The presidential election of the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus (TRNC) has never been merely about personalities. It is a referendum without a referendum — a mirror reflecting not only the future of a divided island but also the unending tug-of-war between autonomy and alignment. On October 19, Turkish Cypriots will go to the polls to elect a president whose official powers are limited, but whose symbolic role could not be greater: to speak, once again, for a community that has lived half a century in diplomatic parenthesis.
The ghosts of 2020
Four years after the fiercely contested 2020 vote, the island still bears the fingerprints of that campaign. Back then, Ersin Tatar’s narrow victory, helped by open Turkish support and the promise of a “new paradigm,” transformed the vocabulary of the Cyprus question. “Federation is dead; long live the two-state solution,” became the mantra of a government confident that history could be rewritten by repetition.
Yet history, in Cyprus, has an inconvenient habit of echoing. In the cafés of Lefkoşa and the seaside bars of Kyrenia, Turkish Cypriots remember how that same declaration of finality was made before — by Rauf Denktaş in the 1980s, by Ankara in the 1990s, by diplomats who later retired to write memoirs titled Why Cyprus Never Changes. The irony, of course, is that the island changes constantly; only the headlines remain the same.
Ankara’s long shadow
In 2025, the political atmosphere feels both familiar and intensified. Turkish Vice President Cevdet Yılmaz has visited three times in as many months; mayors from Gaziantep and Hatay have campaigned in villages populated by their emigrants; Turkish media outlets treat the vote as if it were a municipal election in Anatolia. Officially, Türkiye insists it will work with whoever wins. Unofficially, the machinery of affection is hard at work.
This overt involvement, while resented by some, is not entirely unwelcome. The pragmatic voter in Morphou or İskele knows that without Türkiye’s support there is no budget, no fuel, no electricity grid, and — as the ongoing embargoes remind everyone — no external lifeline. What irritates is not the dependence itself but the theatrical denial of it.
During my recent interviews, Ersin Tatar defended that interdependence as a “strategic partnership.” “We are not anyone’s satellite,” he said, “we are the Turkish Cypriot State, cooperating with our guarantor on equal footing.” To his critics, that equality sounds more aspirational than constitutional.
Tatar’s pitch: Sovereignty by assertion
Tatar’s campaign is not about promising transformation; it is about securing validation. His three Ds — Direct Flights, Direct Trade, Direct Contact — have become the campaign’s holy trinity. None currently exist, yet repeating them creates the illusion of motion.
At rallies, he speaks the language of self-respect through separation: no to a federation that “subordinates us under Greek Cypriot domination,” yes to sovereign equality “already achieved in practice.” Türkiye’s President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan could not have phrased it better — and, in fact, he has.
The Greek Cypriot press depicts this as irredentism by proxy. In reality, it is resignation dressed as defiance. The two-state vision reflects not expansionist ambition but negotiation fatigue. Turkish Cypriots have watched plan after plan collapse — from Annan in 2004 to Crans-Montana in 2017 — usually after Greek Cypriot rejection rewarded by EU membership. Tatar’s supporters now see recognition through endurance as the only realistic path: remain functional long enough and the world will adjust to your existence.
Erhürman’s proposition: Reform through reconciliation
Enter Tufan Erhürman, a constitutional scholar who speaks with the calm precision of someone allergic to slogans. His federation model — bizonal, bicommunal, with political equality and rotating presidency — sounds almost nostalgic in today’s polarized climate. Yet his emphasis on results-oriented negotiations and phased implementation introduces a realism often missing from UN scripts.
In our discussion, Erhürman refused to treat federation as dogma. “We can call it cooperation, partnership, functional federalism — what matters is shared decision-making,” he said. He is aware of Türkiye’s skepticism but argues that genuine dialogue could yield a managed coexistence acceptable to both sides.
Erhürman’s problem is not logic but atmosphere. In 2025, federation has become a four-letter word north of the Green Line, synonymous with betrayal or naivety. He therefore reframes his campaign around accountability, governance, and dignity — domestic concerns that transcend ideology. His audiences, particularly young professionals and educators, respond to that tone of normalcy as something radical: politics without shouting.
The electorate’s paradox
Roughly 218 thousand voters are registered; demographers estimate that 55–60 percent are native Turkish Cypriots, the rest settlers or descendants of migrants from Türkiye. Greek Cypriot analysts often interpret this as demographic engineering. On the ground, the story is more complex: many of those “settlers” have lived decades in the north, raised families, built businesses, and now express a hybrid identity — Anatolian roots, Cypriot rhythms. Their votes are unpredictable, oscillating between conservative loyalty and local frustration.
The popular narrative that these voters are a monolithic Erdoğanist bloc collapses under scrutiny. Some are religiously conservative yet critical of Ankara’s bureaucracy; others are staunchly secular but vote UBP out of economic dependency. For all the talk of manipulation, Turkish Cypriot elections remain stubbornly pluralistic — messy, emotional, and rarely obedient to scripts.
Between patron and partner
The most delicate balance, however, lies in the Ankara–Lefkoşa axis. Both Tatar and Erhürman, despite their rhetorical contrast, acknowledge the inevitability of coordination with Türkiye. The difference lies in tone.
Tatar speaks of brotherhood; Erhürman of consultation. Tatar frames Türkiye as guarantor; Erhürman as stakeholder. In essence, both recognize that the TRNC’s international isolation transforms Ankara into not just a partner but an environment — the oxygen of the system.
Yet the Turkish Cypriot debate today is not about whether Türkiye should be involved, but how far Ankara’s involvement should extend. Should it dictate domestic appointments, university boards, even cultural programming? Or should it confine itself to defence and diplomacy?
These are questions whispered more than spoken. To raise them openly invites accusations of ingratitude — a cardinal sin in small societies. Still, beneath the politeness lies a growing conviction: the north cannot demand recognition abroad while suppressing diversity at home.
Federation fatigue, sovereignty skepticism
Both camps share one hidden premise: the status quo is untenable. Where they diverge is in the direction of escape.
Tatar’s followers see salvation in consolidation — a gradual normalization of statehood through regional alliances such as the Organisation of Turkic States (OTS). His recent trip to the OTS summit in Gabala, where he pitched Northern Cyprus as a “Sister Market,” symbolised this strategy: build functional legitimacy step by step, bypassing the West’s diplomatic blockade.
Erhürman’s camp, conversely, argues that legitimacy cannot be self-declared. Without engagement with the Greek Cypriots and the EU, the north risks ossifying into dependency. They propose a “flexible federal/confederal model” grounded in existing UN resolutions but adaptable to new realities. To Greek Cypriot ears, that sounds inconsistent; to pragmatic Turkish Cypriots, it sounds like the only way forward without surrendering face.
The Greek Cypriot lens: Selective illumination
The Greek Cypriot article framing this debate presents a reasonably accurate outline but through a predictably moral lens: Tatar as obstacle, Erhürman as opportunity, Türkiye as puppeteer. Such portrayals omit the cyclical disappointment that shapes Turkish Cypriot psychology.
Since 1963, when intercommunal governance collapsed, Turkish Cypriots have lived in a perpetual transition that never transitions. Every promise of reunification has ended with the same refrain: “next time.” When Greek Cypriot commentators lament Tatar’s “narrative of fear,” they overlook that fear’s genealogy — Akritas Plan violence, embargoes, economic isolation. Fear may be a poor negotiator, but it is an excellent memory.
Similarly, Erhürman is idealised in the south as the “last moderate,” a trope that flatters Greek Cypriot self-perception as benevolent realists awaiting a reasonable counterpart. Yet many Greek Cypriot leaders — including the current President Christodoulides — publicly reaffirm the very positions that nullify those hopes: rejection of political equality, veto on rotating presidency, insistence on one international identity. The rhetoric of openness meets the reality of constitutional monopoly.
The regional chessboard
Behind the Cypriot theatre lies the grander game. Since 2023, the eastern Mediterranean has turned from an energy promise into a security headache. The Israel–Iran conflict, the re-militarisation of Crete, the joint drills between the Greek Cypriot administration, Israel, France, and the US, all reconfigure Cyprus as an unsinkable aircraft carrier rather than a bridge of peace.
Türkiye’s reaction — deeper ties with the Turkic world, cautious rapprochement with Egypt, and tactical silence toward the EU — forms the backdrop of this election. Ankara’s two-state advocacy is not merely ideological; it is strategic. A recognized or semi-recognized TRNC strengthens Türkiye’s exclusive economic zone (EEZ) claims and reduces legal ambiguity over continental shelf rights.
Conversely, a revived federation could complicate those claims by inserting Brussels into the equation. Hence, Turkish support for Tatar is not just political solidarity but geopolitical geometry.
The Erhürman paradox
Still, Ankara’s diplomats are pragmatic. If Tufan Erhürman wins, few expect a rupture. In interviews, he repeatedly stressed that his first visit as president would be to Ankara, as tradition dictates. “There has never been, and there will never be, a Turkish Cypriot leader who clashes with Türkiye,” he told me. “We may discuss different methods, but the goal — security and dignity for our people — remains shared.”
That assurance, repeated publicly, aims to neutralize suspicion and open space for experimentation. Erhürman’s success, should he win, will depend on convincing both Türkiye and the Greek Cypriot leadership that dialogue can resume without humiliation. He must avoid appearing as Ankara’s spokesman, yet cannot afford to alienate it; he must seek UN talks, yet not chase photo opportunities.
A delicate choreography — and one in which every misstep will be televised.
The economics of endurance
Beyond constitutional abstractions, Turkish Cypriots face economic gravity. Inflation imported from Türkiye erodes salaries faster than political slogans can be printed. Youth migration continues; even skilled professionals increasingly seek EU passports via mixed marriages.
In that sense, the election is less about foreign policy than the psychology of belonging. Tatar promises security through sameness; Erhürman promises dignity through change. Both speak to anxieties rather than ambitions. The tragedy is that neither can unilaterally deliver what the people most crave: recognition that is not conditional.
Europe’s convenient amnesia
Meanwhile, Brussels watches with the patience of a distracted accountant. The EU, which once brandished the Annan referendum as proof of moral superiority, now treats the north as a bureaucratic inconvenience. Aid programs flow, symbolic gestures are made — yet no direct trade, no flights, no serious effort to include Turkish Cypriots in decision-making.
European diplomats whisper that they cannot “reward secession.” Turkish Cypriots counter that they are being punished for obedience. They said “yes” in 2004, and received isolation; the “no” voters received membership cards. Few psychological wounds in modern Europe run deeper.
The politics of fatigue
Political fatigue has become the island’s lingua franca. The Greek Cypriot south, prosperous yet paranoid, repeats security mantras while buying Barak MX missiles from Israel. The Turkish Cypriot north, dependent yet defiant, repeats sovereignty mantras while applying for EU citizenship. Both halves act out the rituals of statehood without the serenity of it.
In this climate, slogans such as “two-state reality” or “federal solution” function more as emotional placeholders than policies. What unites both communities, paradoxically, is a sense of having been deceived by everyone else — by the UN, by guarantor powers, by their own leaders.
Between recognition and relevance
If Ersin Tatar wins, expect a renewed diplomatic push for de facto recognition through regional institutions — the OTS, ECO, perhaps even limited OIC observer upgrades. The strategy will be to accumulate enough international presence to render isolation obsolete.
If Tufan Erhürman wins, expect a rebranding of engagement: a bid to resume UN-sponsored talks under a new label — “cooperative sovereignty,” “functional partnership,” or whatever term can satisfy both pride and pragmatism.
In either case, the Greek Cypriot leadership will face the same question it has evaded since 1974: negotiate equality or preside over permanent division. The difference is that this time, the north may no longer be waiting at the gate.
Ironies and inevitabilities
Cyprus is a theatre where irony writes the script. A community internationally unrecognized yet democratically vibrant; an island geographically united yet mentally federalized; a conflict frozen by the very peacekeepers sent to thaw it.
As voting day approaches, taxi drivers in Nicosia joke that “nothing changes except the slogans on the posters.” Perhaps — but every generation reads those slogans differently. The young Turkish Cypriot today, fluent in both Turkish and English, connected to Europe through digital work but rooted in a community of 300 thousand, no longer dreams of abstract reunification. They crave functionality: an airport that operates internationally, an economy that operates legally, and a political system that operates without apology.
The verdict beyond the ballot
When the ballots are counted and the obligatory congratulations exchanged, the true reckoning will begin. Whoever wins must govern an entity that is diplomatically invisible, economically vulnerable, and psychologically divided between nostalgia and necessity.
For Tatar, the challenge will be to transform rhetoric of sovereignty into substance without alienating moderates or over-promising to Ankara. For Erhürman, it will be to translate his legalist optimism into tangible progress while convincing both Türkiye and the Greek Cypriots that compromise is not capitulation.
Either path leads through uncertainty. But perhaps uncertainty, after decades of imposed certainties, is itself progress.
A closing note
In Cyprus, every negotiation begins with déjà vu and ends with déjà désillusion. Yet the persistence of elections, debates, and independent journalism in the north remains a quiet miracle — proof that even in a limbo state, democracy can survive on stubbornness alone.
This Sunday’s vote will not end the Cyprus problem. It will, however, redefine its grammar: not federation versus partition, but dependence versus self-definition. And that, in the long chronicle of Cypriot paradoxes, might be the most realistic debate of all.