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The Houthis’ recent threat to attack Saudi Arabia risks Iran’s entire regional strategy, and makes a military alliance between Riyadh and Washington much more urgent. It also threatens to rekindle the war in Yemen
Houthi leader Abdul Malik al-Houthi went ballistic on Sunday. In a filmed speech, he threatened to attack Saudi ports, airports and banks, if Riyadh “obeys” American directives he said are aimed at destroying the Yemeni economy. The Houthis’ official website, Al-Masirah, then showed aerial photos of several airports and seaports in Saudi Arabia with the subtitle, “Just try us.”
In his speech, al-Houthi said that “the Americans are pushing the Saudi regime to undertake stupid and hostile actions that we will never accept. If the Saudi regime is convinced to get involved with the Americans and provide financial and propaganda support to the Jews, it’s their choice – but the results will be dangerous. Our hands will not remain tied when faced with these crazy measures … The fact that we are engaged in the ‘campaign of support’ in Gaza [the term for Iran’s ‘unity of fronts’ concept]does not mean that we cannot do anything against their crazy actions … We will respond in kind – ports for ports, airports for airports and banks for banks.”
Al-Houthi’s anger was also directed at the Saudi-backed official Yemeni government, after it ordered banks in the capital Sana’a, which was conquered by the Houthis in 2014, to end operations in the city and move to Aden, where the government is based. Banks were given two months to implement the decision once it was made in March. When they failed, the government cut off contact with six of the biggest ones operating in Houthi-controlled areas. It continues to insist that if the banks do not reduce their operations in Sana’a, it will enforce international rules against money laundering and cooperation with terror groups.
In response, the Houthis announced they were cutting ties with 13 banks that operate in Aden. In addition, they decided to mint new 100-riyal coins and ban the use of the new riyals issued by the official Yemeni government. In turn, the government banned the use of the Houthis’ new coins.
The immediate result was that thousands of Yemenis living in areas controlled by the Houthis quickly withdrew money from their accounts to buy dollars. That is, until they encountered a long-standing banking directive that bars withdrawals because the central bank had not transferred enough money to the banks to cover them.
Two years after seizing Sana’a, the Houthis, who control northern and central Yemen, set up their own central bank and passed their own banking laws. But whereas in Sana’a the Yemeni riyal is traded at a rate of 530 to the dollar, in Aden the same currency trades at about 1,800 riyals to the dollar. Yemenis who conduct banking activities in both parts of the country to take advantage of the differing rates now fear for the future of the money and their businesses. Furthermore, remittances by Yemenis working abroad – a critical part of the economy – are stuck, with people unsure where to deposit their money without it losing its value or being confiscated.
Millions of Yemenis, especially those living in Houthi-controlled areas, have no alternative income. Moreover, the official Yemeni government has ordered international aid organizations to carry out all their funding operations through the central bank in Aden, a move designed to stanch the flow of funds to the Houthi-controlled banks.
For Al-Houthi, the “banking war” is an integral part of the military campaign waged by the United States and its limited coalition in the Red Sea against the Houthis. That campaign has so far not been able to stop the Houthi attacks on vessels and reopen one of the world’s most important maritime routes, accounting for about 15 percent of all global maritime traffic.
Two years after a Saudi-Houthi cease-fire was reached through UN mediation and American pressure, Al-Houthi’s issuing a direct threat to the Saudis is a dangerous development. It places Saudi Arabia on the Houthi target list, even though Riyadh, alongside the United Arab Emirates, Egypt and Jordan, isn’t a partner to the United States’ military coalition despite being impacted by the shutdown of Red Sea trade.
In issuing his threats, accusing the Saudis of succumbing to American and Israeli pressure and demanding that Riyadh press the government in Aden to rescind its banking directives, Al-Houthi is also challenging Iran’s new relations with Saudi Arabia. The two countries restored ties in March 2023 via Chinese mediation, after the Saudis and Houthis reached a cease-fire agreement over the war in Yemen and begun reconciliation talks. These two developments contributed to the working assumption that Riyadh had freed itself from the Iranian and Houthi threat and that the Houthis’ role in the “unity of fronts” was now directed solely against Israel.
However, while Hezbollah closely coordinates its actions with Iran, serving not only as a regional military arm but as a political anchor for its regional and global interests, the Houthis have independent interests that, as is now evident, do not always align with Iran’s. The Houthi threat on Saudi Arabia – all the more so, if they act on it – poses a direct threat to Iran, which views the improvement of relations with the Arab world as a key strategic goal. It is for that purpose that it renewed ties with the UAE and the Saudis, and is now seeking to do the same with the Egyptians.
Now that Iran cannot count on the Houthis to fully obey its instructions and lift the threat over Saudi Arabia, the “ring of fire” it had formed with the Houthis, the Shiite militias in Iraq, and Hezbollah, threatens to burn down its own strategic goals in the region. Worse still, the Houthi threat makes a military alliance between Saudi Arabia and the U.S. much more urgent, thus working against Iran’s ambition to thwart it.
On the other hand, the Houthi threat also puts Washington in a difficult spot. The prospective alliance with the Saudis, designed to create a regional shield against Iran, could embroil the U.S. in a “secondary” war against the Houthis if they make good on their threat, and test its willingness to fulfill its role in a future defense alliance.
If it were to occur, such a development would not depend on the war in Gaza and its connection to the “unity of the fronts.” It would amount to a new and independent battleground that threatens to rekindle the war in Yemen and undermine the efforts to end it through diplomacy.
ملخص
تهديد الحوثيين الأخير بمهاجمة المملكة العربية السعودية يهدد استراتيجية إيران الإقليمية برمتها، ويجعل التحالف العسكري بين الرياض وواشنطن أكثر إلحاحا. كما يهدد بإشعال الحرب في اليمن من جديد
واتجه غضب الحوثي أيضا إلى الحكومة اليمنية الرسمية المدعومة من السعودية، بعد أن أمرت البنوك في العاصمة صنعاء، التي استولى عليها الحوثيون عام 2014، بإنهاء عملياتها في المدينة والانتقال إلى عدن.وتم منح البنوك شهرين لتنفيذ القرار بمجرد اتخاذه في مارس. وعندما فشلوا، قطعت الحكومة الاتصال مع ستة من أكبر الشركات العاملة في المناطق التي يسيطر عليها الحوثيون. وهي تواصل الإصرار على أنه إذا لم تقلص البنوك عملياتها في صنعاء، فإنها ستطبق القواعد الدولية ضد غسيل الأموال والتعاون مع الجماعات الإرهابية.