September 6, 2010
Glyn Davies, the United States Permanent Representative to the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) in Vienna, said recently that the time for a special inspection in Syria is fast approaching. Syria was secretly building a nuclear reactor in the Dair Alzour region before it was bombed by Israeli jets in September 2007. In an August 6, 2010 Wall Street Journal report, Davies noted that it has been “years since the IAEA had its one crack at this. And it came away with more questions than answers.” Indeed, Syria continues to deny it even had a reactor under construction. Although Syria allowed the IAEA to partially inspect this site once in June 2008, it has answered very few of the IAEA’s questions. It has repeatedly denied the IAEA’s requests for additional information or access again to the reactor site and to a number of other suspect sites.
Davies added, “We as shareholders in the system need to talk about this and find the way forward for the Agency and to help the [IAEA’s] Director General.” Because of Syria’s refusal to cooperate, and the possibility that the reactor was part of a nuclear weapons effort, Davies is right. The IAEA Secretariat and its Board of Governors should start the process of calling for a special inspection. Without adequate Syrian cooperation, the November 2010 Board of Governors meeting should call for one.
Why a Special Inspection
A special inspection is necessary in order to gain a better understanding of Syria’s undeclared activities, some of which may continue. Syria has refused to sign the IAEA’s Additional Protocol, an advanced inspection agreement aimed at discovering undeclared nuclear facilities and materials. Under the traditional safeguards agreement signed by Syria under the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), one of the few tools to investigate undeclared nuclear activities is the special inspection.1 The IAEA can call for this type of inspection, although in practice the Board of Governors will need to approve it.
The IAEA does not often call for a special inspection—this is reserved for extreme situations where a particularly egregious safeguards violation is suspected and where the member state has demonstrated a lack of cooperation. In 1993, concerned that North Korea had conducted undeclared plutonium reprocessing campaigns, the IAEA requested a special inspection after North Korea denied access to suspect sites. That a NPT signatory could separate plutonium in covert reprocessing campaigns and stonewall the IAEA threatened not only the international community but also the legitimacy of the IAEA and the value of verification measures that NPT parties must adhere to.
Although not as urgent as the North Korean example, the current situation with Syria also warrants a special inspection. The Syrian reactor project stands as one of the most egregious cases of nuclear proliferation. Since the IAEA began to investigate in 2008, Syria has largely refused to cooperate with the IAEA’s investigation. If the IAEA cannot make any further progress in its investigation, its credibility is eroded and verification in general is undermined.
As more time goes by, it will become inherently more difficult for the IAEA to conduct its investigations into Syria’s activities. A special inspection will prevent Syria from further hiding its activities related to the reactor construction project. The passage of time may also make Syria more comfortable stonewalling IAEA requests for access to certain people, facilities, or documents. Syria can, for example, claim that certain individuals have left the country or died. The sooner a special inspection takes place, the fewer opportunities Syria will have to cover up evidence about the project.
Although the reactor has been destroyed, and despite the manner in which that occurred, the IAEA needs to provide the requisite international verification that Syria does not still have undeclared nuclear facilities or materials, whether of North Korean-origin or not.