Close Menu
    Facebook Instagram LinkedIn
    • العربية (Arabic)
    • English
    • Français (French)
    Facebook Instagram LinkedIn
    Middle East Transparent
    • Home
    • Categories
      1. Headlines
      2. Features
      3. Commentary
      4. Magazine
      5. Cash economy
      Featured
      Headlines Shaffaf Exclusive

      Talk and Plot: Teheran Double Game with the Sharaa Regime

      Recent
      6 January 2026

      Talk and Plot: Teheran Double Game with the Sharaa Regime

      5 January 2026

      When “law enforcement” looks like piracy: The Maduro seizure, Türkiye’s caution, and the “precedent” problem

      5 January 2026

      The Financial Stabilization and Deposits Repayment Act: A Controversial Step in Lebanon’s Crisis Management

    • Contact us
    • Archives
    • Subscribe
    • العربية (Arabic)
    • English
    • Français (French)
    Middle East Transparent
    You are at:Home»Shield Lebanon from the Arab upheavals

    Shield Lebanon from the Arab upheavals

    0
    By Michael Young on 24 March 2011 Uncategorized

    Two developments in the past 24 hours, one inside Lebanon, the other in neighboring Syria, have the potential to exacerbate communal relations between Sunnis and Shiites in the coming months. It would be irresponsible for Lebanese officials, on both sides of the country’s growing political divide, do nothing about this.

    The first is news that the prime minister-elect, Najib Mikati, has shown President Michel Sleiman the first draft of his Cabinet lineup. If a government is formed soon, all the indications are that it will harden dissension in Beirut. Hezbollah and Michel Aoun will use the government to advance agendas that March 14 views as anathema. At the same time, the departing prime minister, Saad Hariri, has made public censure of Hezbollah and its weapons a cornerstone of his political strategy, and this will extend to the new Cabinet. The predictable result of all this is a widening of the Sunni-Shiite rift.

    The second development comes from Syria, where the news on Wednesday was that the security forces had stormed a mosque in Daraa, killing at least six people. It’s unclear where the situation is going, but things are more likely to get worse than better in the foreseeable future. The great danger is that Syrian instability will eventually take on a sectarian coloring. And what happens in Syria could have daunting sectarian repercussions in Beirut.

    Lebanese politicians have rarely appeared so at odds with one another, and never have they allowed their disagreements to be expressed as much, explicitly or implicitly, in sectarian terms. Indeed, they have come to rely inordinately on sectarian symbolism, solidarities, and animosities to rally support. Complicating matters, the politicians have linked these actions to similar impulses regionally.

    It is perfectly understandable for Hariri to condemn Sayyed Hassan Nasrallah when the Hezbollah leader chooses to immerse himself in the affairs of Bahrain, where Sunnis and Shiites are fighting over the kingdom’s future. Lebanon, given its complex sectarian makeup, has no interest in taking a stand on Bahrain, let alone playing along with Nasrallah’s ambition to bolster other Arab upheavals (though Hezbollah has been dead silent on repression in Iran and Syria).

    However, Hariri has also shown little hesitation in pushing the sectarian envelope, albeit more subtly. His foreign allegiances were all too clear on March 13, when a large portrait of King Abdullah of Saudi Arabia was unfurled above Martyrs Square. And by focusing on Hezbollah’s arms without offering a political quid pro quo as an incentive to the Shiite community, all the caretaker prime minister and March 14 are doing is strengthening a perception among Shiites that disarmament is a byword for their marginalization.

    As implausible as this may sound, now is the time for Hariri and Nasrallah to establish mechanisms to cushion the ominous impact of regional turmoil on Lebanese affairs. Regardless of the profound personal tensions between the two men, the incompatibility between Hariri’s vision of Lebanon and Hezbollah’s, their divergences over the Special Tribunal for Lebanon, and much else, the benchmark they should adopt is a simple one: a Sunni-Shiite conflict in Lebanon would be devastating for all; it would be just as fatal to Hezbollah as it would to the political and social system that Hariri seeks to promote.

    The safety nets that Lebanon once enjoyed to contain its problems have all precariously eroded in recent years. Arab diplomacy, always on hand to intercede and lessen friction in Beirut, is in disarray because of Arab disarray. Constitutional institutions, which were created to manage political and inter-communal interaction, have been seriously undermined by a succession of events. They were ransacked during the time of Syrian tutelage; and during the post-2005 period, when Hezbollah and its allies faced off against March 14, the constitution was repeatedly undermined for political convenience.

    What can Nasrallah and Hariri do to avert the worse? A good starting point is to greatly calm their rhetoric and that of their allies and partisans, and grasp, as much as possible, that everything they say is being fed by the Lebanese into a template of regional confrontation. Such advice may sound nonsensical when both sides have embarked on a systematic effort to delegitimize the other – Hariri by challenging Hezbollah’s arms, Hezbollah by accusing March 14 of siding with Israel during the summer 2006 war. However, neither side will eliminate the other. Hezbollah will not succeed in imposing its writ on Lebanon, and March 14 is living under an illusion if it imagines that the weapons quarrel, or even an indictment issued by the special tribunal naming Hezbollah members, will mean the party’s downfall.

    Beyond the rhetoric, Hariri and Nasrallah must set up a group whose role would be to act as a regular channel between the two leaders, its main purpose to identify and neutralize looming sectarian flashpoints. This team could include both men’s closest advisers, but the most important thing is that it remain secret and continue to meet regardless of the public stances taken by the leaders. Over and above this, Hariri and Nasrallah should urge Michel Sleiman to resume the national dialogue sessions, the principal item of discussion being the shielding of Lebanon from regional tremors. While that forum may become a futile talk shop, it would also bring in all communal leaders and reassure the Lebanese that conciliatory exchanges are always possible. This would help reduce the pressures in the street.

    Of course, such an approach would only scratch the surface in absorbing the force of sectarian strains. But Lebanon’s leaders, for once, must transcend their narrow, parochial calculations and accept that the country invariably distils what happens in the Middle East, and often the very worst of what happens in the Middle East. Whichever instrument or medium they adopt, Hariri and Nasrallah must stay in contact, even through the toughest of times.

    Michael Young is opinion editor of THE DAILY STAR and author of “The Ghosts of Martyrs Square: An Eyewitness Account of Lebanon’s Life Struggle” (Simon & Schuster).

    Share. Facebook Twitter LinkedIn Email WhatsApp Copy Link
    Previous ArticleSaudi polls, aid sweeteners not enough: activists
    Next Article Don’t kill them because they’re Shia!

    Comments are closed.

    RSS Recent post in french
    • La liberté comme dette — et comme devoir trahi par les gouvernants 2 January 2026 Walid Sinno
    • La « Gap Law »: pourquoi la précipitation, et pourquoi les Français ? 30 December 2025 Pierre-Étienne Renaudin
    • Au Liban, une réforme cruciale pour sortir enfin de la crise 23 December 2025 Sibylle Rizk
    • Le Grand Hôtel Abysse sert toujours des repas en 2025 16 December 2025 Walid Sinno
    • Au cœur de Paris, l’opaque machine à cash de l’élite libanaise 5 December 2025 Clément Fayol
    RSS Recent post in arabic
    • ردّاً على فاخر السلطان: إما قانون دولي يُحترم، أو فوضى يدفع ثمَنَها الجميع 5 January 2026 د. فيصل الصابغ
    • بيان جمعية المصارف حول “مشروع قانون الانتظام المالي واسترداد الودائع” 5 January 2026 الشفّاف
    • فنزويلا الملاذُ الآمن لقيادات حزب الله والعلماء النوويين الإيرانيين! 4 January 2026 خاص بالشفاف
    • دونالد ترامب ممزّق بين الإمارات العربية المتحدة والمملكة العربية السعودية 4 January 2026 خاص بالشفاف
    • هَلَّلتُم لاعتقال “صدام”.. فلماذا اعتقالُ مادورو “بلطجة”! 3 January 2026 فاخر السلطان
    26 February 2011

    Metransparent Preliminary Black List of Qaddafi’s Financial Aides Outside Libya

    6 December 2008

    Interview with Prof Hafiz Mohammad Saeed

    7 July 2009

    The messy state of the Hindu temples in Pakistan

    27 July 2009

    Sayed Mahmoud El Qemany Apeal to the World Conscience

    8 March 2022

    Russian Orthodox priests call for immediate end to war in Ukraine

    Recent Comments
    • P. Akel on The Grand Hôtel Abysse Is Serving Meals in 2025
    • Rev Aso Patrick Vakporaye on Sex Talk for Muslim Women
    • Sarah Akel on The KGB’s Middle East Files: Palestinians in the service of Mother Russia
    • Andrew Campbell on The KGB’s Middle East Files: Palestinians in the service of Mother Russia
    • farouk itani on A Year Later, Lebanon Still Won’t Stand Up to Hezbollah
    Donate
    © 2026 Middle East Transparent

    Type above and press Enter to search. Press Esc to cancel.