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Abdullah Öcalan’s call for the dissolution of the PKK and an end to armed struggle presents significant legal, security, and geopolitical challenges. How does this declaration align with Türkiye’s constitutional framework, counterterrorism policies, and historical peace efforts? What are its implications for regional security dynamics, particularly regarding the PYD/YPG in Syria? Could this development pave the way for genuine disarmament, or will it merely shift the conflict to a different front? Understanding the broader impact of Öcalan’s statement requires an in-depth analysis of Türkiye’s national security strategy, the potential consequences of PKK disbandment, and the evolving role of external actors in the region.
Türkiye’s long-standing Kurdish issue has reached a critical juncture with Abdullah Öcalan’s call for the PKK’s dissolution and the cessation of armed struggle. While this statement could signify a historic shift, it also brings forth complex legal, security, and geopolitical challenges. Given Türkiye’s unitary state structure, counterterrorism policies, and regional security concerns, any peace initiative involving PKK disarmament must be carefully evaluated within a broader strategic framework.
Key Questions:
• Can the PKK dissolve without addressing the PYD/YPG issue in Syria?
• Would the U.S. accept PYD/YPG disarmament?
• Would Türkiye’s security establishment consider disarmament viable if the PKK’s Syrian branch remains armed?
• How do past peace processes inform the potential success or failure of this initiative?
From a legal standpoint, Türkiye’s constitutional framework, particularly the first four articles, strictly upholds the unitary state principle, prohibiting any move toward separatism. Thus, PKK’s transformation into a political entity must align with these legal constraints. At the same time, counterterrorism laws pose challenges to reintegration efforts, raising questions about accountability for past crimes and potential amnesty mechanisms.
From a security perspective, the PKK has been militarily weakened within Türkiye due to the successful operations of the Turkish Armed Forces (TSK) and intelligence agencies (MİT). However, the PYD/YPG’s continued armed presence in Syria complicates the picture, as its leadership has hinted that disarmament is conditional on gaining political legitimacy. Would the U.S. accept such a deal? If not, how would that impact Türkiye’s willingness to negotiate with the PKK?
From a geopolitical perspective, the PYD/YPG remains a key U.S. partner in Syria, despite Türkiye’s repeated demands for Washington to sever ties. If the PKK disbands while the PYD/YPG remains militarily active, Türkiye’s security apparatus will likely reject any peace initiative, viewing it as a tactical deception rather than a genuine end to armed struggle.
I will try to explore these dimensions, incorporating the PYD/YPG factor, U.S. policy considerations, and past peace processes, to assess the feasibility of PKK disarmament and its implications for Türkiye’s security and regional stability.
1. Legal and constitutional considerations
1.1 Türkiye’s Constitutional Constraints
Türkiye’s Constitution explicitly defines the indivisibility of the state and the nation within its first four articles, which are unchangeable. This means that any disarmament or reintegration process must comply with the following:
• No regional autonomy or federalist structures (PKK’s past demands must be abandoned).
• Strict adherence to the official language policy (Kurdish can be recognized in cultural contexts but not as an official state language).
• No parallel governance structures (PYD’s governance model in Syria cannot be replicated in Türkiye).
This raises the question: Can the PKK dissolve while maintaining ideological and organizational ties with the PYD/YPG? If not, how would the state ensure that disarmament does not merely shift the struggle to Syria?
1.2 Counterterrorism laws and amnesty dilemma
Under Türkiye’s anti-terror laws (TMK & TCK), PKK members face severe legal consequences, making reintegration difficult. The 2014 Resolution Process Law (6551) provided limited legal protection for peace negotiations, but it lacked a comprehensive amnesty or reintegration mechanism. Any new process must address:
• Selective Amnesty: Would PKK leaders face prosecution while lower-ranking members receive clemency?
• Transitional Justice: How would victims of PKK attacks be compensated while ensuring reconciliation?
• Monitoring Mechanisms: Would Türkiye allow international oversight, or would it insist on exclusive state control?
If the PKK dissolves but its Syrian branch remains armed, Türkiye’s security establishment may see any amnesty arrangement as premature or even dangerous.
2. Security and military considerations
2.1 The PKK’s military decline and the role of the PYD/YPG
The PKK has suffered significant losses due to Türkiye’s military operations and intelligence efforts, leading to a weakened operational presence within the country. However, its Syrian affiliate (PYD/YPG) remains intact, raising major concerns:
• Would disarmed PKK members simply relocate to Syria and continue the struggle under the YPG’s banner?
• Would the PKK truly dissolve, or would it operate through PYD/YPG-controlled areas in Northern Syria?
• Could the YPG eventually become an “alternative PKK,” keeping the armed struggle alive under a different name?
Türkiye’s military leadership remains skeptical, fearing that disarmament without PYD/YPG compliance would be a trap rather than a genuine step toward peace.
2.2 US policy and the PYD/YPG question: A geopolitical dilemma
The United States’ long-standing support for the YPG-led Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) has been a major point of contention between Washington and Ankara. While the U.S. officially designates the PKK as a terrorist organization, it does not recognize the PYD/YPG as part of the PKK, despite overwhelming evidence of ideological, logistical, and operational ties. This divergence in classification has been one of the primary obstacles in U.S.-Türkiye relations.
The central question remains: Would Washington accept a disarmament plan for the YPG if a political settlement were offered? Several key factors suggest that such a scenario is unlikely under current circumstances:
A- Strategic U.S. Interests: The YPG as a Regional Asset in Post-Assad Syria
With the Assad regime no longer in power, Syria has entered a new era of fragmented governance, shifting alliances, and ongoing power struggles among various factions. In this volatile environment, the YPG remains Washington’s primary military proxy, serving as a key player in the evolving balance of power. The group continues to act as a buffer against Iranian expansion, a counterweight to Russian-backed factions, and a means for the U.S. to maintain influence over Syria’s fractured political landscape.
The collapse of Assad’s rule has fundamentally altered the U.S. strategic calculus in Syria. Instead of merely using the YPG to pressure the former regime, Washington now faces a broader challenge: securing long-term influence in a post-Assad Syria while preventing a full-scale power vacuum that could be exploited by Iran, Russia, or extremist groups.
The U.S. is left with limited options:
• Strengthening its partnership with Türkiye—a difficult prospect given years of mistrust and Ankara’s demand for the dismantling of YPG-controlled structures in northern Syria.
• Forging new alliances within Syria’s opposition factions, a challenge made even more complex by their internal divisions and external dependencies.
• Doubling down on support for the YPG, potentially transforming it from a tactical military asset into a more formalized governance entity in northeastern Syria.
From a Pentagon and CENTCOM perspective, maintaining support for the YPG remains the most viable short-term strategy for ensuring U.S. influence without committing large-scale ground forces. However, in a post-Assad Syria, the long-term sustainability of the YPG as a U.S. ally is increasingly uncertain. The group’s ambitions for political autonomy, its ideological ties to the PKK, and Türkiye’s persistent opposition make it a source of geopolitical friction.
Without a viable alternative force to stabilize northeastern Syria, Washington is unlikely to abandon the YPG anytime soon. However, as regional dynamics continue to shift, the U.S. will eventually have to confront the reality that its reliance on a single faction in a deeply fragmented Syria may not be a sustainable strategy.
B- Congressional support for the SDF and the internal political landscape
The U.S. Congress has demonstrated bipartisan support for the SDF/YPG, largely due to:
• The YPG’s role in defeating ISIS (a narrative widely promoted in Washington).
• Lobbying efforts by Kurdish political groups, which have successfully framed the SDF as a pro-democracy, secular force in the region.
• Skepticism toward Türkiye’s regional policies, particularly after Ankara’s closer ties with Russia (e.g., the S-400 deal) and its independent foreign policy stance.
Any U.S. move to cut ties with the YPG would face strong resistance from Congress, particularly from policymakers who view Türkiye as an unreliable ally and see the SDF as a stabilizing force in an otherwise chaotic Syria.
C- Türkiye’s demands vs. US policy: A stalemate in Washington-Ankara relations
Türkiye has repeatedly demanded that Washington:
• End military and political support for the YPG.
• Recognize the PYD/YPG as an extension of the PKK.
• Ensure that U.S.-supplied weapons to the SDF do not end up in PKK hands.
However, Washington has consistently refused these demands. Even during periods of closer U.S.-Türkiye cooperation (e.g., during Trump’s presidency), the U.S. maintained its support for the YPG under the pretext of counterterrorism operations against ISIS.
In response, Türkiye has:
• Increased its military operations in Syria, particularly targeting YPG positions in Northern Syria.
• Strengthened its counterterrorism strategy inside Iraq, pressuring PKK strongholds in the Qandil Mountains.
• Expanded military partnerships with regional actors, including Iran and Russia, to counterbalance U.S. influence.
The core issue: would the US allow the PYD/YPG to disarm?
A disarmament process for the PKK inside Türkiye is meaningless if the YPG remains militarized in Syria. From Ankara’s perspective, any disarmament agreement that excludes the YPG/SDF would be a temporary and deceptive maneuver. Key concerns include:
• Could disarmed PKK militants simply shift to the YPG and continue their activities under a different name?
• Would Washington accept a security arrangement that includes dismantling YPG forces?
• If the U.S. refuses to disengage from the YPG, would Türkiye escalate military operations in Syria?
Possible Scenarios:
1. U.S. gradually reduces support, forcing PYD/YPG to seek a settlement
• If Washington prioritizes its strategic relations with Türkiye, it could reduce military aid to the YPG and encourage it to enter a political framework within Syria.
• This, however, would require diplomatic guarantees from Türkiye and possibly a negotiated agreement involving regional actors.
2. U.S. maintains full support, leading to increased Turkish military action
• If the U.S. refuses to disengage, Türkiye will likely intensify military operations in Northern Syria, targeting YPG-held territories.
• This could result in direct U.S.-Türkiye confrontations, further damaging NATO cohesion.
3. A compromise deal where the YPG is integrated into a new Syrian security structure
• The U.S. could propose that the YPG transitions into a non-military political entity under a new Syrian security framework, reducing Türkiye’s security concerns.
• However, such an arrangement would require cooperation from multiple actors, including the remnants of the Assad regime and local Arab tribal forces.
US support for the PYD/YPG remains the biggest obstacle
Without a clear U.S. policy shift regarding the YPG, any PKK disarmament plan will likely be seen as incomplete and potentially deceptive by Türkiye. Ankara will not accept any peace initiative that allows the YPG to remain militarized, as this would simply shift the conflict’s center of gravity to Syria.
The future of PKK disarmament in Türkiye is, therefore, directly linked to the U.S.-Türkiye-YPG triangle. Unless Washington reconsiders its strategic dependency on the YPG, any attempt at peace will remain politically fragile and strategically unsustainable.
3. Lessons from past peace processes
The PKK’s internal divisions, shifting geopolitical dynamics, Türkiye’s domestic political landscape, and broader security concerns all contributed to the collapse of negotiations. Moreover, FETÖ was not only embedded within MİT but had infiltrated nearly all branches of the state apparatus, from the judiciary and military to law enforcement and bureaucracy.
3.1 Key failures in previous attempts: lessons from past peace processes and institutional sabotage
Türkiye has pursued multiple peace initiatives with the PKK, yet none have resulted in a lasting resolution. Each effort failed due to a combination of political miscalculations, internal divisions within both the PKK and the state, shifting regional dynamics, and security concerns. Among these failures, the influence of FETÖ, though not the sole reason, played a disruptive role, particularly in the Oslo Talks (2009–2011) and the 2013–2015 Solution Process. However, beyond FETÖ’s interference, wider systemic issues—including PKK’s strategic miscalculations, Türkiye’s evolving security doctrine, and external geopolitical shifts—were also key determinants of failure.
1. The Oslo Talks (2009–2011) – A Secretly Negotiated Peace Process Undermined by Sabotage and Mistrust
Between 2009 and 2011, the first structured peace negotiations between the Turkish government and PKK representatives were conducted in Oslo, Norway, under Norwegian mediation. The talks aimed to:
• Secure a PKK ceasefire and withdrawal from Türkiye.
• Define a legal framework for disarmament and reintegration.
• Develop constitutional reforms addressing cultural and political rights.
Despite early progress, the Oslo Talks collapsed in 2011 due to:
1. The Leaked Recordings Scandal (2011)
• Secret audio recordings of the talks were leaked, damaging public trust and fueling political backlash.
• The opposition (MHP, CHP) accused the government of “negotiating with terrorists”, forcing the AK Party into a defensive position.
• The leaks created deep suspicion between the state and the PKK, with each side questioning the other’s intentions.
2. Escalation of PKK Attacks
• While negotiations were ongoing, the PKK continued its armed activities, leading to skepticism within Türkiye’s security institutions.
• In July 2011, PKK fighters killed 13 Turkish soldiers in Silvan, intensifying domestic political pressure to abandon peace efforts.
3. Institutional Fragmentation and FETÖ’s Influence
• FETÖ had infiltrated not only MİT but also the judiciary, law enforcement, and military intelligence, allowing it to influence both security assessments and media narratives.
• FETÖ-linked elements in the judiciary later attempted to arrest MİT Undersecretary Hakan Fidan (2012), citing his role in the Oslo Talks, which was widely seen as an attempt to sabotage peace efforts and undermine the intelligence leadership.
While FETÖ played a role in undermining Oslo, the broader issue was that the negotiations lacked transparency, political consensus, and institutional alignment. The collapse of Oslo Talks set the stage for a more structured peace initiative in 2013, which would ultimately face similar challenges.
2. The 2013–2015 Solution Process: A grand strategy disrupted by urban warfare, political shifts, and geopolitical realities
Following the Oslo failure, direct peace talks resumed in 2013, leading to the most ambitious peace effort in Türkiye’s history.
2.1 The core framework of the solution process
• Direct negotiations between the Turkish government and Öcalan, with third-party mediators.
• A declared PKK ceasefire in March 2013 and a partial withdrawal of PKK militants from Türkiye.
• Proposed legal and constitutional reforms to accommodate Kurdish political demands.
By 2015, however, the process collapsed, driven by several key developments.
2.2 Why did the solution process fail?
1. The rise of urban warfare (Hendek Strategy) and PKK’s strategic miscalculation
• PKK-affiliated youth gangs (YDG-H) launched armed urban uprisings, digging trenches and establishing barricades in major Kurdish-populated cities.
• These urban conflicts eroded state trust in the PKK’s commitment to peace, leading to a massive military crackdown in Cizre, Sur, and Nusaybin.
2. The rise of the PYD/YPG in Syria and shifting geopolitics
• The Syrian Civil War (2011–present) and the rise of the PYD/YPG changed the strategic calculus.
• With U.S. military support, the YPG established a de facto autonomous region in Northern Syria, creating a regional power shift that emboldened PKK elements.
• Türkiye viewed the PKK as using the peace process as a cover to consolidate power through the PYD/YPG, making Ankara less willing to continue negotiations.
3. The role of FETÖ in sabotaging the process
• FETÖ-linked security personnel manipulated intelligence reports, presenting exaggerated threats of PKK rearmament, creating distrust within the state.
• FETÖ’s infiltration into law enforcement facilitated the unchecked flow of arms into PKK-affiliated urban strongholds, exacerbating the Hendek urban warfare crisis.
• The Suruç bombing (July 2015), blamed on ISIS, is believed to have involved FETÖ-linked security failures, triggering renewed PKK-state hostilities.
• FETÖ-controlled media and judicial elements sought to frame state officials as “collaborators with terrorists”, fueling nationalist backlash and destroying public support for peace efforts.
4. Political shifts and the November 2015 elections
• The June 2015 elections saw the pro-Kurdish HDP (Peoples’ Democratic Party) gain historic support, preventing the AK Party from forming a majority government.
• As political instability grew, the AK Party shifted toward a more nationalist discourse, eventually regaining a parliamentary majority in November 2015.
• The collapse of peace talks coincided with a realignment of Türkiye’s domestic politics, where the AK Party forged closer alliances with the MHP and adopted a harder stance against the PKK.
Why have peace efforts failed?
The Oslo Talks and the Solution Process both failed due to a combination of structural, political, and geopolitical factors:
Key Lessons:
1. PKK miscalculations (urban warfare and the YPG factor) undermined the credibility of the peace process.
2. Türkiye’s political shifts, particularly electoral realignments, influenced the durability of negotiations.
3. FETÖ actively sabotaged state institutions and intelligence operations, increasing mutual distrust.
4. External actors (the U.S.’s support for the YPG) created new strategic concerns, making Ankara more resistant to peace efforts.
5. Institutional coordination within the Turkish state was lacking, leading to conflicting strategies between political leadership, the military, and intelligence services.
Can another peace attempt succeed?
While FETÖ’s purge from state institutions after 2016 removed one major source of sabotage, future peace efforts must address:
• The PYD/YPG’s military role in Syria.
• Stronger institutional alignment within Türkiye’s security apparatus.
• A carefully managed political messaging strategy to prevent nationalist backlash.
Without correcting these historical failures, any new peace process risks repeating the same mistakes and leading to further cycles of conflict.
3.2 The PYD/YPG factor in the current process
Unlike past peace processes, the 2024-2025 scenario includes a powerful PKK-linked entity in Syria. Lessons from previous failures suggest:
• A fragmented peace process (PKK disarms, but YPG remains armed) will not be accepted by Türkiye.
• Türkiye will demand ironclad guarantees that disarmed militants do not regroup in Syria.
• A U.S.-backed political settlement for the PYD/YPG may be the only way to convince Türkiye to engage.
Can Öcalan’s Call Lead to a Sustainable Peace?
While Öcalan’s call for PKK dissolution and disarmament represents a major shift, its success depends on resolving the PYD/YPG dilemma. Without clear guarantees that the YPG will also disarm or transition into a non-military entity, Türkiye’s security institutions will likely reject the process as incomplete or deceptive.
For this initiative to succeed, the following must align:
1. A legally sound reintegration framework under Türkiye’s constitutional limits.
2. A security guarantee ensuring PKK members do not simply relocate to Syria.
3. A shift in U.S. policy regarding the PYD/YPG’s military role.
Without addressing these geopolitical realities, any peace process will risk repeating the failures of past initiatives, leading to further instability rather than a lasting solution.
*Yusuf Kanli is a former editor at Hürriyet Daily News