organization’s logistical forecasts also proved correct, given its success in preserving a large inventory of ammunition, thereby enabling Hizbollah soldiers to hit Israel with large numbers of rockets during every stage of the fighting (an average of 150-200 rockets per day were fired). From the organization’s perspective, these actions both brought about an end to the fighting and severely shook the “Zionist entity.” From this vantage, the operational balance was positive.
At the same time, a number of weak points in Hizbollah’s operational preparations surfaced. The first of these was the IDF’s success in damaging the organization’s strategic assets – its medium and long range rocket systems. The rapid damage inflicted on this system and the destruction of Hizbollah’s Zelzal rockets in Beirut (an Iranian rocket with a range of 210 km) in the first hours of fighting appears to have been especially painful.[1] Hizbollah’s second weak point was probably the low fitness of its rearguard units. During the fighting, the IDF struck the organization’s centers in Baalbek in the Beqaa valley and carried out several special forces operations in the region. This area was considered Hizbollah’s main logistical staging area, and a key Shiite stronghold. This was probably the background for the dismissal of the regional unit commander responsible for security there. Preparations in other rearguard units also exposed various lapses.[2] In addition, on the tactical level, the multi-barrel rocket launchers (mostly 220 mm launchers) demonstrated poor survivability. According to Israel Air Force reports, most of the launchers that fired rocket barrages at Israel were destroyed shortly after the launch.[3]
Hizbollah’s operational doctrine since the war has been influenced by two principal components: lessons from the war, and the new reality in southern Lebanon following the deployment of the Lebanese armed forces and the reinforcement of UNIFIL in the region. Hizbollah has been taking these two factors into account while rebuilding its forces at an accelerated pace since the war, a process that proceeds with little interference other than isolated exceptions. The transfer of weapons and equipment to the organization in large quantities by Syria and Iran on a weekly basis is a major contribution to the buildup of Hizbollah’s forces and to its military rehabilitation.[4]
The New Reality in Southern Lebanon
On August 11, 2006 the UN Security Council unanimously passed resolution 1701, which ended the Second Lebanon War. The decision, which became effective two days later, was designed to create a new reality in Lebanon, particularly in the south. In this framework, it was decided to disarm the militias in the country, deploy the Lebanese military south of the Litani, and substantially increase UN forces in the region to serve as a supporting force to the Lebanese military. In addition, the transfer of arms to parties in Lebanon other than official governmental entities was banned. This ban was obviously aimed at stopping arms smuggling from Iran and Syria to Hizbollah.
In accordance with the resolution, a relatively large force of approximately 10,000 Lebanese soldiers was deployed, reinforced by over 12,000 UN soldiers from various countries.[5] These forces patrol in southern Lebanon, mostly near the Israeli border, and also occasionally expose weapons caches in the south. In isolated cases, the Lebanese military has also arrested suspected operatives. In general, it appears that the very presence of such large forces in the south complicates Hizbollah’s activity. For this reason, it is likely that this reality has affected the organization in three aspects. One is the rebuilding and manning of its infrastructure (mostly underground) located in open spaces near the border with Israel. Another is carrying out high signature operations, such as the digging of booby traps and new tunnels. A third is maintaining an open military presence on the border itself. Thus according to one report, the presence of the Lebanese military and the UN in the south has forced the organization’s operatives in the region to move about unarmed and in civilian dress. At the same time, their presence is quite evident in area villages.[6]
Overall, it appears that this reality has not effected a substantial change in Hizbollah’s operational doctrine for its next campaign against Israel. Nevertheless, it has led to a number of significant developments:
1. A smaller presence in the area near the border. Some of Hizbollah’s land-based infrastructure remains abandoned, and its presence in open spaces near the border with Israel will certainly be on a smaller scale. From Israel’s viewpoint, the contact line in open space is becoming more remote, and local raids must therefore penetrate more deeply. However, it is possible that more operational and intelligence gathering attention can now be devoted to dealing with problem villages that constitute sources of enemy firepower in the near border area, and to establishing a military presence more quickly and easily in strategic locations near the border.
2. Difficulty in stopping the IDF in the area close to the border. This difficulty is likely to stem from two main sources: an irregular presence by Hizbollah on the border (following the destruction of the organization’s positions), which is likely to disrupt the organization’s intelligence gathering in the north, and difficulty in creating new obstacles and booby traps, given the presence of the UN and Lebanese soldiers near the border.
3. A shift in the operational focus to villages. Instead of open spaces, where Hizbollah fighters probably find it difficult to operate clandestinely, the organization has focused the reconstruction and development of its infrastructure in villages. Thus despite the presence of the large UN force in southern Lebanon, Hizbollah has built an extensive underground infrastructure – mostly in Shiite villages – that includes many bunkers, some of which are equipped with sophisticated communications devices.[7]
Hizbollah’s Post-War Military Deployment
Complementing the influence of the new reality in southern Lebanon are the lessons Hizbollah drew from the war and the information subsequently revealed in Israel. Following the war, Hizbollah undertook an orderly review process, from which it gained many new insights.[8] A lack of information, however, allows only the partial identification of these lessons. Among these, two spheres stand out: the organization’s rocket artillery system, and its ground-based forces (infantry and anti-tank personnel).
The Rocket Artillery System: “Stronger and Deeper”
Overall it appears that Hizbollah regards the performance of its rocket artillery system as a success. Accordingly, buildup of the organization’s force in this context has focused on two areas. The first is the renewal of its inventory of short range rockets (with ranges up to the Haifa line). With massive help from Iran and Syria, Hizbollah has apparently succeeded in restoring the inventory of Katyushas at its disposal. Only a few months after the war, Saudi Arabian sources estimated that the quantity of Katyushas possessed by the organization was equal to the number before the war. Similarly, Israeli security sources estimated the number of Hizbollah’s short range rockets at 10,000-20,000.[9] In other words: in the next campaign, the north of Israel, up to the Haifa-Tiberias line, will once again be vulnerable to bombardment by large numbers of Katyushas.
Hizbollah’s second area of focus of military buildup is renewal and upgrading of its long range rocket system. This system aims to deter Israel from initiating hostilities, and once begun, to deter it from bombing Beirut. Another objective is to constitute a strategic weapon – a means of attacking Israel’s “soft underbelly” (the central Gush Dan region). In the Second Lebanon War, this system did not achieve its objectives (neither did it deter Israel from initiating the fighting or from damaging the organization’s centers in Beirut, nor did it succeed in achieving even symbolic damage in the Gush Dan region). Furthermore, a large portion of the system was damaged already in the initial stages of the war. Following the war, Hizbollah therefore began an accelerated process of procuring long range rockets.[10] Hizbollah’s first move was to restore the inventory of Syrian (220 mm and 302 mm) and Iranian (Fadjr 3.5) rockets that it possessed before the war. In addition, it has apparently managed to upgrade this strategic system with Iranian Fateh 110 missiles, which have a range of 250 km.[11] This system of rockets and missiles is not confined to the south; according to Lebanese sources, it is also deployed north of the Litani, in the Beqaa valley, to the east,[12] and, it is reasonable to assume, in the Beirut region (similar to the deployment of the Zelzal launchers in the previous war).
This state of affairs suggests that in the next round of fighting against Hizbollah:
1. Larger areas in Israel are under threat of missile attacks. In the course of the next war, the Gush Dan region in particular and the central region in general will be more exposed to missile fire.
2. The potential risk to sensitive installations behind Israel’s front lines is greater. Fateh 110 missiles are relatively accurate (CEP 10m). If Hizbollah has indeed obtained such missiles, this will significantly improve its capability of hitting sensitive targets within Israel: enterprises, infrastructure installations, military bases, hospitals, and so on.
3. The IDF faces additional difficulties in dealing with the threat of missiles and rockets. In the next war, the IDF will face a more complex challenge in dealing with long range rocket/missile launchers, for two main reasons. The first is that the geographically broad deployment of the launching platforms (the Beqaa valley, southern Lebanon, and the Beirut region) will oblige the Israel Air Force to disperse its collection and attack platforms over a wider area. The second is that the IDF will be dealing with a greater number of launchers, most of which are disposable. Since the IDF had great success in the last war in destroying multi-barrel rocket launchers (due to their high signature), it is probable that Hizbollah will rely on single-barrel launchers that can be used only once. It can therefore be assumed that Hizbollah will have a greater number of launchers, while an individual launcher will have little operational importance.
The Ground Campaign: “From an Aerial Effort to a Ground Maneuver”
Before the last war, Hizbollah’s principal working assumption was that the IDF would not conduct a broad ground campaign in Lebanon (or as a last resort only). This assumption indeed proved correct during most stages of the fighting. Nevertheless, two factors combined to undermine it.
1. The ground operation begun by the IDF in the final days of the fighting. The landing of large forces near the Litani River and the entry of large ground forces from the Israeli border demonstrated to Hizbollah the IDF’s capability in this sphere, and raised the possibility that this type of operation will be a more viable option in the next war.
2. The exposure of the IDF’s operational plans. In the context of the post-war public debate in Israel, many particulars about the IDF’s plans for a broad ground operation in Lebanon emerged. Also exposed in this context was the IDF’s “Marom Water” plan, its order of battle (three divisions), and its operational conception: a widespread ground operation, combining attacks from a number of directions, in order to take control of the area between the Litani and the border, with an option of taking over the Nabatiyeh heights (the largest and most important Shiite center in Lebanon north of the Litani).[13]
Given Hizbollah’s new assessment of the likelihood of an Israeli ground operation, the organization has begun more substantial preparations for this scenario. First, Hizbollah has apparently reinforced its military presence north of the Litani. In this framework, it is expanding its existing infrastructure and is also building new fortifications and “nature reserves” (also called “defense pockets”) – a type of military field base designed to facilitate protected fighting and rocket fire from outside villages and built-up areas. Furthermore, one report indicated that as part of the new preparations north of the Litani, Hizbollah was apparently buying land in Christian and Druze areas in order to strengthen the Shiite presence in this region. This is probably designed to enable Hizbollah fighters to operate in a safer and friendlier environment. The same report also names the small Christian village of Qotrani, located on a road leading to the Beqaa valley, as one of the villages in which a large area was purchased.[14] If so, it suggests that Hizbollah is also preparing for the possibility that the IDF will conduct a more extensive ground campaign in the next war in southern Lebanon and possibly a deeper one as well in the direction of the Beqaa valley.
Second, Hizbollah has strengthened its anti-tank deployment. During the war, several dozen Israeli tanks were hit by anti-tank fire. Although no great damage was done to some of them, the model of missile used by Hizbollah (the Russian-make Kornet and Metis) demonstrated their destructive capacities. In some cases, these missiles even penetrated the Merkava Mk 4 tank, considered the best armored tank in the world. It appears that in some of its preparations for a prospective Israeli ground maneuver, Hizbollah began receiving large quantities of advanced anti-tank missiles after the war. Damascus is delivering these Russian-manufactured missiles to the organization. Furthermore, the fact that Syria concluded a large anti-tank missile transaction with Russia at the beginning of the year means that it will probably enable Hizbollah to upgrade and expand its anti-tank system significantly.[15]
Third, Hizbollah has strengthened its combat theater frameworks. As a rule, Hizbollah deploys in a theater unit, i.e., military units responsible for a specific area. For example, a unit called Netzer (“victory”) is deployed in the geographic area between Israel and the Litani River, and two other theater units are deployed north of the Litani and in the Beqaa valley.[16] It is quite likely that following Hizbollah’s perceptions of future IDF actions, the theater-sector battle formations will be substantially strengthened at both the headquarter level (e.g., fleshing out the command apparatus in the village) and the fighting unit level (increasing the number of anti-tank squads, allocating more resources, and so on). Although information is hard to obtain, this development seems a given, in light of the change in the way Hizbollah regards Israel’s moves in the next war.
The significance of all this for the IDF is clear. In the next war, Hizbollah will be better prepared and more ready doctrinally, vis-à-vis its ground infrastructure and in the weapons that it possesses for an Israeli ground campaign, even deep within Lebanon (north of the Litani and beyond).
Hizbollah’s Deployment Difficulties
Hizbollah’s process of military rehabilitation is relatively rapid, particularly given the heavy flow of weapons to the organization from Iran and Syria. At the same time, it appears that the organization has encountered a number of difficulties in its renewed deployment against Israel. The first and probably central difficulty is replenishing its ranks. During the Second Lebanon War, the organization lost several hundred of its soldiers (estimates vary between 250 and 600 dead, or even more).[17] The process of recruiting and training a Hizbollah soldier takes many years, and includes protracted indoctrination periods and grueling training. The organization’s soldiers are chosen in a lengthy process from young Shiites on the basis of their moral behavior and dedication to religious principles.[18] Due to the prolonged training process, and perhaps also as a result of a drop in motivation to join its ranks, it appears that Hizbollah is having trouble replacing the manpower that it lost in the war. This would explain the acceptance of former Amal members – Hizbollah’s Shiite competition – into the organization’s ranks, as well as the acceptance of Sunni volunteers[19] and underage Shiites.[20] Lack of technical and trained manpower may have been the reason why Syria agreed to Iran’s suggestion to become more involved in managing Hizbollah’s long range rocket system.[21]
A second difficulty likely concerns the undermining of Iran’s absolute confidence in Hizbollah’s leadership. It appears that the “adventure” into which Nasrallah dragged his organization and all of Lebanon angered many in Tehran. The war damaged the organization’s military, human, and political infrastructure. Worse, it exposed to public view the strategic weapons in its possession. From an Iranian perspective, these long range rockets were probably designated for use as a response to an Israeli or American attack on its soil, not for exchanges of fire between Hizbollah and the IDF. As such, the Iranian leadership may be seeking to increase its supervision of Hizbollah’s leadership, and has even deployed new command and control systems in Lebanon for this purpose. Placing Iranian officers at the organization’s various field levels also may in part also signal this process.[22]
These difficulties join the complications presented by the presence of UN and Lebanese forces on the border with Israel. Furthermore, Hizbollah faces an uphill battle in reestablishing the organization’s center in the Dahiya neighborhood. Its destruction was a severe blow to the organization’s infrastructure, and during the long reconstruction period, Hizbollah will have to operate from temporary headquarters and safe havens.
The Next War in the Lebanese Theater
Although the deployment of Lebanese and UNIFIL forces in southern Lebanon has had relatively little effect on Hizbollah’s military deployment and recovery of its military capabilities, the organization has had trouble maintaining an open military presence on the border, and many of its positions and much of its infrastructure in the region were destroyed or abandoned. In place of the operational area it lost near to the contact line with Israel, the organization began reinforcing deep within southern Lebanon and beyond the Litani. In the next campaign, therefore, the organization will have a more limited presence on the border, which will allow the IDF some freedom of action in Lebanon near the fence. However, Hizbollah operatives are still maintaining a massive military presence (albeit more cautious and clandestine) in the villages in the south, particularly those with Shiite residents.
However, the most urgent issue is the organization’s connection with Syria and Iran, which are Hizbollah’s financial, logistical, and military lifeline. With their assistance, the organization is rapidly rebuilding the military capabilities damaged in the war. Herein lies the urgent imperative of diplomatic activity, either with or instead of military force. Without an end to the Hizbollah-Syria/Iran connection, the depth and extent of Israeli military activity appears almost unimportant, since in any case, Hizbollah will rebuild its strength within a few months once the fighting ends. The fact that the organization in effect represents most Shiites in Lebanon gives it a reliable political and social base, beyond the purely military sphere. In practice, the failure of Israel, the Lebanese government, and the international community to sever the link between Hizbollah and its Syrian and Iranian patrons through either military and diplomatic means complicates any attempt to create a different reality in Lebanon, especially in southern Lebanon.
To date, Hizbollah has succeeded in substantial military rehabilitation and preparations for the future. The next campaign with Hizbollah is expected to resemble the previous one to some degree: missile bombardment of the Israeli home front, a heavy Israeli air response, and possibly a more extensive ground operation than in the past. Despite Hizbollah’s massive rebuilding process, its understanding of this operational doctrine is likely to enable the IDF to cope better with the organization in the next war. Specifically, a number of planning directions likely to upset the operational balance can be cited.
War is composed of a number of dimensions: space, time, targets, methods of warfare, and tactical means. The organization can be confronted with new responses in each one of these dimensions.
1. Space and time. Hizbollah must be taken by surprise, at least at the beginning of the fighting. An attack must include most of the organization’s physical assets: its headquarters, bases, and the homes of senior operatives. The fighting itself should take place during the day in order to generate as many points of friction as possible between IDF soldiers, most of whom are more highly skilled, and Hizbollah soldiers. The land battlefield should include not only the south, but regions in which the organization does not expect a substantial Israeli ground entry, such as Baalbek and Beirut itself. These regions must be subjected to some kind of Israeli ground attack in the initial stages of the confrontation.
2. Targets. This is perhaps the most significant aspect. The IDF’s lack of success in the preceding war in Lebanon in striking the organization’s senior command, let alone its political leadership, revealed an important weakness. Furthermore, the fact that Hizbollah managed to time its rocket fire (increasing and decreasing it) during every stage of the fighting showed that the organization’s command and control apparatus was not substantially damaged. Israel’s intelligence effort must therefore focus on the targets, so that in the next campaign against the organization, both the senior command staff and the control centers in southern Lebanon and elsewhere can be neutralized. Another type of target that must be addressed is the Lebanese state infrastructure. In the preceding war, these targets were off limits. At the same time, attacking some of them, for example electricity and fuel in certain regions, is likely to render it difficult for Hizbollah to conduct a regular campaign, and will certainly have this effect if the fighting is prolonged.
3. Methods of warfare. In addition to the entry of masses of infantry and armor, new and original methods should be developed, mainly in order to deal with the extensive deployment of rockets and its dispersal throughout Lebanon. For example, the more remote launching areas (Beqaa valley, Beirut region) can be saturated with small forces – special teams – with intelligence capacities and independent firepower, perhaps like those used by the British and Americans in Afghanistan and western Iraq in the 1991 Gulf War. The air force will probably find it difficult to provide an effective response by itself to all the launching areas.
4. Tactical means. This sphere is quite complicated and requires separate analysis, but certainly here Israel will have to devise surprises, for example, a means that will provide a better way of dealing with the organization’s deployment in open areas, locate rockets before they are fired, pinpoint and destroy headquarters and control centers, and other such measures.
In conclusion, the recent war in Lebanon revealed not only the IDF’s lack of preparedness for dealing with Hizbollah, but also its lack of success in preparing for the different type of war that can be expected in the region in the future: a struggle against an enemy that partly lacks the familiar form of squad and battalion, battle theaters saturated with anti-tank weapons, and fighting that takes place simultaneously at the front and in the rear. This aspect actually constitutes an opportunity for the IDF not only to comprehend the nature of the coming campaigns in principle, but first and foremost to assimilate the changes taking place in the nature of this warfare, and prepare more effectively on both doctrinal and operational levels.
[1] For example, the Israel Air Force reported that in an attack close to the city, it had destroyed a Zelzal launcher mounted on a truck. Note, however, that the extent of the damage to this system is not clear. According to statements by IDF Deputy Chief of Staff Moshe Kaplinsky (July 18, 2006), the IDF destroyed ten launchers of this type during the fighting. In any case, it is clear that the organization regarded the very fact of exposure of this rocket system as a failure. See interview with Kaplinksy on IDF Radio on July 18, 2006, quoted here .
[2] Ze’ev Schiff, “Hizbollah Commanders Also Dismissed After the War,” Haaretz, November 29, 2006.
[3] For example, see Hanan Greenberg, “Lebanon: The IDF Attacked Two Rocket Launchers in the Tzur Region,” Ynet, June 23, 2006, and the daily summary its attacks in Lebanon on the Israel Air Force website – for example see here.
[4] Yoav Stern, “The UN: The Lebanese Army has Arrested Three Hezbollah Operatives since the Ceasefire,” Haaretz, December 3, 2006; Yoav Stern, “Military Source: The Organization Cannot Strike Everywhere,” Haaretz, July 24, 2007; “Middle East Newsline, Morning Report” 9, no. 27, January 19, 2007.
[5] Israel Intelligence Heritage and Commemoration Center, “One Year After the 2nd Lebanese War,” August 12, 2007.
[6] Nicholas Blanford, “Hezbollah Regroups in a New Mountain Stronghold,” The Times, February 26, 2007.
[7] Uzi Mahnaimi, “Hezbollah Has Stockpiled Rockets on Israeli Border,” Sunday Times, June 10, 2007.
[8] For example, see Schiff, “Hizbollah Commanders Also Dismissed”; AP, “Hezbollah No. 2: We Learned Lessons from the War,” Ynet, April 11, 2007.
[9] Ze’ev Schiff, “Rice to Israel: Avoid Even Preliminary Feelers with the Syrian Leadership,” Haaretz, February 25, 2007; “Hizbollah Has Rehabilitated its Force,” nrg-Maariv, November 25, 2006 ; Mahnaimi, “Hezbollah has Stockpiled Rockets.”
[10] Amos Harel, “Deputy IDF Chief of Staff Moshe Kaplinsky: Iran Will Achieve Nuclear Capability in the Near Future,” Haaretz, December 10, 2006.
[11] Mahnaimi, “Hezbollah has Stockpiled Rockets,” quotes Israeli intelligence sources. See also comment by Lebanese military intelligence commander George Khoury concerning Hizbollah’s possession of 250 km range missiles, al-Akhbar, October 4, 2007. The Lebanese forces website reports that that Hizbollah has not only 210 km range Zelzal 2 missiles, but also Zelzal 3 (Fateh 110) missiles. See “The Christian Owners are Barred from Entering their Land in Jezzine and the Surrounding Area,” August 26, 2007.
[12] Roni Nachmias, “Hizbollah Deputy Secretary-General: Prepared for an Israeli Attack,” Ynet, May 5, 2007.
[13] For examples of the exposure of the IDF ground plan in the Israeli press, see Amos Harel and Avi Issacharoff, “First Publication: General Staff Discussions in the Lebanon War,” Haaretz, January 23, 2007; Ze’ev Schiff, “War, and How,” Haaretz, February 23, 2007; Lior Estlane, “Death in Injury Time,” Haaretz, May 22, 2007; an interview with the Northern Command deputy commander, who was responsible for formulating the plan, was also published in Yediot Ahronot, including many details about the IDF’s plans in this sphere.
[14] Nicholas Blanford, “The Times,” “Hezbollah Regroups in a New Mountain Stronghold,” February 26, 2007. See also Ze’ev Schiff, “Who has the Strength to Wage War in the Summer?” Haaretz, May 18, 2007. A report on construction north of the Litani can also be found in Andrew Exum, “Hezbollah’s Big Surprise and the Litani Line,” Washington Policy Institute,” Watch No. 1276, August 21, 2007. The Lebanese Forces website reports that closed military areas have been set up deep within South Lebanon – Jezzine and its surroundings. See “Jezzine Land and the Surrounding Areas are Off-Limits to their Christian Owners,” August 26, 2007.
[15] Mahnaimi, “Hezbollah has Stockpiled Rockets”; Amos Harel and Aluf Benn, “Syria is Close to Concluding the Purchase of Thousands of Anti-Tank Missiles from Russia,” Haaretz, February 22, 2007.
[16] Schiff, “Hizbollah Commanders Also Dismissed.”
[17] According to IDF figures published in the media, Hizbollah lost approximately one tenth of its force – about 600 soldiers. See Amos Harel, “Israel IDF Intelligence: An Iranian Nuclear Capacity in mid-2009,” Haaretz, July 11, 2007.
[18] Ghaith Abdul-Ahad, “Out of the Ashes,” The Guardian, March 24, 2007.
[19] Ze’ev Schiff, “Who has the Strength to Wage War in the Summer?” Haaretz, May 18, 2007.
[20] Harel, “An Iranian Nuclear Capacity in mid-2009.”
[21] Ze’ev Schiff, “Rice to Israel: Avoid Even Preliminary Feelers with the Syrian Leadership,” Haaretz, February 25, 2007.
[22] Middle East Newsline, “Iran Clamps Down on Hezbollah,” Morning Report 9 no. 5, March 2, 2007; nrg-Maariv, “Hezbollah has Rehabilitated its Force,” November 25, 2006.
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