Close Menu
    Facebook Instagram LinkedIn
    • العربية (Arabic)
    • English
    • Français (French)
    Facebook Instagram LinkedIn
    Middle East Transparent
    • Home
    • Categories
      1. Headlines
      2. Features
      3. Commentary
      4. Magazine
      5. Cash economy
      Featured
      Headlines Ronald Sandee

      New Front to be Opened in Kurdish areas of Iran

      Recent
      4 March 2026

      New Front to be Opened in Kurdish areas of Iran

      3 March 2026

      A return to the same process, or a new modality?

      2 March 2026

      The Death of Khamenei and the End of an Era

    • Contact us
    • Archives
    • Subscribe
    • العربية (Arabic)
    • English
    • Français (French)
    Middle East Transparent
    You are at:Home»France’s War in Mali Lessons for an Expeditionary Army

    France’s War in Mali Lessons for an Expeditionary Army

    0
    By Sarah Akel on 4 November 2014 Uncategorized

    Abstract

    French Army operations in Mali (Operation Serval) in 2013 provide a model for designing and operating an expeditionary force, one that has a number of attributes and competencies that United States Army Chief of Staff General Raymond Odierno has indicated to be requirements for the Army. The model therefore provides a living example that illustrates what meeting those requirements entails, as well as the associated risks. As France’s War in Mali: Lessons for an Expeditionary Army details, the French in Serval demonstrated that they are adept at quickly fielding small yet highly capable forces tailored for specific needs and objectives and reiteratively task organizing as the situation evolves. They have done so in part by pushing modularity below the battalion level, enabling them to disaggregate and reaggregate elements of their brigades. The French have also invested in technologies and vehicles designed to enhance the capabilities of its units at all echelons. Moreover, the French Army, particularly its expeditionary brigades, is for all intents and purposes a regionally aligned force that has a demonstrated ability to leverage its area-specific expertise to compensate for its small size and to work effectively with and among local populations. The French Army also appears to have an operational culture well suited for expeditionary warfare, particularly in austere environments and with limited resources. The aspects of French Army operations in Mali discussed in this report make the French Army a model for building the kind of expeditionary force envisioned by Odierno, and perhaps one that is also increasingly in line with future United States Army budgets. The French example also highlights compromises that are associated with becoming more expeditionary and the attendant risks.

    Key Findings

    Operation Serval Provides an Example of How a Technologically Sophisticated Army Organizes and Fields an Expeditionary Force.

    * The French Army exhibits many of the traits outlined by General Raymond Odierno in his vision of the future force.

    * The French Army in Mali operated using small, scalable, and task-organized combined arms forces and built them up or folded them into larger, scalable formations.

    French Requirements and Resource Limitations Have Led the Army to Adopt a Force Structure Well Suited for Operations Such as Serval.

    * The French use relatively lightly armored wheeled vehicles, which have smaller sustainment requirements compared with heavier, tracked vehicles.
    The French prefer mobility over protection, a choice that reflects their cultural and doctrinal emphasis on maneuver.

    * The French Army draws on an expeditionary culture, which reportedly makes coping with austerity a point of pride and also reinforces certain approaches toward operating among local populations.

    The French Way of War Represented by Serval Might Not Be Optimal for U.S. Commanders, Who Have Greater Resources at Their Disposal.

    * Those resources enable Americans to minimize risk in a manner that the French cannot.

    * Serval does not shed light on France’s capacity to handle more-intense conventional conflicts or provide conventional deterrent power.

    * The French are confident that their success on the battlefield and low casualty rate demonstrate the proficiency of their military, but they took large risks.

    Recommendations

    The Army should examine the French experience for additional insights, including in the following areas:

    * the advisability of reducing protection and fielding lighter vehicles to enhance mobility and reduce sustainment requirements, and in particular the introduction of a vehicle with the weight, protection level, and firepower of the VBCI

    * the potential advantages and costs of pushing modularity below the brigade level to facilitate battalion and company-sized combined arms deployments
    the impact of digitization on small-unit operations

    * the integration of intelligence into lower-echelon operations

    * training to enable company commanders to conduct decentralized, combined arms operations and practice mission command

    * French insights into training and interoperating with West African and Sahelian security forces

    * the costs of France’s rotational equipping strategy (PEGP) and its effect on readiness.

    Read the full report

    Share. Facebook Twitter LinkedIn Email WhatsApp Copy Link
    Previous ArticleHow the U.S., Not Iran, Is Making Concessions
    Next Article In the Syria We Don’t Know

    Comments are closed.

    RSS Recent post in french
    • Le Liban entre la logique de l’État et le suicide iranien 3 March 2026 Dr. Fadil Hammoud
    • Réunion tendue du cabinet : différend entre le Premier ministre et le chef d’état-major des armées, qui a menacé de démissionner ! 3 March 2026 Shaffaf Exclusive
    • En Arabie saoudite, le retour au réalisme de « MBS », contraint d’en rabattre sur ses projets pharaoniques 27 February 2026 Hélène Sallon
    • À Benghazi, quinze ans après, les espoirs déçus de la révolution libyenne 18 February 2026 Maryline Dumas
    • Dans le nord de la Syrie, le barrage de Tichrine, la forteresse qui a résisté aux remous de la guerre civile 17 February 2026 Hélène Sallon
    RSS Recent post in arabic
    • الشيعة والنضال ضد الظلم*: الاختلاف الحادّ حول “ولاية الفقيه” بين المرشد وابنه مجتبى! 3 March 2026 مجتبى خامنئي
    • جلسة حكومية متوترة: خلاف بين رئيس الحكومة وقائد الجيش الذي هدد بالإستقالة! 3 March 2026 خاص بالشفاف
    • إزاحة الغموض عن مشهد الحرب والسلام في سوريا 2 March 2026 أندرو جي تابلر
    • عندما يغرق قارب طهران، هل سيغرق لبنان أم سَيَنجو؟ 1 March 2026 سمارة القزّي
    • أعرافي.. هل هو المرشد الإيراني القادم؟ 1 March 2026 شفاف- خاص
    26 February 2011

    Metransparent Preliminary Black List of Qaddafi’s Financial Aides Outside Libya

    6 December 2008

    Interview with Prof Hafiz Mohammad Saeed

    7 July 2009

    The messy state of the Hindu temples in Pakistan

    27 July 2009

    Sayed Mahmoud El Qemany Apeal to the World Conscience

    8 March 2022

    Russian Orthodox priests call for immediate end to war in Ukraine

    Recent Comments
    • Kamal Richa on When Tehran’s Anchor Falls, Will Lebanon Sink or Swim?
    • me Me on The Disturbing Question at the Heart of the Trump-Zelensky Drama
    • me Me on The Disturbing Question at the Heart of the Trump-Zelensky Drama
    • کمیسیون پارلمان ترکیه قانون موقتی را برای روند خلع سلاح پ ک ک پیشنهاد کرد - MORSHEDI on Turkish parliamentary commission proposes temporary law for PKK disarmament process
    • سیاست آمریکا در قبال لبنان: موانعی برای از بین بردن قدرت حزب الله - MORSHEDI on U.S. Policy Toward Lebanon: Obstacles to Dismantling Hezbollah’s Grip on Power
    Donate
    © 2026 Middle East Transparent

    Type above and press Enter to search. Press Esc to cancel.