Close Menu
    Facebook Instagram LinkedIn
    • العربية (Arabic)
    • English
    • Français (French)
    Facebook Instagram LinkedIn
    Middle East Transparent
    • Home
    • Categories
      1. Headlines
      2. Features
      3. Commentary
      4. Magazine
      5. Cash economy
      Featured
      Headlines Yusuf Kanli

      Mojtaba Khamenei: From silent heir to Supreme Leader

      Recent
      13 March 2026

      Iran Alone

      13 March 2026

      A Farewell to a Mind That Spoke with History: In memory of Prof. Dr. İlber Ortaylı

      13 March 2026

      Lebanon’s failure to disarm Hezbollah keeps doing greater damage

    • Contact us
    • Archives
    • Subscribe
    • العربية (Arabic)
    • English
    • Français (French)
    Middle East Transparent
    You are at:Home»Categories»Features»What do the Muslim Brothers want?

    What do the Muslim Brothers want?

    0
    By يوسف سيدهم on 15 February 2007 Features

    Problems on hold

    Over the past 15 months, since the November 2005 legislative elections, the Muslim Brotherhood (MB) maintained a high public profile through a string of debates, demonstrations and clashes with the police, but without achieving any impact whatsoever on the political, economic or cultural reform fronts.

    In the immediate aftermath of the 2005 parliamentary elections, in which the MB secured 88 seats—20 per cent of all parliamentary seats—I accepted an invitation from my friend Mohammed Abdel-Qodous, who is a MB member, to conduct a dialogue with MB figures. Contrary to claims by some observers that the dialogue was a Coptic-Brotherhood one, I was keen to stress that it was a dialogue among Egyptians under the umbrella of citizenship concepts. Meanwhile, I was convinced that focusing on areas of divergence between myself as a staunch advocate of a civil State and the MB members as promoters of a religious State would do more harm rather than good. I considered it more worthwhile to explore points of convergence, our shared homeland and cultural and civilisational heritage.

    I was eager to steer the dialogue clear off two points. One concerned the ideologies and strategies of the MB, and the other pertained to the position of Copts in the Islamic State the MB aspires to establish. Delving into the first point would have only served to create a climate of distrust and to widen the ideological gap between us, especially since the MB themselves are intentionally vague on the matter. As to the second point, I found it extremely humiliating, on the citizenship rights level, to ask about the fate of Copts in a MB-sponsored Islamic State.

    The MB figures approved my proposal and we agreed to work on mending fences between Copts and Muslims, especially young people who had grown up steeped in the divisive culture which prevailed throughout the past three decades. We stressed the need to focus on shared activities, and ingrain a culture of accepting differences. This is one of the main principles applied by Watani in all the activities it sponsors, such as its Youth Parliament, Journalistic Formation Centre, and the Coexistence Group co-sponsored by the Journalists’ Syndicate. Following up on shared areas of interest proved beneficial in creating a climate favourable to accepting the other. At the time, prominent MB member Essam al-Erian said that the MB’s 20 per cent of parliamentary seats shoulders the group with great responsibility. The group, he said, would thus not concern itself primarily with being at loggerheads with the government, but would embark upon formulating a comprehensive programme for modernity and reform that would take into account the principles of citizenship rights, pluralism, women’s issues, and modern state features.

    That was then. Today, following more than a year in Parliament, the group’s performance leaves much to be desired. I know that many Egyptians, especially intellectuals and politicians, share my wariness. The frequent fanatic declarations by the MB supreme guide, the performance of the group’s MPs, and the military-style parade organised by MB students at al-Azhar University, have all triggered public fears. Last but not least was the latest declaration on the Brotherhood’s intention to form a political party, which dealt a blow to citizenship values. In all these instances, the frightful discriminatory spirit characterising the MB was directed against both Muslims and Copts; the group propagated the message that it monopolised the correct vision of Islam—the sharia of God—and that all other outlooks were sinful and infidel. It reached the point where an honourable MB member announced in Parliament that the Brotherhood’s project of an Islamic State was the sole valid outlook and that anyone who disagreed should go find himself another religion.

    I do not regret my dialogue with the MB, am happy with my friendship with some of the group’s leaders, and am keen to maintain our communication despite disagreement. But when I contemplate the past 15 months, I realise that the gap between the Brotherhood and the Egyptian public has widened, and that the former need to work hard if they are to quell people’s fears.

    Finally, I would like to say that some positive outcome has ensued out of the MB clamour. The supreme guide’s declarations have prompted a general disaffection which proved that most Egyptians are for modernity, and that the cause of citizenship rights is not about Muslims versus Copts, but about an Egyptian majority versus an extremist minority.

    Share. Facebook Twitter LinkedIn Email WhatsApp Copy Link
    Previous ArticleTraffic Cop in an Unsettled Region
    Next Article STATEMENT BY PRESIDENT BUSH

    Comments are closed.

    RSS Recent post in french
    • Le Liban entre la logique de l’État et le suicide iranien 3 March 2026 Dr. Fadil Hammoud
    • Réunion tendue du cabinet : différend entre le Premier ministre et le chef d’état-major des armées, qui a menacé de démissionner ! 3 March 2026 Shaffaf Exclusive
    • En Arabie saoudite, le retour au réalisme de « MBS », contraint d’en rabattre sur ses projets pharaoniques 27 February 2026 Hélène Sallon
    • À Benghazi, quinze ans après, les espoirs déçus de la révolution libyenne 18 February 2026 Maryline Dumas
    • Dans le nord de la Syrie, le barrage de Tichrine, la forteresse qui a résisté aux remous de la guerre civile 17 February 2026 Hélène Sallon
    RSS Recent post in arabic
    • تقييم متشائم: بأُمرة “الحرس” مباشرةً، 30 الف مقاتل في حزب الله ومعركة طويلة 13 March 2026 خاص بالشفاف
    • 500 ألف دولار شهريا لنبيه برّي لدعم نفوذ إيران في بيروت 12 March 2026 إيران إنترناشينال
    • بالفيديو والصور: بلدية صيدا “قَبَعت” القرض الحسن من شارع رياض الصلح! 12 March 2026 خاص بالشفاف
    • “طارق رحمن”: الوجه الجديد في عالم التوريث السياسي 12 March 2026 د. عبدالله المدني
    • صفقة التمكين الأخيرة: السودان ينزع عباءة الأيديولوجيا تحت وطأة المقصلة الأمريكية 12 March 2026 أبو القاسم المشاي
    26 February 2011

    Metransparent Preliminary Black List of Qaddafi’s Financial Aides Outside Libya

    6 December 2008

    Interview with Prof Hafiz Mohammad Saeed

    7 July 2009

    The messy state of the Hindu temples in Pakistan

    27 July 2009

    Sayed Mahmoud El Qemany Apeal to the World Conscience

    8 March 2022

    Russian Orthodox priests call for immediate end to war in Ukraine

    Recent Comments
    • hello world on Between fire and silence: Türkiye in the shadow of a growing regional war
    • بيار عقل on Did Iran just activate Operation Judgement Day?
    • Kamal Richa on When Tehran’s Anchor Falls, Will Lebanon Sink or Swim?
    • me Me on The Disturbing Question at the Heart of the Trump-Zelensky Drama
    • me Me on The Disturbing Question at the Heart of the Trump-Zelensky Drama
    Donate
    © 2026 Middle East Transparent

    Type above and press Enter to search. Press Esc to cancel.