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(No Mush No: Ex-ISI head Hamid Gul at an anti-Musharraf rally in Islamabad, Jan 31)
A bid is on to keep the army apolitical. Only an ISI revamp can ensure its finality.
It was a sight unprecedented in Pakistan’s history, an event symbolic of the deep divisions in its polity. On a bitterly cold Tuesday—this February 5—retired army officers gathered outside the General Headquarters of the Pakistan army in Rawalpindi to protest against one of their very own former colleagues. They waved placards on which were inscribed the slogans they were shouting—”Go Musharraf Go”, “No Musharraf No”. Among those who participated in the demonstration were former corps commanders, lieutenant generals and generals.
Four days prior to that, these ex-army officers had vented their anger against Pakistan President Pervez Musharraf at a public meeting organised under the aegis of the All Pakistan Ex-Servicemen Society. Then too, superannuated officers demanded that Musharraf should resign as president because he had ceased to symbolise the unity of the federation of Pakistan. “We should also work together to strengthen democracy by removing the only impediment in its way—Musharraf,” said former chief Gen Mirza Aslam Beg, adding that he should in fact hand over power to deposed chief justice Iftikhar Chaudhry. Further, they apologised to the nation for the army’s role in subverting democracy and repeatedly foisting dictatorship on it.
A letter Gen Kayani, above left, wrote to his subordinates tacitly meant it was time for Musharraf to go, an expert says.
The clamour of former army officers invited a prompt riposte from Musharraf, who dismissed them as “disenchanted job-seeking retired generals.” Federal information minister Nisar Memon too was dismissive. “They should themselves tender an apology to the nation for their possible role in the previous interregna of military intervention,” he said. Indeed, some of the agitating fomer officers have a dubious record—Air Marshal Asghar Khan had written a letter to Gen Zia-ul-Haq in 1977, asking him to stage a coup; Ex-Servicemen Society’s president Faiz Ali Chisti became the deputy martial law administrator under Gen Zia; and former chief of army staff (COAS) Mirza Aslam Beg was involved in rigging the 1990 elections.
Either these senior ex-officers have been influenced by the recent ferment in Pakistan or they feel Musharraf’s rule has undermined the army’s interest. Perhaps their audacity can also be traced to a letter that COAS Ashfaq Pervez Kiyani wrote to those currently serving under him. Kiyani cautioned the officers against indulging in politics and advised them to adhere to their professional responsibilities. Ikram Sehgal, editor of Defence Journal, offered this interpretation, “Kiyani’s letter…is an indirect way of conveying to Musharraf that it’s time for him to go.”
However, Sehgal says this doesn’t mean the army is on the verge of forcing Musharraf out of office. For the moment, Kiyani will concentrate on reversing the damage inflicted on the army by his predecessor. As Sehgal explains, “Under Musharraf, military officers were installed in many influential civilian posts, alienating Pakistanis, who saw this as an abuse of power. By recalling these people, Kiyani is sending a very strong message.” Others feel Kiyani’s intervention has come about also because of the army’s loss of focus under Musharraf from its primary responsibilities, manifest in the setbacks it suffered in fighting the insurgents in the border areas. The Pakistan army can better realise its objectives, says Rashed Rahman, editor, The Post, “by harnessing the professional capabilities of the army. That would require removing it from those undertakings (read politics) that serve to weaken its punch.”
But, accustomed to enjoying powers and privileges in a democracy, it is moot whether the army as an institution will completely—and silently—withdraw from politics.
For one, it can wield influence through Musharraf whose civilian attire can’t conceal the source of his power. Its corollary is equally true—Musharraf can’t stay in power without the army dipping its toes in politics.
Analysts feel Kiyani may withdraw officers from civilian postings, but the army will play a decisive role in politics through the all-powerful ISI. For instance, Air Marshal (retd) Asghar Khan feels depoliticisation of the ISI is a prerequisite before the army can be distanced from politics. As Khan told Outlook, “It’s the internal wing of the ISI which has been greatly involved in the national politics since the ’70s. I’m still curious to know if Gen Kiyani is also planning to confine the ISI to its legitimate role of intelligence gathering by dissolving its internal political wing.”
Pakistan’s military dictators, says political scientist Hasan Askari Rizvi, trust the ISI because, unlike other agencies, it is part of the military brotherhood. For those who don’t know, the ISI draws its senior officers from the army. Even Kiyani as ISI chief, before he became COAS, negotiated with Benazir Bhutto on Musharraf’s behalf for hammering out a deal for democracy.
Not only this, the ISI was accused of manipulating the 1990 election to favour the Islami Jamhoori Ittehad—an alliance of rightist and Islamist parties. A case in this regard is still pending with the Supreme Court. It originated in June ’96 from a letter by Air Marshal Asghar Khan to chief justice Sajjad Ali Shah, asking him to take appropriate action against interior minister Major General (retd) Naseerullah Khan Babar who had declared in the National Assembly, “The ISI collected some Rs 140 million from the Habib Bank Ltd and distributed among a number of politicians prior to the 1990 general election.” He further said, “You never know how many elections have been rigged and manoeuvred by the ISI in the past.”
Among the respondents in the case was former COAS Mirza Aslam Beg, who said in his written reply to the Supreme Court that it “had been routine for the ISI to support the favourite candidates in elections under directives of the successive chief executives.” Admitting to having received the Rs 140 million, he said, “The ISI director-general also informed me that funds so received were properly handled and the accounts were maintained. I had also briefed the then president, Ghulam Ishaq Khan, on the matter.”
This is why analysts say the success of Kiyani’s reform plan depends on his ability to circumscribe the ISI’s role in politics. The army as an institution must understand that its interests transcends those of individuals. It consequently must distance itself from Musharraf to reduce the collateral damage in case his ship starts sinking. Says political analyst Babar Sattar: “As Musharraf refuses to acknowledge lengthening shadows as an ominous sign of impending sunset, his parent organisation might need to borrow from the wisdom he preached to justify both his coups: ‘In dire circumstances one needs to sever a limb to save the body.'”
http://www.outlookindia.com/full.asp?fodname=20080218&fname=Pak+%28F%29&sid=1