More than a year has passed since the end of the Israeli war against “Hezbollah,” and today we stand only days away from the first anniversary of the election of General Joseph Aoun as President of the Lebanese Republic. Since that war—and because of it—Lebanon has undergone numerous changes, most of which have penetrated deeply into the public and private lives of millions of resident and expatriate Lebanese. There is no doubt that the most significant change has affected the collective consciousness of the overwhelming majority of Lebanese.
Until the so-called “War of Support” ignited by Hezbollah on October 8, 2023—less than 24 hours after the “Al-Aqsa Flood” attack carried out by Hamas—the vast majority of ordinary Lebanese, a broad popular bloc cutting across sects and regions, were distinguished by their varying degrees of opposition to Hezbollah’s project. Many prominent figures who opposed the party were subjected to political, judicial, and administrative persecution, while others were targeted by campaigns of moral assassination that in some cases escalated to physical assassination.
Over the past two decades, this majority of Lebanese had lost all hope of reclaiming the country from the grip of a heavily armed militia operating within a regional security and military function. That militia turned Lebanon into a platform for open attacks against the Arab world, in full view of all, while simultaneously working to swallow Lebanon—security-wise, politically, institutionally, economically, financially, demographically, and in real estate terms. Lebanon became the target of a project of domination that gradually evolved into a project aimed at effecting profound changes in the country’s culture and in its delicate internal balances at every level.
Millions of Lebanese even lost hope of restoring their homeland and Lebanon’s historic formula, after the Land of the Cedars came to resemble a vast prison. Do we not remember that before the 66-day war, Lebanon had a “supreme guide” similar to Iran’s Supreme Leader—someone whose televised speeches citizens awaited to learn the “order of the day,” an authority that towered above all state offices and institutions?
Then came the adventure of the “War of Support,” followed by Israel’s “Operation Northern Arrows,” culminating in a devastating war from which Hezbollah’s military wing emerged largely destroyed. As signs of weakness appeared within Hezbollah, the Lebanese state idea was revived once again. Many therefore concluded that had it not been for the war that Hezbollah lost, hope would not have returned to Lebanese of all components regarding the possibility of saving Lebanon from the path of deviation that had, over the preceding twenty years, turned the country into an advanced Iranian base on the shores of the Mediterranean.
Today, it can be said that the prevailing Lebanese public opinion—despite Lebanon’s continued suffering—views the future with optimism. Paradoxically, this optimism grows stronger the more signs of weakness creep into Hezbollah’s body. In other words, the strength of logic, law, and coexistence rises with Hezbollah’s weakness, and vice versa. In this sense as well, an idea has begun to make its way through Lebanon’s diverse public opinion: that it is in Lebanon’s interest, after addressing the contentious issues, to move forward on the path of peace with Israel.
President Joseph Aoun expressed an advanced position in this regard when he stated in his speech on the occasion of the most recent Independence Day that Lebanon is ready to join the major regional settlements, because it does not wish to remain standing on the sidelines of the region. In other words, Lebanon does not want to remain marginalized as it is today. Likewise, President Aoun’s use of the term “the Abrahamic religions” in the statement of condemnation he issued following the Bondi massacre in Sydney—given the term’s strong symbolism—was particularly striking.
The interpretation is that the Lebanese state, at the highest levels, has begun to use new and different terminology that reflects a strategic Lebanese orientation toward joining regional peace agreements. These agreements began with Egypt and Jordan to close the chapter of wars, and later evolved with the “Abraham Accords” to open a new chapter in Arab-Islamic relations with Israel. Accordingly, observers in Lebanon note that talk of peace with Israel is no longer classified as a “taboo” or a forbidden subject. This in itself represents a major development in a country that, until 2023, was captive to the dominance of Iran’s arm in Lebanon, where merely raising the issue of peace with Israel was enough to trigger countless forms of persecution.
Even the former leader of the Progressive Socialist Party, Walid Jumblatt, despite his rejection of surrendering to all Israeli conditions, expressed in a televised interview his support for “holding a popular referendum in Lebanon on joining the Abraham Accords.”
In conclusion: the weaker Hezbollah—and with it Iranian influence—becomes, the more Lebanon regains its vitality as a state and as a diverse society, and the more it consolidates its regional position as part of the broader regional trajectory moving toward major settlements and comprehensive peace.