Close Menu
    Facebook Instagram LinkedIn
    • العربية (Arabic)
    • English
    • Français (French)
    Facebook Instagram LinkedIn
    Middle East Transparent
    • Home
    • Categories
      1. Headlines
      2. Features
      3. Commentary
      4. Magazine
      5. Cash economy
      Featured
      Headlines Yusuf Kanli

      Confidence in Trump: A test written in Venezuela, read in Cyprus and Ukraine

      Recent
      10 January 2026

      Confidence in Trump: A test written in Venezuela, read in Cyprus and Ukraine

      9 January 2026

      Liquidity at the Core of Lebanon’s Financial Deposit Repayment Act

      6 January 2026

      Talk and Plot: Teheran Double Game with the Sharaa Regime

    • Contact us
    • Archives
    • Subscribe
    • العربية (Arabic)
    • English
    • Français (French)
    Middle East Transparent
    You are at:Home»Iraq’s Jihadi Jack-in-the-Box

    Iraq’s Jihadi Jack-in-the-Box

    0
    By Sarah Akel on 20 June 2014 Uncategorized

    ( Read the full report in PDF->http://www.crisisgroup.org/ /media/Files/Middle%20East%20North%20Africa/Iraq%20Syria%20Lebanon/Iraq/b038-iraq-s-jihadi-jack-in-the-box.pdf?utm_source=iraq-report&utm_medium=3&utm_campaign=mremail)

    Within days, the jihadist group Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL) conquered parts of north-western Iraq and revealed the fragility of a country ruined by sectarianism, hollowed-out institutions and high-level, pervasive corruption. Accumulated grievances of Sunnis in the area meant that ISIL pushed against a house of cards. But its possibilities are limited and a kneejerk international military intervention risks stoking the conflict instead of containing it. The International Crisis Group’s latest briefing, Iraq’s Jihadi Jack-in-the-Box, outlines necessary actions by Iraq, Iran, the U.S. and the wider international community to end the harmful course of events and reverse its underlying drivers.

    The briefing’s major findings and recommendations are:

    ISIL’s advance has highlighted all that has been wrong with the Iraqi government’s Sunni strategy, which sacrificed political reforms in the interest of fighting “terrorism” – a term used for all forms of Sunni violence but not for Shiite equivalents. This strategy enhanced polarisation and prepared the ground for the successful jihadi push in the north.

    International actors collectively failed to exert the necessary pressure on the Iraqi government to change its policy.

    Despite their recent conquests, jihadis are not on the verge of storming Baghdad, nor is an all-out civil war inevitable. It could, however, be triggered by a disproportionate Iraqi Shiite and Iranian response that would cause Sunni ranks to close around the jihadis.

    Iran and the U.S. should avoid a precipitate military response. Deployment of Iranian troops, who would be seen as a Shiite-Persian occupation force in Sunni-Arab territory, would bolster the jihadis’ standing further. The U.S., instead of rushing to send advisers, special troops or air power, should lay out plainly what it is willing to do to help Iraq address the ISIL challenge militarily but base its help on the premise that the government immediately implements overdue political reforms.

    Iraq should form a genuine government of national unity, with meaningful Sunni inclusion and based on the recent election results, as the basis for national reconciliation.

    ISIL’s rise is largely due to the growing integration of the Iraqi and Syrian arenas. Any lasting solution must be based on an integrated approach to those two arenas, possibly on the basis of a UN Security Council resolution if the Council’s disunity on Syria can be reduced.

    “Under Prime Minister Maliki, the security apparatus has been undermined, parliament made toothless and other institutions gutted” says Maria Fantappie, Iraq Analyst. “All could see it, but it took swathes of the country falling to jihadis to put the extent of state deterioration in perspective”.

    “A U.S. military response alone will achieve very little and could even worsen the situation”, says Peter Harling, Senior Middle East and North Africa Adviser. “Counter-insurgency cannot be successful without an effective Iraqi army to ‘clear’, an accepted Iraqi police to ‘hold’, and a legitimate Iraqi political leadership to build”.

    Read the full report in PDF

    Share. Facebook Twitter LinkedIn Email WhatsApp Copy Link
    Previous ArticleISIS, Iraq, and the War in Syria: Military Outlook
    Next Article Why the Arab Spring went wrong

    Comments are closed.

    RSS Recent post in french
    • Pourquoi la pomme de la tyrannie tombe-t-elle toujours ? 10 January 2026 Walid Sinno
    • La liberté comme dette — et comme devoir trahi par les gouvernants 2 January 2026 Walid Sinno
    • La « Gap Law »: pourquoi la précipitation, et pourquoi les Français ? 30 December 2025 Pierre-Étienne Renaudin
    • Au Liban, une réforme cruciale pour sortir enfin de la crise 23 December 2025 Sibylle Rizk
    • Le Grand Hôtel Abysse sert toujours des repas en 2025 16 December 2025 Walid Sinno
    RSS Recent post in arabic
    • أموال رئيسة فنزويلا وأموال “مادورو” مجمّدة في سويسرا منذ 2018  10 January 2026 سويس أنفو
    • ليبيا واستراتيجية “القفل الفولاذي”: نموذج الاستقرار القسري 2026 10 January 2026 أبو القاسم المشاي
    • ثرثرة على ضفّة “الحركة” بمناسبة الذكرى الحادية والستين لانطلاقة حركة فتح! 10 January 2026 هشام دبسي
    • طالبت الغرب بالتدخّل، عبادي: قطع الإنترنيت في إيران مقدّمة لارتكاب “مجرزة”! 10 January 2026 شفاف- خاص
    • هل الجمهورية الإسلامية على وشك الانهيار؟ 9 January 2026 خاص بالشفاف
    26 February 2011

    Metransparent Preliminary Black List of Qaddafi’s Financial Aides Outside Libya

    6 December 2008

    Interview with Prof Hafiz Mohammad Saeed

    7 July 2009

    The messy state of the Hindu temples in Pakistan

    27 July 2009

    Sayed Mahmoud El Qemany Apeal to the World Conscience

    8 March 2022

    Russian Orthodox priests call for immediate end to war in Ukraine

    Recent Comments
    • P. Akel on The Grand Hôtel Abysse Is Serving Meals in 2025
    • Rev Aso Patrick Vakporaye on Sex Talk for Muslim Women
    • Sarah Akel on The KGB’s Middle East Files: Palestinians in the service of Mother Russia
    • Andrew Campbell on The KGB’s Middle East Files: Palestinians in the service of Mother Russia
    • farouk itani on A Year Later, Lebanon Still Won’t Stand Up to Hezbollah
    Donate
    © 2026 Middle East Transparent

    Type above and press Enter to search. Press Esc to cancel.