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    You are at:Home»Categories»Headlines»The Kılıçdaroğlu–Özel rivalry: A mirror of Türkiye’s opposition struggles

    The Kılıçdaroğlu–Özel rivalry: A mirror of Türkiye’s opposition struggles

    1
    By Yusuf Kanli on 21 September 2025 Headlines

    The Republican People’s Party (CHP), Türkiye’s oldest political party and the country’s main opposition, is once again trapped in a leadership crisis. What appears on the surface as a rivalry between Kemal Kılıçdaroğlu, the long-time party leader until late 2023, and Özgür Özel, his successor, is in reality a much deeper struggle over CHP’s direction, survival, and credibility as the only nationwide counterweight to Recep Tayyip Erdoğan’s entrenched rule.

     

     

    The conflict is about far more than personalities: it is about how CHP positions itself in an authoritarian political climate, how it defends its municipalities and leaders from weaponized corruption charges, and how it balances unity with renewal at a moment when Erdoğan’s government is beset by economic collapse yet still masters the art of discrediting its rivals.

     

    Kılıçdaroğlu’s legacy: Persistence without victory

    Kemal Kılıçdaroğlu led the CHP from 2010 to 2023, positioning himself as a soft-spoken, cautious, and steady hand. Under his leadership, the party:

    • Expanded beyond its Kemalist base, reaching out to Kurdish voters and conservative-leaning segments through broad electoral coalitions.
    • Held crucial municipalities, with figures like Ekrem İmamoğlu in Istanbul and Mansur Yavaş in Ankara becoming credible governance alternatives to the AKP.
    • Framed itself as the umbrella of the opposition, attempting to build unity against Erdoğan’s dominance.

    Yet, despite this persistence, Kılıçdaroğlu became synonymous with defeat. His cautious style never translated into a decisive national breakthrough. The final blow came with the 2023 presidential election: despite unprecedented economic crisis, Erdoğan’s grip on power held, and Kılıçdaroğlu’s campaign failed to inspire a majority.

    For many CHP members, that loss confirmed what had long been suspected: Kılıçdaroğlu could not win, and his leadership was now a liability.

    Özgür Özel: The face of change

    Özgür Özel, a younger parliamentarian with a reformist profile, capitalized on the demand for change. In November 2023, he was elected party leader in a contentious congress that symbolized a generational handover.

    • Symbol of Renewal: His rise was a clear rejection of the “status quo” leadership embodied by Kılıçdaroğlu.
    • Local Election Success: Under Özel, CHP performed strongly in the March 2024 municipal elections, retaining Istanbul, Ankara, and Izmir, while expanding its control to new provinces.
    • Sharper Opposition Tone: Özel adopted a more confrontational style, denouncing judicial overreach and framing corruption probes as political tools of repression.
    • Internal Reformist Agenda: He pushed for bylaw reforms, quotas for youth and women, and mechanisms to democratize CHP’s internal structures.

    Özel’s leadership energized a demoralized party. But success brought new risks: Erdoğan’s regime, recognizing the potential of a younger, sharper opposition leader, moved to neutralize CHP’s momentum through the same methods it had used against İmamoğlu — weaponized courts, trustees, and corruption investigations.

    The weaponization of corruption charges

    The flood of corruption accusations against CHP municipalities cannot be seen as normal accountability. Instead, they represent a deliberate campaign by Erdoğan’s government to tarnish the opposition’s clean-image advantage at a time of spiraling economic crisis.

    • Deflecting economic anger: With inflation, currency collapse, and living standards deteriorating, attacking CHP helps deflect blame from AKP mismanagement.
    • Targeting rising stars: Figures like İmamoğlu — widely seen as a future presidential candidate — are repeatedly dragged into courtrooms to sap their legitimacy.
    • Eroding CHP’s brand: By painting CHP municipalities as corrupt, Erdoğan’s regime aims to undercut the party’s biggest comparative advantage: its ability to present itself as more transparent and accountable than the AKP.

    What makes this more toxic is the role of Kılıçdaroğlu in this environment. Instead of closing ranks, he has at times remained silent, and even suggested that wrongdoing may have occurred at the 2023 party congress. Many in CHP interpret this as a tacit abetting of the ruling coalition’s strategy. Whether out of resentment at losing the chairmanship or loyalty to his own factional networks, Kılıçdaroğlu’s hints validate Erdoğan’s narrative, weakening Özel at a critical moment.

    This dynamic transforms an internal rivalry into an existential question: can CHP defend itself collectively against a regime-engineered smear campaign, or will internal fractures do the government’s work for it?

    Internal party factionalism

    CHP’s current turmoil also reflects its chronic factional divides:

    1. Continuity vs Change:
    o The “continuity” bloc, loyal to Kılıçdaroğlu, favors moderation and coalition-building.
    o The “change” bloc, led by Özel, wants sharper opposition and internal renewal.
    2. Generational Divide:
    o Older cadres, shaped by Cold War-era politics, often prioritize party discipline and incrementalism.
    o Younger members demand modernization, openness to social movements, and bolder resistance to authoritarianism.
    3. Personal legacies:
    o Kılıçdaroğlu, despite defeat, retains loyal networks.
    o Özel must navigate between consolidating his authority and avoiding the appearance of purging his predecessor’s allies.

    These fault lines are now being tested under judicial pressure: with courts intervening in provincial branches and even challenging the legitimacy of Özel’s congress victory, factional disputes risk becoming existential crises.

    Performance as counterweight to Erdoğan

    Here lies the central strategic debate. Has Özel been effective as a counterweight to Erdoğan?

    • Strengths: His sharper rhetoric, defense of İmamoğlu, and defiance against judicial overreach have made him more visible than Kılıçdaroğlu in the post-2023 climate. His municipal election victories gave CHP fresh confidence.
    • Limitations: Yet, critics argue that his confrontational style has not yet translated into a coherent national vision. The structural power asymmetry — Erdoğan’s control of media, judiciary, and state resources — still constrains CHP’s ability to expand beyond its strongholds.

    Meanwhile, Kılıçdaroğlu’s silence or insinuations about corruption serve to undermine CHP’s unity, leaving Özel exposed and Erdoğan emboldened.

    What to Know About Özel Going Forward

    Özgür Özel embodies both promise and peril for CHP.

    • Promise:
    o A younger, reformist leader with electoral validation.
    o A more combative figure willing to call out authoritarianism.
    o A reformer who seeks to democratize the party internally.
    • Peril:
    o Judicial traps that could delegitimize his leadership.
    o Corruption accusations that, even if baseless, erode trust.
    o Internal sabotage from factions still aligned with Kılıçdaroğlu.
    o The difficulty of turning municipal victories into national dominance under Erdoğan’s asymmetric system.

    Özel’s real test will be whether he can transform CHP’s local momentum into national viability, while surviving a political environment where courts, prosecutors, and media are systematically deployed against him.

    CHP at a crossroads

    The Kılıçdaroğlu–Özel rivalry is more than an internal party feud; it is a reflection of the broader fate of opposition politics in Türkiye.

    • Kılıçdaroğlu represents persistence and coalition-building, but also the fatigue of repeated defeats.
    • Özel represents renewal and defiance, but also vulnerability in the face of judicial and factional traps.

    Corruption allegations, far from being neutral checks on governance, are part of an orchestrated campaign by an economically embattled Erdoğan regime to neutralize all challengers, from İmamoğlu to Özel. Kılıçdaroğlu’s silence — or worse, his echoes of government narratives — deepens the fissures.

    In the end, the question is stark: will CHP act as a unified, credible counterweight to Erdoğan, or will it remain trapped in a cycle of rivalry and recrimination that only serves the ruling coalition?

    The answer may well determine not only the future of the CHP, but the future of Turkish democracy itself.

     

    Also Read:

    Campaign is over, battle continuing for CHP

     

     

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    Walid Sinno
    Walid Sinno
    2 months ago

    Özel monte en flèche dans tous les sondages. Ça fait des jaloux dans son parti qui stagne depuis 1975 et dérange bcp Erdoğan qui sent que la fin n’est pas loin. Il doit donc lutter contre une fraction de son parti (dinausores) et Erdoğan qui a mobilisé la justice contre lui (nombreux élus locaux CHP, le maire d’Istanbul en tête en taule en attendant leur procès). Il sait mobiliser les masses et dialoguer avec les électeurs de tous les bords. Très énergique. CHP est un parti social-étatiste comme AKP. Mais il se distingue de lui parti sa fidélité à la démocratie,… Read more »

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