Close Menu
    Facebook Instagram LinkedIn
    • العربية (Arabic)
    • English
    • Français (French)
    Facebook Instagram LinkedIn
    Middle East Transparent
    • Home
    • Categories
      1. Headlines
      2. Features
      3. Commentary
      4. Magazine
      5. Cash economy
      Featured
      Headlines Samara Azzi

      A Second Devaluation Looms Over Lebanon’s Fragile Currency Regime

      Recent
      3 April 2026

      A Second Devaluation Looms Over Lebanon’s Fragile Currency Regime

      2 April 2026

      Christianity in Lebanon: A Rock of Faith

      1 April 2026

      Now or Never: How to Finish the Job in Iran

    • Contact us
    • Archives
    • Subscribe
    • العربية (Arabic)
    • English
    • Français (French)
    Middle East Transparent
    You are at:Home»Categories»Headlines»Split between Ukrainian, Russian churches shows political importance of Orthodox Christianity

    Split between Ukrainian, Russian churches shows political importance of Orthodox Christianity

    0
    By Pew on 16 January 2019 Headlines

    Ukrainian President Petro Poroshenko stands with Ecumenical Patriarch Bartholomew I of Constantinople (center) and Metropolitan of Kiev Epiphanius I (right) at a ceremony to sign the decree that proclaims the independence of the Ukrainian Orthodox Church. (Ozan Kose/AFP viaGetty Images)

     

     

    BY DAVID MASCI

    The recent decision by the Ukrainian Orthodox Church to split from its Russian counterpart after more than 300 years of being linked reflects not only the continuing military conflict between the two countries in recent years, but also the important political role Orthodox Christianity plays in the region.

    Ukraine is an overwhelmingly Orthodox Christian nation, with nearly eight-in-ten adults (78%) identifying as Orthodox (compared with 71% in Russia), according to a 2015 Pew Research Center survey of much of the country (some contested areas in eastern Ukraine were not surveyed). This is up from 39% who said they were Orthodox Christian in 1991 – the year the officially atheist Soviet Union collapsed and Ukraine gained its independence. With roughly 35 million Orthodox Christians, Ukraine now has the third-largest Orthodox population in the world, after Russia and Ethiopia.

    In addition, Orthodox Christianity is closely tied to Ukraine’s national and political life. Roughly half of all Ukrainians (51%) say it is at least somewhat important for someone to be Orthodox to be truly Ukrainian. The same is true for Russia, where 57% say being Orthodox is important to being truly Russian. In both countries, about half (48% in each) say religious leaders have at least some influence in political matters, although most Ukrainians (61%) and roughly half of Russians (52%) would prefer if this were not the case.

    The split between the Orthodox churches in the two countries is part and parcel of a wider history of political tensions between Russia’s geopolitical ambitions in the region and Ukraine’s resistance to them – even as some other predominantly Orthodox countries in Eastern Europe look toward Russian for political and religious leadership. For example, majorities of Orthodox Christians in countries such as Serbia (77%) and Georgia (62%) say Russia has an obligation to protect Orthodox Christians outside its borders, but fewer Orthodox Ukrainians (41%) feel this way.

    Indeed, even though the survey was conducted in 2015 – while the Ukrainian Orthodox Church was still under the jurisdiction of the Russian Orthodox Church – a plurality of Orthodox Ukrainians (46%) said they looked to the leaders of the Ukrainian national church (either the patriarch of Kiev or the metropolitan of Kiev and all of Ukraine) as the highest authority of Orthodoxy. Just 17% saw the patriarch of Moscow(currently Kirill I) as their spiritual leader, and an even smaller share (7%) said they looked to the ecumenical patriarch of Constantinople(currently Bartholomew I) for leadership, even though he is technically the foremost leader of the world’s roughly 300 million Orthodox Christians.

    But attitudes in Ukraine toward Russia’s political and religious leadership are also highly divided between the eastern and western parts of the country. Eastern Ukrainians have more positive attitudes toward Russia than do western Ukrainians. For example, the 2015 survey found that over half of those living in the east (55%) say Russia has an obligation to protect Orthodox Christians living outside its borders. In western Ukraine, meanwhile, a majority (58%) disagree with this view. The patriarch of Moscow also receives higher support in eastern Ukraine than in western Ukraine. Western Ukrainians are more likely to look to their own national patriarchs as the highest authority of the Orthodox Church.

    Due to fighting in eastern Ukraine between pro-Russian forces and the Ukrainian government, the 2015 survey used in this analysis covered only 80% of the country’s population and excluded the southernmost province of Crimea (which Russia annexed in 2014), as well as the eastern provinces of Donetsk and Luhansk. Given ongoing geopolitical tensions between the two countries, western Ukrainian attitudes toward Russia are not likely to have improved since 2015. But support for Russia in eastern Ukraine may have been somewhat higher had we been able to survey the contested provinces of the country.

    PEW

    David Masci is a senior writer/editor focusing on religion at Pew Research Center.

    Share. Facebook Twitter LinkedIn Email WhatsApp Copy Link
    Previous Articleليت اليسار أهلكنا وصدّع رؤوسنا..!!
    Next Article فاطمة.. وفجر.. ورهف
    Subscribe
    Notify of
    guest
    guest
    0 Comments
    Newest
    Oldest Most Voted
    Inline Feedbacks
    View all comments
    RSS Recent post in french
    • Le courage a un prix. La servitude aussi. 2 April 2026 Walid Sinno
    • De Riyad à Dubaï, la hantise des monarchies du Golfe face à l’extension de la guerre contre l’Iran 24 March 2026 Georges Malbrunot
    • Le Liban entre la logique de l’État et le suicide iranien 3 March 2026 Dr. Fadil Hammoud
    • Réunion tendue du cabinet : différend entre le Premier ministre et le chef d’état-major des armées, qui a menacé de démissionner ! 3 March 2026 Shaffaf Exclusive
    • En Arabie saoudite, le retour au réalisme de « MBS », contraint d’en rabattre sur ses projets pharaoniques 27 February 2026 Hélène Sallon
    RSS Recent post in arabic
    • لماذا استثنت إيران تركيا من عدوانها؟ 2 April 2026 د. عبدالله المدني
    • مهمّةٌ للجيش اللبناني 2 April 2026 مايكل يونغ
    • اغتيال يوسف هاشم: خسارة اقليمية للحرس الإيراني 2 April 2026 خاص بالشفاف
    • أهل “كريات شمونة” عَرَب مغاربة، ومِثلَ اللبنانيين “تعبوا من الحرب” هم أيضاً! 1 April 2026 أ ف ب
    • وجود “بلباس مدني” لجنود الجيش والأمن الداخلي في قرى الحدود! 1 April 2026 خاص بالشفاف
    26 February 2011

    Metransparent Preliminary Black List of Qaddafi’s Financial Aides Outside Libya

    6 December 2008

    Interview with Prof Hafiz Mohammad Saeed

    7 July 2009

    The messy state of the Hindu temples in Pakistan

    27 July 2009

    Sayed Mahmoud El Qemany Apeal to the World Conscience

    8 March 2022

    Russian Orthodox priests call for immediate end to war in Ukraine

    Recent Comments
    • The Stablecoin Paradox: How Crypto Is Powering Both Financial Freedom and Terror Financing in Lebanon - Middle East Transparent on Saida and the Politics of a Surplus City
    • Energy Shock hits Turkiye: War-driven price surge tests economy and boosts transit role on Energy Shock hits Turkiye: War-driven price surge tests economy and boosts transit role
    • hello world on When Tehran’s Anchor Falls, Will Lebanon Sink or Swim?
    • hello world on Between fire and silence: Türkiye in the shadow of a growing regional war
    • بيار عقل on Did Iran just activate Operation Judgement Day?
    Donate
    © 2026 Middle East Transparent

    Type above and press Enter to search. Press Esc to cancel.

    wpDiscuz