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Once a president is elect in 2025, and whilst the ceasefire is under implementation, and after the fall of the Asad regime in Syria, and with the experience that Lebanon has endured since the early 1990s, an overhaul of the security forces in Lebanon has become a must.
How to go about it?
In a democracy, the allocation of tasks among intelligence services, military services, and police forces is a complex process that requires careful balancing to avoid duplication of efforts, prevent abuses of power, and ensure that each service operates within its defined mandate without interfering with the democratic process. Below are key principles and mechanisms that are typically used to achieve this balance:
1. Clear Definition of Roles and Jurisdictions
Each service—intelligence, military, and police—has a distinct role in a democracy:
- Intelligence Services: Primarily responsible for gathering, analyzing, and reporting on information related to national security, including threats from foreign adversaries, terrorist organizations, or internal subversion. Their activities are generally focused on prevention and strategic planning rather than immediate law enforcement.
- Military Services: Charged with defending the state against external threats. Their tasks are defensive in nature, though they may also be involved in peacekeeping missions or humanitarian efforts abroad. In democracies, the military is typically limited to external operations, with strict rules governing its involvement in domestic matters.
- Police Force: Tasked with maintaining domestic order, enforcing laws, preventing crime, and protecting citizens’ rights. In most democratic systems, the police are involved in investigations, policing public spaces, and responding to immediate threats within the country’s borders.
Practically, as it relates to Lebanon:
The Army: a Constituional Amendment must be passed, without the possibility of any exception even by vote, that no officer in the army, irrespective of his rank, can seek public office before 5 years from leaving his post whether his post has been terminated by retirement or by voluntary resignation. The army’s intelligence services: must be directed at militray intelligence only. No spying on civilians or getting involved in the political affairs of the country and no other mandate should be given it, except securing the army facilities and personnel and gathering intelligence on the strength and belligerent intentions of foreign armies neighboring Lebanon to prevent any attack on Lebanese soil. One exception should be the encampments of Palestinians in Lebanon -and their total disarmament- with the army being given total authority over said camps till a final resolution of this matter is reached.
The Internal Security Forces: to be limited to policing activities (civil infractions and criminal offenses) and to have an intelligence services that would deal with all internal threats: domestic terrorism, drug trafficking, smuggling of arms, explosives and humans, kidnappings, etc.. Again no policing activities relating to peaceful political activities by chartered and licensed Lebanese parties. The scope of the FBI in the US, should be a model for this service.
The General Security: apart from its general duties (issuing passport, fighting couterfait of official documents and of currencies) this service should strictly deal with all activities relating to foreign nationals -from issuing residencies to policing suspicious activities on Lebanese soil including spying, and counter-espionnage. The scope of the DGSE or CIA, should be a model for this service.
The State Security Service (Amn al Dawlah): should be dismentled.
The Military Tribunal: should be narrowly limited in its scope and jurisdiction to the military personnel and not civilians. Special crininal courts, outside the Military jurisdiction, should have the exclsuive jurisdiction over all other offenses including espionnage and terrorism.
2. Oversight and Accountability Mechanisms
Democratic systems implement various layers of oversight to prevent abuses of power by intelligence, military, or police services:
- Independent Oversight Committees: Many democracies establish independent bodies—often legislative committees or specialized oversight agencies—to monitor the activities of these services. For instance, in the U.S., the Intelligence Committees in the Senate and House of Representatives oversee the intelligence community’s operations. Similar committees exist in other democracies, such as the Intelligence and Security Committee in the UK.
- Judicial Oversight: Courts can serve as a check on the activities of these agencies, especially in cases involving civil rights or when agencies exceed their legal mandates. For example, a court may issue warrants for surveillance, ensuring that intelligence services operate within the bounds of the law.
- Internal Oversight: Within each agency, internal watchdogs or inspector general offices are responsible for monitoring the agency’s compliance with laws and ethical standards. This internal oversight helps identify misconduct and prevents the abuse of power before it escalates.
3. Legal Safeguards and Limitations
Legal frameworks play a critical role in limiting the scope of each service’s powers and ensuring that their activities do not infringe upon citizens’ rights:
- Intelligence: The activities of intelligence services are typically restricted by laws that define the circumstances under which surveillance, wiretapping, or covert operations are permitted. This ensures that intelligence agencies do not overstep their bounds and violate individual freedoms.
- Military: The military’s involvement in domestic affairs is generally prohibited except in cases of national emergency or under certain conditions, such as after a declaration of martial law or when responding to threats that the police or local authorities cannot handle.
- Police: Police powers are subject to legal constraints, such as the requirement for a warrant before conducting searches or making arrests. Laws related to the use of force, accountability, and due process are also essential in maintaining the democratic order.
4. Prevention of Politicization
The separation of roles and the principles of accountability and transparency also help prevent the immersion of these services in the democratic process. Politicization can happen when these services are used to suppress political opposition, manipulate elections, or undermine democratic institutions. To prevent this:
- Apolitical Appointment of Leadership: Leadership positions within the military, intelligence, and police services should be filled based on merit, expertise, and adherence to democratic principles rather than political loyalty.
- Non-partisan Law Enforcement: Law enforcement should not be used as a tool for partisan political advantage. Laws regarding election security, anti-corruption efforts, and public safety should be applied evenly, regardless of political affiliation.
Conclusion
The successful allocation of tasks among intelligence services, military, and police forces in a democracy hinges on a system of clear legal mandates, accountability mechanisms, oversight bodies, and separation of powers. These services must be structured to respect individual rights, prevent abuse of power, and remain politically neutral. By instituting robust oversight and transparency while protecting civil liberties, a democracy can maintain security without compromising its foundational values.