David Schenker, (director of the Program on Arab Politics at the
Washington Institute for Near East Policy) is of the opinion that an Israeli raid on Iran’s nuclear sites is more than probable, later this year. What would be the consequences for Iran’s nuclear ambitions and, more important, for the two neighbours of Israel, Lebanon and Syria?
Speculations about a new war in the Middle East seem to have calmed down. Is there a risk of a new war either between Israel and Lebanon or of an Israeli strike against Iran’s nuclear installations?
Regional tensions spiked a few weeks ago during the “SCUD missile crisis.” Since then, fears of imminent war have subsided. Still, the threat of another conflict persists. The question of SCUDS notwithstanding, Israel remains concerned about the increasingly advanced weaponry that Syria is providing Hizballah. In particular Syria’s transfer of the IGLA anti-aircraft system and the Fatah 110 missiles are seen by the US and Israel as destabilizing and reckless Syrian behavior.
Given the environment, it’s not difficult to imagine the ways in which a war could be sparked. Israel could choose, for example, to strike an arms shipment-on either the Syrian or Lebanese side of the border-an act that could precipitate retaliation. Hizballah could attack an Israeli or Jewish target-like it did in Argentina in 1994-to avenge the assassination of the militia’s military commander, Imad Mugniyyeh, prompting an Israeli response. It’s also conceivable that Hizballah could hit Israel in retaliation for an Israeli strike on Iranian nuclear sites.
Israel is clearly focused on the Iranian threat at present, and appears to be looking to avoid a war in Lebanon until after the Iranian nuclear challenge is countered. Hizballah, too, maybe waiting, in part because its constituents do not want another destructive war right now, but also because it wants to maintain its military infrastructure should Israel launch a strike against Iranian military facilities.
Could international sanctions against Iran modify the war perspective?
The type of international sanctions currently under discussion will do little to convince Iran that it should scrap its weapons program. Both China and Russia do not support “crippling” sanctions-i.e., on refined petroleum products-or even “sanctions that bite.” It is difficult to imagine these sanctions being effective.
Does Israel have the capacity to destroy Iran’s nuclear
installations? French sources speculate that Israel does not enjoy
such a “technical” capacity?
Israel has significant capabilities, but the underground and dispersed targets pose a difficult technical challenge for the Jewish state. It would seem that Israel, if necessary, would strike Iranian installations, knowing that it cannot “destroy” the program, but merely slow or delay the process. When Israel destroyed Osirak in Iraq in 1981, many said it would only buy a few years. Given the assessed risk, I believe Israel would come to the same conclusion.
Would the Obama Administration give the “green light” for an Israel
strike against Iran?
All indications are that the Obama Administration is counseling the Israelis not to strike Iran. Washington wants to give the sanctions time to work, and, failing that, time to establish a coalition and base of support in the International community to confront Tehran. Whether Israel would be prepared to hit Iran in the event of an unambiguous US “red light” is the important question. Israel was censured by the Reagan Administration following the Osirak raid-but the dynamic between Israel and the Obama Administration is entirely different these days.
What could be the consequences of an Israeli raid on Iran on US
interests in the region?
Regardless of whether the US approves of, denounces, or attempts to stymie an Israeli strike, Tehran will likely consider Washington responsible for a strike, and continue-if not upgrade-its efforts to undermine US interests in the Middle East. This could mean more difficulties for the US in Afghanistan and Iraq-or elsewhere, ala Khobar in 1996. Iran also has a special relationship with Al Qaida, which it could try and employ against the US.
Would it spark a new war between Israel and Hizbullah? What could
be the consequences for Lebanon’s fragile political balance of power?
First part of the question is answered above. For Lebanon, a war would no doubt be disastrous.
In 2006, Hizballah’s war cost Lebanon 1000 lives and $7 billion-and the Israelis say that during the next round, they will widen the scope.
Could Syria keep out of a new war between Hizbullah and Israel?
The Assad regime has little interest in getting involved in the next war. Many analysts believe that if Syria gets involved, it could put the Asad regime’s hold on power at risk. More likely, like 2006, Bashar Assad would prefer to stand on the sidelines, cheer Hizballah on, and then take credit for the “divine victory.”
Sitting it out this time, however, will be more difficult. Syria has drawn closer to Iran and Hizballah since 2006, and has publicly pledged to join the fighting to defend the resistance next time. So the Assad regime just might be shamed into fighting, which of course, would make the war more costly for all sides.
Would such a strike be seen as the end of the current Peace Process?
It’s unclear what kind of blow Israel could inflict on the Iranian nuclear program or on Hizballah-or how much damage Israel would want to do to Syria and the Asad regime. Should Syria, Hizballah, and Iran-emerge weaker from a confrontation it would be a blow to Hamas and regional militancy, which could generate a new momentum for the Israeli-Palestinian peace talks. Such a decisive outcome is unlikely, though. At a minimum, it seems that Israel’s performance in the 2006 war did not promote an environment in which Israel was willing to take more risks for peace.
An Israeli attack on Iran would strengthen the hold of the Iranian
regime, do yo agree?
From the outside, the clerical regime in Tehran appears brittle and profoundly unpopular. Yet it continues to prove that it is willing to do ruthless things-such as murdering Iranian opponents of this tyrannical regime-to stay in power. It is unclear whether an Israeli strike would spur a “rally around the flag” effect in Iran, generating support for the despised regime. If it did, it would clearly be a real negative implication of a strike. This is one of those critical unknowns.