Close Menu
    Facebook Instagram LinkedIn
    • العربية (Arabic)
    • English
    • Français (French)
    Facebook Instagram LinkedIn
    Middle East Transparent
    • Home
    • Categories
      1. Headlines
      2. Features
      3. Commentary
      4. Magazine
      Featured
      Headlines Yusuf Kanli

      Türkiye’s fight against fragmentation abroad, ethnic flirtation at home

      Recent
      23 July 2025

      Türkiye’s fight against fragmentation abroad, ethnic flirtation at home

      22 July 2025

      Lebanese Central Bank Lands a Blow on Hezbollah’s Finances, but It’s Not Enough

      22 July 2025

      Druze Revolts, Then And Now

    • Contact us
    • Archives
    • Subscribe
    • العربية (Arabic)
    • English
    • Français (French)
    Middle East Transparent
    You are at:Home»To participate or not to participate?

    To participate or not to participate?

    0
    By Michael Young on 27 January 2011 Uncategorized

    Despite the talk of a “coup” circulating in recent days in March 14’s ranks, Saad Hariri and his allies must take the measure of where they stand, beyond the slogans. Indeed, Syria and Hezbollah have made a major step forward in reversing the gains of 2005, when Syria removed its army from Lebanon and, for a moment, Lebanon’s unaccountable security chiefs faced the rule of law. But March 14 needs to take a deep breath and coldly assess what happened.

    The real “coup” was not the appointment of Najib Mikati to form a new government; it was Hezbollah’s ability, with Syrian acquiescence, to turn Walid Jumblatt against the March 14-led majority. There are interesting ingredients in this reversal that have to do with the complicated dynamics of the Syrian-Iranian relationship.

    Last week it seemed that Hezbollah and Michel Aoun had made a decision not only to prevent Hariri’s return as prime minister, but also to cripple him politically. Their calculation was that if Hariri came back, he would be able to further delay a Lebanese decision to sever relations with the Special Tribunal for Lebanon. Hezbollah’s secretary-general, Sayyed Hassan Nasrallah, and Aoun sought to bring in Omar Karami. But the former prime minister would have been too bitter a pill to swallow for everyone, and Syria intervened with a bait and switch, replacing Karami with the more palatable Mikati.

    The shoddy way Mikati was presented had to do with Hezbollah’s haste to get a government in quickly, to cut ties with the tribunal. On Sunday, Aoun and Nasrallah hinted that Karami was out (since he could not have won a vote against Hariri). However, the cursory way Aoun mentioned Mikati, and the fact that Nasrallah did not, may have indicated that neither was overwhelmed with the choice. Could it be that Syria’s imposition of Mikati, and the subsequent offer by Syria’s ally Suleiman Franjieh that March 14 take the blocking third in a Mikati government, denied them the chance to eliminate Hariri? It’s instructive that Syria’s allies in Beirut were explaining that Damascus did not want to repeat the mistake of Emile Lahoud’s extension.

    What are the options for Hariri? The former prime minister has said that he would not join a government “named by Hezbollah.” And there are growing signs that he may carry through on this, even as his bloc pursues an internal debate on participation. If so, this might be mistake.

    There are two schools of thought: that March 14 should stay outside of the government, denying it Sunni legitimacy and compelling Mikati to form a cabinet of “one color.” This cabinet will take a contentious decision on the Special Tribunal, incensing both the Sunnis and the international community, eroding what tenuous credibility Mikati has. Consequently, the government will not last, forcing Syria and Hezbollah to negotiate once again with a reinvigorated Hariri.

    That may happen, but recent events suggest that relying on this scenario is risky. The rioting on Monday was both good and bad for Hariri. It showed that the Sunnis are angry, and that their anger might spin out of control, therefore it is a bad idea to push too harshly against Hariri and the tribunal. But the scenes of violence also made many Lebanese worry that they were on the cusp of sectarian warfare. And for better or worse, by default many will now identify Mikati with stability.

    Unfortunately for Hariri, and his Sunni legitimacy notwithstanding, any successful strategy to undermine a Mikati government would require feeding off ambient insecurity, much like Hezbollah has done in the past. But that is not really Hariri’s way.

    If Hariri participates in the government, or just in talks to establish one, this may open up opportunities. In light of Hezbollah’s alacrity to rid itself of the Special Tribunal, Franjieh made his blocking third proposal to March 14 without conditions. Damascus may not have endorsed this, but Hariri should seize the offer anyway. It is doubtful that Syria seeks Hariri’s political disappearance. For as long as the former prime minister retains clout as the dominant Sunni, Damascus will ensure that it can continue playing him off against Hezbollah.

    If Hariri’s participation is so vital to the new government, then this gives him latitude to impose conditions. The minimal demand of March 14 must be the blocking third. Much bargaining lies ahead, despite Franjieh’s statement, but negotiations would buy time for confirmation of the tribunal indictment. And if Hariri does not get what he wants, he can always pull out and place the onus of failure on Mikati.

    Hariri can also demand that the break with the tribunal not be mentioned in the cabinet statement, delegitimizing such a move from the start. Mikati may support this, even if he has probably agreed to end Beirut’s collaboration with the institution. If March 14 gets the blocking third, it could obstruct a vote in the cabinet to annul the protocol with the Special Tribunal (which is why Hezbollah and Syria are liable not to surrender that advantage to Hariri). Whatever happens, and more cynically, if Mikati goes ahead with the divorce anyway, Hariri would be giving him rope with which to hang himself.

    There are other advantages in participating in a Mikati government with a blocking third. There will be occasions for March 14 to ally itself on important issues with President Michel Sleiman, and even Walid Jumblatt. The Druze leader is keen, for electoral reasons, to regain Sunni favor after his decision last week to vote against Hariri.

    All eyes will be on Saudi Arabia’s reaction. The Saudis have spent two years sponsoring a Syrian comeback to Lebanon, on the assumption that better Syria leading in Beirut than Iran. There may be those in the kingdom who regard the pro-Syrian Mikati as fulfilling that logic. Hariri will remain the Sunnis’ leader, but he will also be careful not to maneuver outside the parameters set by the previous Syrian-Saudi dialogue. Ultimately Mikati is the man in the hot seat today, so entering the government could emerge as Hariri’s optimal way of exploiting what will surely be its impossible contradictions.

    Michael Young is opinion editor of THE DAILY STAR and author of “The Ghosts of Martyrs Square: An Eyewitness Account of Lebanon’s Life Struggle” (Simon & Schuster).

    Share. Facebook Twitter LinkedIn Email WhatsApp Copy Link
    Previous ArticleWill Egypt’s ‘Day of Rage’ Become a Revolution?
    Next Article Tunisian leaders should waste no time to fill gap between gov’t, streets

    Comments are closed.

    RSS Recent post in french
    • « Vers le sauvetage »: Pour mettre fin à l’hémorragie chiite… et lancer le redressement économique 18 July 2025 Nahwa al Inqaz
    • Du Liban indépendant et de son « héritage syrien » (avec nouvelles cartes) 8 July 2025 Jack Keilo
    • Nouvelle approche des Forces Libanaises: Alliances ou Endiguement ? 5 July 2025 Kamal Richa
    • Ce que nous attendons de vous, Monsieur le Président 3 July 2025 Michel Hajji Georgiou
    • Il faut être pour Nétanyahou lorsqu’il affaiblit la menace iranienne ; et ardemment contre lui lorsqu’il détruit Gaza 1 July 2025 Denis Charbit
    RSS Recent post in arabic
    • معركة تركيا ضد التقسيم في الخارج مقابل مُغازلة “الأَعراق” في الداخل! 24 July 2025 يوسف كانلي
    • انسحاب القوات الأميركية من المنطقة غير وارد 24 July 2025 هدى الحسيني
    • لكي ينجو اليسار العالمي من الانقراض: “الوصايا العشر”! 24 July 2025 سعيد ناشيد
    • هل يُستدعى “جبران باسيل” للمثول امام القضاء؟ 23 July 2025 خاص بالشفاف
    • الشَعرة التي انقَطَعت في السُويداء 23 July 2025 سلمان مصالحة
    26 February 2011

    Metransparent Preliminary Black List of Qaddafi’s Financial Aides Outside Libya

    6 December 2008

    Interview with Prof Hafiz Mohammad Saeed

    7 July 2009

    The messy state of the Hindu temples in Pakistan

    27 July 2009

    Sayed Mahmoud El Qemany Apeal to the World Conscience

    8 March 2022

    Russian Orthodox priests call for immediate end to war in Ukraine

    Recent Comments
    • K Khairallah on Türkiye’s fight against fragmentation abroad, ethnic flirtation at home
    • Elie Abdul Hay on Türkiye’s fight against fragmentation abroad, ethnic flirtation at home
    • Khairallah Khairallah on Türkiye’s fight against fragmentation abroad, ethnic flirtation at home
    • Khaled Mahrouq on Why al-Sharaa’s success in Syria is good for Israel and the US
    • Edward Ziadeh on Why al-Sharaa’s success in Syria is good for Israel and the US
    Donate
    Donate
    © 2025 Middle East Transparent

    Type above and press Enter to search. Press Esc to cancel.

    loader

    Inscrivez-vous à la newsletter

    En vous inscrivant, vous acceptez nos conditions et notre politique de confidentialité.

    loader

    Subscribe to updates

    By signing up, you agree to our terms privacy policy agreement.

    loader

    اشترك في التحديثات

    بالتسجيل، فإنك توافق على شروطنا واتفاقية سياسة الخصوصية الخاصة بنا.