Eric Edelman is a distinguished fellow at the Center for Strategic and
Budgetary Assessments and served as undersecretary of defense during
the George W. Bush administration. Dennis Ross is a counselor at the
Washington Institute for Near East Policy and served as a special
assistant to President Obama from 2009 to 2011. Ray Takeyh is a senior
fellow at the Council on Foreign Relations.
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After a decade of patient negotiations with Iran over its
contested nuclear program, the prospects of the United
States and other world powers securing a final deal are not
good. The wheels of diplomacy will grind on and an
extension of the talks should be granted. But it is time to
acknowledge that the policy of engagement has been
predicated on a series of assumptions that, although logical,
have proven largely incorrect. As Washington assesses its
next moves, it would be wise to reconsider the judgments
that have underwritten its approach to one of its most
elusive adversaries.
Two administrations — those of George W. Bush and Barack
administrations — those of George W. Bush and Barack
Obama — have relied on financial stress to temper Iran’s
nuclear ambitions. At its core, this policy has argued that
steady economic pressure would change the calculus of the
Islamic Republic, eventually leading it to concede the most
disturbing aspects of its nuclear program. This was
American pragmatism at its most obvious, as economics is
thought to transcend ideology and history in conditioning
national priorities. To be sure, the policy has not been
without its successes, as it solidified a sanctions regime that
compelled Iran to change its negotiating style. Still, what
was missed was that the Islamic Republic is a revolutionary
state that rarely makes judicious economic decisions. In fact,
the notion of integration into the global economy is
frightening to Iran’s highly ideological rulers, who require an
external nemesis to justify their absolutist rule.
Washington’s diplomatic strategies seemed to be equally
uninformed by the changing dynamics of Iranian politics.
The fraudulent 2009 presidential election was a watershed
event in Iran’s history, as it transformed the Islamic
Republic from a government of factions into just another
Middle Eastern dictatorship. The forces of reform were
purged from the body politic, leaving behind only likeminded
mullahs. While many in the West still view Iran as a
country of quarrelling factions and competing personalities,
the Iranians themselves talk of nezam — the system. This is
not to suggest that there are no disagreements among key
actors, but the system has forged a consensus on core issues
such as repressing dissent and preserving the essential
trajectory of the nuclear program.
The U.S. misdiagnosis of Iran was at its most glaring when
Hassan Rouhani, a clerical apparatchik, assumed the
presidency in 2013. Rouhani’s election was considered a
rebuke to Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei and his
ideological presumptions, and many in Washington
convinced themselves that by investing in Rouhani they
could usher in an age of moderation in Iran. Suddenly, an
empowered Rouhani would make important nuclear
concessions and even collaborate with the United States to
steady an unhinged region. Missing in all this was how the
nezam had come together in 2009, consolidated its power
and destroyed the democratic left. The Obama
administration sought to manipulate Iran’s factions at the
precise moment when factionalism was no longer the
defining aspect of Iranian politics.
Iran will not easily alter its approach. If there is any hope of
changing the Iranian calculus, its leaders must see that the
price — as they measure it — is high. Any coercive strategy
still has to be predicated on further segregating Iran from
global markets and financial institutions; at a time of falling
oil prices, Iran’s economy should prove particularly
vulnerable to such stress.
But this cannot be the end of it. Iran must face pressure
across many fronts, and the Obama administration should
focus on mending fences at home while rehabilitating our
battered alliances in the Middle East. It is important for
Tehran to see that there are no divisions for it to exploit
between the White House and Congress. The president
would be wise to consult with Congress on the parameters of
an acceptable deal and to secure a resolution authorizing
him to use force in the event that Iran violates its obligations
or seeks a breakout capacity.
A new strategy of pressure should also focus on isolating
Iran in its neighborhood and undermining its clients. This
will necessitate U.S. involvement in the region’s many crises.
For both humanitarian and strategic reasons, the United
States must be invested in the outcome of the Syrian civil
war. A nofly zone, at least in the north, could make a
humanitarian, political and military difference in Syria —
and would signal to Iran that the cost of backing dictator
Bashar alAssad will go up. Similarly, the Iraqi government
must be pressured into limiting Iran’s influence. It is
unlikely that Baghdad will move in that direction as long as
our campaign against the Islamic State remains hesitant and
we hint at possible collaboration with Iran there. The core of
the U.S. alliance system in the Middle East remains our close
partnership with Israel. The value of U.S. deterrence is notpartnership with Israel. The value of U.S. deterrence is not
enhanced by perceptions of discord in that essential
relationship.
The purpose of this new, robust and coercive strategy is to
signal our readiness to compete, to show that we don’t need
a deal more than Iran does and to raise the price to Tehran
of its objectionable policies. It is time to press the Iranians to
make the tough choices that they have been unwilling to
make.