Every election in Pakistan brings out more about ISI’s perpetual role in the subversion of democracy at the behest of the military generals in power. Major General ® Ehtesham Zamir’s revelation in a recent media interview that as head of the Internal Political Wing of ISI in 2002 he had rigged the polls on the orders of the then Chief of Army Staff and President General Pervez Musharraf.
Later he clarified and what he had earlier said to be “rigging” he describe it as “political management prior to the election,” and he confessed that the ISI did play a role, which it had been doing since 1975 as per the directions of the government. Besides, he also disapproved of the role of any intelligence agency in politics. While one endorses his opinion that there should be a re-organisation of the whole intelligence apparatus in the country, I would like to put the record straight vis-à-vis his allegation that it was Prime Minister Zulfikar Ali Bhutto who had dragged ISI in politics.
It was not ZAB who had “politicised” ISI as claimed by Zamir. This is a perception deliberately circulated by the successive Bonapartist generals to pass their own buck onto Mr Bhutto. General ® Aslam Beg provided this his stamp of authenticity since no general has ever been brave enough to accept his faults and failures of his institution. And for them all most convenient punching bag are Bhuttos—be it SZAB or SBB. The facts related to the issue, however, are different.
ISI’s role in domestic politics was introduced by Field Marshal Ayub Khan because of his growing distrust in the Intelligence Bureau due to the presence of Bengali officers. It was the1965 war in Kashmir that provoked a major crisis vis-à-vis ISI and the entire intelligence apparatus. When the war started there was a complete collapse of the operations of all the intelligence agencies including ISI, which had been largely devoted to concentrate on the surveillance of domestic political activities to be aware of any conspiracy from politicians against Ayub. They indulged in tapping of telephone conversations and chasing political suspects including the communists and progressives to keep the Americans happy.
The covert infiltration plan in the Indian-occupied Kashmir , codenamed Operation Gibraltar –a brainchild of GHQ and ISI turned out to be an intelligence fiasco. According to analysts ISI had overestimated so-called “local support” to Pakistani commandos in Kashmir and underestimated the Indian response to the plan. The ISI’s colossal failure got exposed when Operation Gibraltar met reverses and the Indians—in order to teach Ayub a lesson—broadened the theatre of war beyond Kashmir into Pakistani territory. What added insult to Ayub’s injury was the failure of ISI to locate the Indian armored division that had sneaked into a position when Lahore could have fallen to it without much ado.
Pakistan lost hundreds of commandos in the Operation Gibraltar . ISI was singled out for its gross failure both in Kashmir and during Pakistani military’s war operations. Army had been allegedly let down by the lack of intelligence feed back. In one of the meetings of his top brass Ayub pulled up the then ISI chief Brigadier Riaz and chided him for ISI’s failure to locate a whole Indian armoured division that caused immense damage to Pakistan . When asked what had ISI been doing, Brig Riaz—a forth right officer—did not mince his words and told him that it was busy keeping surveillance on his political opponents.
This was a slap on Ayub’s face and he appointed a committee headed by General Yahya Khan to examine the working of the ISI and other intelligence agencies. The Committee found that ISI had been deeply involved in domestic politics and, had been devoting its time and energy in monitoring the activities of Ayub’s political opponents.
Prior to the imposition of Martial Law in 1958, ISI reported to the Commander-in-Chief of the Army (C-in-C). When martial Law was imposed in 1958 all the intelligence agencies fell under the direct control of the President and Chief Martial Law Administrator. ”The intelligence agencies began competing to demonstrate their loyalty to Ayub Khan and his government”. All the agencies tried to over take each other–in giving Ayub a rosy picture of the country. They kept him in the dark about the freedom movement in former East Pakistan .
Subsequently, General Yahya along with Major-General Umar got the ISI more deeply involved to manufacture results of their choice in the 1970/71 general elections. Umar was assigned to ensure that no political party should get an overall majority in the general election. Huge unaccountable amounts were put at Umar’s disposal to defeat Mujib in East Pakistan and Bhutto in West Pakistan to enable a hung parliament to be dominated by the Jamaat-i-Islami, JUP and PML-Q (Qayyum) to dance to General Yahya’s tunes. It ended in tragedy for Pakistan , its break up and a humiliating defeat for its army.
The ISI, however, lost its political importance when ZAB assumed power in 1972. He was very critical of its role during the 1970/71 general elections, which triggered off the events leading to the break up of Pakistan and creation of Bangladesh . ZAB was also aware of GHQ and ISI’s shoddy attempt at blaming him and the Pakistan Foreign Office of the failure of the Operation Gibraltar .
ISI did strike back at Bhutto subsequently. Its chief General Jilani gained his confidence by divulging to him the conspiracy by General Gul Hasan to overthrow him. This got Jilani a clout with ZAB and he ensured that his confidante General Ziaul Haq succeeds Tkika Khan as army chief. And that is where ZAB made the mistake of his life. By promoting Zia–a Wahabi fanatic– out of turn ZAB did not realize he was giving his would-be hang man a rope to kill him. Zia instead of remaining loyal to his benefactor decided to bite the hand that had fed him fat. He used his ISI to conjure an alliance of different political parties; got PNA formed and ignited a fake movement that looked real to topple Bhutto.
The ISI regained its lost glory after Gen. Zia became all powerful following his coup against Bhutto in July 1977. Clever man that he was he knew that he could not depend on the military for long so he converted ISI into his constituency for support and expanded its role. Its operatives were spread to the nook and corner of the country, made responsible for the collection of intelligence about the PPP, organising ethnic and religious groups in order to divide Sindh’s political power. PPP and its leadership, however, remained his primary target of persecution by ISI.
Zia and ISI got a windfall opportunity to become the sole arbiter of power in the region following the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan . Much like Musharraf he too was a pariah dictator for the democratic West but his fortunes changed after Soviet’s occupied Afghanistan . He had Washington and London on their toes to help him to carry out their jihad. However, with the withdrawal of the Soviet Union from Afghanistan his utility was over.
By the time he was killed in the air crash, a democratic wave was sweeping across the world. Despite the profound interest of the Bonapartist generals in Pakistani politics, they could not stem the popular tide as symbolised by martyred PPP leader Benazir Bhutto. However, they could not concede to her a landslide victory so the ISI chief General Hameed Gul—according to his confession–formed IJI to deny Bhutto an absolute majority to avert what he called “democratic dictatorship”. Punjab —in particular—was handed over to Bhutto opponents. His accomplice, of course, was his boss General Aslam Beg.
Gul’s confession ignited a controversy about ISI’s role, who controls it and when was its internal political division established. Testifying before the Supreme Court on June 16, 1997 in a petition filed by Air Marshal ® Asghar Khan, former chief of the Pakistan Air Force, challenging the legality of the ISI’s Political Division accepting a donation of Rs.140 million from a bank for use against Benazir Bhutto and PPP candidates during elections.
Gen. (R) Beg claimed that though the ISI was manned by serving army officers and was part of the Ministry of Defence it reported to the Prime Minister and not to the COAS. As regards who established its internal wing, he tried to pass the buck onto Mr Bhutto. Incidentally, this case is resting in peace in the morgue of the Supreme Court of Pakistan. Most important part of the case is an affidavit by Lt Gen ® Asad Durrani, former ISI Chief, in which he has named some of the top political leaders and political parties—all opposed to Benazir Bhutto and PPP—of having received millions from ISI to oppose her. It is an irony that the case even continued to collect dust during the tenure of Chief Justice Mr Justice Iftekhar Muhammad Choudhry.
Aslam Beg’s claim has been widely challenged. Many Pakistani analysts do not agree with him. According to them the ISI, though de jure under the Prime Minister, had always been controlled de facto by the COAS and that its internal Political Division had been in existence at least since the days of Ayub Khan, if not earlier.
Whatever, the fact of the matter is that the latest confession by ISI’s number 2 under Musharraf that he rigged 2002 polls for him in favour of PML-Q – has lent support to the allegations of selective rigging in the 2008 elections as well. Though Ehtesham was not there in ISI, General Musharraf’s close relative held the fort. instead It is another thing that the intensity of anti-Musharraf vote did not give the government machinery tailor-made for the Gujrati thugs much of room to carry out massive rigging. It did, however, managed to do it selectively to give some respectability to PML-Q.
According to Ehtesham, not only ISI was head deep in 2002 rigging but the National Accountability Bureau (NAB) too was involved “in this exercise.” His statement should be read in the light of yet another disclosure about much more of the same by Lt-Gen (R) Jamshed Gulzar Kiyani who had earlier come on record that majority of the corps commanders, in several meetings, had opposed Musharraf’s decision of patronising the leadership of the King’s party.
Kiyani has recalled meetings of the top brass: “We had urged Musharraf many times during the corps commanders’ meeting that the PML-Q leadership was the most condemned and castigated personalities. They are the worst politicians who remained involved in co-operative scandals and writing off loans. But Musharraf never heard our advice.” He also disclosed that one of Musharraf’s colleagues, who was chief of the accountability bureau at that time, had even sought permission from Musharraf to put dog collar around the necks of top leaders of PML-Q but he was always refused permission to proceed against them.
The disclosures made by Gulzar Kiyani and Ehtesham Zamir should serve as eye openers. These are substantive proof for the indictment of Musharraf–enough to lent credence to the rigging allegations supported by TV videos as well as what might have happened in February 18 elections. Though he describes them much freer than 2002, Zamir does not rule of the possibility of 2008 polls being rigged. According to a generally held view, COAS General Ashfaq Kiyani had ensured army’s non-interference in polls that is why there was comparatively less institutional interference of intelligence agencies this time as compared to the last time.
Democracy in Pakistan and the Internal Political Division of ISI are anathema to each other. They can not co-exist. It would, therefore, be incumbent upon the new government to recast, re-organise and revamp country’s intelligence apparatus especially IS. It should be defanged of its domestic political role. To set up an example it should pillory all those Bonapartist generals and judges of the Supreme Court who have violated the Constitution including those civil and military personnel who have confessed to be part of electoral rigging or subversion of democracy. This punitive exercise is a must to give roots to the sapling of democracy nurtured by martyred Benazir Bhutto through her noble blood. Major General ® Ehtesham Zamir’s confession should be treated as the last nail in ISI’s coffin if democracy is to be saved, served and strengthened.
w.hasan@virgin.net
* Wajid Shamsul Hasan is Pakistan’s ex High Commissioner in the UK.