Türkiye is positioning itself as an indispensable actor within the shifting pragmatism of the new global order. Yet the strategic flexibility gained abroad appears to be transforming into a perception of unlimited authority at home—a development that may, in the long run, endanger both domestic stability and international legitimacy. In a world where Erdoğan is praised as a “strong leader,” one must ask: how much room is left for democracy to survive?
The world is going through a process that recalls the 1945 Yalta Conference—but this time, it’s far more ambiguous, unstructured, and ruleless. Roosevelt, Churchill, and Stalin are no longer at the table. Their seats have been taken—albeit differently—by Trump, Putin, and to a lesser degree by Erdoğan, with Netanyahu lurking on the sidelines, ready to intervene at any moment.
The most striking feature of this new era is the replacement of lasting ideological blocs with fluid, interest-based alliances. NATO is being redefined. The competition with China is now waged not through arms, but through artificial intelligence and high technology. As for old enemies like Iran, they are now addressed not on the battlefield but across diplomatic tables.
From the Middle East to the Black Sea, from Europe to the South Caucasus, Türkiye has transformed into more than just a regional player; it has become the platform where global power-brokers negotiate. Türkiye was the first to reach out to the new Islamist leadership that emerged after Assad’s fall in Syria, recognizing it and appointing an ambassador. It holds the southern flank of NATO, balances Russia despite the S-400 crisis, and maintains tense but intact relations with the United States.
This power stems not only from geography but also from Türkiye’s dual-track diplomacy. Rather than saying “either you or them,” Türkiye is now saying, “I’ll work with everyone—on my terms.” In the old world order, such ambiguity was viewed as unreliability. In today’s world, it is seen as agility and strategic finesse.
Green Light for Hamas? A New Global Realism
One of the clearest signs of this new paradigm came recently from Washington. Reports suggest that if Hamas lays down its arms and renounces terrorism, it could become a legitimate political actor in Gaza’s future.
This signals a shift beyond the 1990s “peace with moderate Islam” framework. Now, even so-called “radical” Islam may be acceptable—if it functions and delivers stability. The same approach was tested with the Taliban in Afghanistan. Then came the de facto legitimization of HTS in Syria. Now it’s Hamas.
These developments reveal what has become an open secret: the West champions values such as “human rights, democracy, and secularism” only insofar as they don’t conflict with strategic interests. What matters now isn’t who you are, but whether you work, maintain order, and can sit at a negotiating table.
This backdrop provides insight into Erdoğan’s increasingly authoritarian domestic posture. The Turkish government seems convinced that as long as it retains strategic value for the West, the U.S. and EU will turn a blind eye to media restrictions, opposition crackdowns, and democratic backsliding.
And it’s not just a belief—it’s a strategy. The post-2016 political climate in Türkiye has only intensified: judicial independence suspended, media fully subordinated, dissent criminalized. All of this fits the logic of being too useful to criticize.
But can this strategy be sustained?
Can Opportunism Become a Doctrine?
The new global order, driven by interest rather than principle, may work in the short term. But it carries a high risk of imbalance and distrust. In a system built on utility rather than values, today’s partner can quickly become tomorrow’s adversary. Russia’s miscalculations in Ukraine are a prime example.
Türkiye’s gains in Syria, its growing weight within NATO, and renewed relevance in Washington are all real. But these are tactical wins—not strategic ones—unless backed by long-term institutional capacity and trust-building.
Worse, the growing authoritarianism at home could start bleeding into foreign relations. A new wave of migration, an energy crisis, or destabilizing military steps could quickly shift Western silence into backlash.
Is Cyprus a Forgotten File?
Cyprus, long seen as a frozen conflict, is quietly being reframed under this new logic. The latest Geneva talks offered little more than confidence-building measures, without any real solution in sight.
Behind closed doors, one thing is clear: neither the Turkish nor Greek Cypriot side believes a comprehensive settlement is realistic. The EU’s leverage has weakened. U.S. interest is fragmented. In such an environment, Ankara may have realized: as long as Türkiye remains essential in Syria, NATO, and the Black Sea, Cyprus will not rise to the top of anyone’s agenda.
This reality opens the door for Ankara to more openly advocate its two-state solution model. Not full recognition, but tacit acceptance is being gradually built.
Türkiye’s multi-vector foreign policy—engaged with NATO and Russia, in conflict with Israel yet talking to Hamas—has positioned it as a geopolitical lynchpin. And that influence is starting to shape internal politics too.
A Boundless Domestic Agenda: Pressure on Opposition and Institutions
Recent developments in Türkiye show how external indispensability has translated into a sense of unlimited power at home. The opposition is no longer treated as a political rival but as an entity to be neutralized.
Multiple court cases against Istanbul’s mayor, Ekrem İmamoğlu, a detention ruling, and talk of appointing a trustee under allegations of terror affiliation—these are not just legal procedures; they reflect a political purge. The will of the voters is being overshadowed by the will of the judiciary.
This isn’t just about İmamoğlu. The Republican People’s Party (CHP) is facing an orchestrated campaign—from legal inquiries to reputational attacks. The Interior Ministry’s control over municipalities, politically charged rulings by RTÜK (the media regulator), and judicial repression all point toward the construction of a regime where opposition is tolerated only when authorized.
The underlying logic?
“If I am essential to the West’s regional calculus, then they won’t question what I do domestically.”
And so far, that assumption hasn’t been disproven.
Radical but Useful: The New Realism Reinforced
Geopolitics continues to justify domestic authoritarianism. The post–Cold War ideal of engaging with “moderate Islam” has evolved into a pragmatic openness to “radical but functional” Islamism.
The West’s silence on the Taliban, tacit tolerance of HTS in Syria, and now the floated idea of Hamas becoming a political actor in Gaza—all these reflect a global pivot from norms to necessity.
Democracy, human rights, and transparency are now negotiable, unless they directly threaten core interests. Erdoğan’s government has read this environment well and continues to entrench its model with impunity.
And sometimes, this approach is even met with praise.
The Trump Era: Old Friendship, New Leverage?
President Donald Trump’s recent statements about Türkiye and President Erdoğan leave no doubt about the personal affinity he feels:
“I know President Erdoğan very well. He’s a strong leader. Türkiye is a great country and a very important partner for us. Erdoğan does his job very well. It’s always been easy and productive to work with him.”
This isn’t just diplomatic courtesy. It signals the revival of the personalized “leader-to-leader” model that defined Trump’s first term.
However, today’s context is more complex. Trump faces a divided Washington, rising tensions with China, and crises in both Gaza and Ukraine. Erdoğan may attempt to leverage this personal bond again, but the guardrails of U.S. bureaucracy—Pentagon, State Department, Congress, and media—are all watching more closely now.
New Secretary of State Marco Rubio has previously been critical of Erdoğan. Yet even under his leadership, recent U.S. rhetoric has remained tactfully warm: “constructive partner,” “regional stabilizer,” “key NATO ally.” These aren’t just polite phrases—they also hint that Washington continues to tolerate Türkiye’s domestic trajectory for the sake of strategic alignment.
But history warns us. Saddam, Gaddafi, Mubarak—each was once hailed as essential, only to be abandoned when the costs outweighed the benefits. Rubio’s early restraint doesn’t guarantee Erdoğan’s immunity; it simply signals that Türkiye’s role hasn’t yet collided with American red lines.
The Appearance of Strength, the Risk of Isolation
Türkiye stands at a historic crossroads. In this new “Yalta” order, it is not just at the table—it’s reshaping parts of the map. It has altered the Syrian equation, emerged as the lone dialogue channel with Hamas, enhanced its bargaining power within NATO, and reestablished direct ties with Washington.
But this strength must be coupled with responsibility—not just abroad but at home.
Indispensability must not be mistaken for invincibility.
Those who are indulged today can be abandoned tomorrow.
Being at the table now does not guarantee a seat tomorrow.
If Erdoğan’s Türkiye truly aims to be not just a regional actor but a global one, it must base its position on internal stability, institutional rule of law, free media, and democratic competition. Otherwise, today’s tactical victories may evolve into tomorrow’s strategic isolation.
And that isolation, once it begins, is neither easy to reverse—nor without cost.