Monarchies Of The Arab World In Time Of Revolution

The Arab rebellions which began in December 2011 pressured the monarchies to offer reforms and changes. Although the monarchies have more legitimacy than the long-time rulers of the Arab republics had. But the populations they rule have lived with some of the same lack of political expression, freedoms, and accountability as Arabs under other systems of government. Movements in Jordan and Morocco are trying to gain traction, which is why it is important for the monarchies to present the people with road maps for reform. Moroccan King Mohammed VI has been the most forthcoming in constitutional and political reforms among all the region’s monarchs and has in the short term been able to absorb the energy of the street. This has helped Morocco avoid major instability while also electing a prime minister and a government based on competition between various political parties.

In Jordan King Abdullah II has formed four governments since the Arab spring. Reforms have been limited, however, and challenges from the street movement have gained strength. In May 2012, the resignation of Awn Khasawneh, a reform-oriented prime minister, contributed to the fragmentation of the regime’s political base. Khasawneh had objected to the limitations on his reforms coming from the security apparatus and from the king’s inner circle.
Issues such as unemployment, corruption, democratization, the voting system, and social justice, along with the power of the monarch versus the power of the parliament, stand at the core of the present movement in Jordan. Jordan currently sits at the crossroad of a total system collapse or far-reaching reforms that could lead to a constitutional monarchy. Attempts to avoid major reforms will only exacerbate the situation, plus Jordan’s stability could be shaken once the Syrian rebellion concludes.

In the Gulf, Bahrainis filled the streets to protest discrimination, centralization of power, marginalization of the Shia majority, and policies of politicized naturalization directed against the Shia majority. They also expressed their dissatisfaction with having had the same prime minister for forty years. Bahrainis had agreed through a national document in 2001 with King Hamad Al-Khalifa to turn Bahrain into a constitutional monarchy but it never came to fruition. Bahrainis rebelled in February 2011 but where suppressed and the GCC intervened militarily for the first time ever to support the Bahraini government.
The situation in Bahrain is currently in an uneasy state of paralysis and tension between the people and the regime. Only through reform, rotation of power, and a popularly elected government and prime minister can Bahrain regain true peace. The militarization of the conflict, with some activists taking up arms, is not a remote possibility if the existing stalemate continues.

Further up the peninsula, Kuwait is the most open Gulf state in its politics. Kuwait has a constitution and a freely-elected parliament, but political parties are prohibited. The Amir appoints the prime minister, who forms the government. The parliament constantly challenges the prime minister over policy and direction. Throughout 2011 a youth-based movement organized opposition to the government, mobilizing 60,000 demonstrators among a population of 1 million Kuwaitis. As a result, the Amir changed the prime ministers, accepted the resignation of the government, and called for new parliamentary elections, in which the opposition won thirty-four of the fifty seats. During summer 2012, the constitutional court declared the 2012 elections illegal on procedural grounds, opening the way for more elections in fall 2012.

Larger numbers among the opposition support the goal of the youth-led movement to turn Kuwait into a constitutional monarchy with a popularly elected prime minister and a government formed by the legislature. This would require as a first step the legalization of political parties and judicial and electoral reforms. Such an evolution in the coming years would make Kuwait the first consolidated democracy in the Gulf. But also such an evolution will not be conflict free and will need many components of society and the political system on board.

On the other hand the announcement of the arrest of forty-one citizens in the United Arab Emirates during July 2012 for conspiring to change the regime is representative of the current climate in more stable countries. Citizens are becoming bolder. Demands for freedom of expression, the right to form political parties, and to partner with the ruling families on policy and direction have moved to the forefront. Even Oman experienced protests, with several Omanis losing their lives in the process in 2011.

Saudi Arabia, the most populous GCC member state, is also experiencing external and internal challenges as a result of the Arab revolutions. King Abdullah has announced the development of large housing projects and the creation of more than 60,000 jobs-most of them in the Ministry of Interior. Furthermore, the kingdom created one of the most ambitious scholarship programs in the history of the kingdom to send tens of thousands of students to the United States to complete graduate and undergraduate degrees in various fields of knowledge. As Saudi society changes, the role of intellectuals will gain new momentum.

Saudis on the whole are becoming more active and assertive, which likely will require political reform to ease growing tensions. During 2012 the number of Saudis expressing their opinion publicly through social media outlets rose significantly. Some were jailed, eliciting even more responses, in protest against the sentences. The most immediate challenge facing Saudi Arabia is in the Eastern province, in Qatif and Ihsa. The Shia minority, roughly (and unofficially) estimated at one million to one million and half, is weary of discrimination against them in jobs and employment. The Shia issue and the handling of it could lead to demands for equality in other areas of the kingdom, including in Najd and Riyadh, home to the country’s cultural and power structures.

The transition from the older generation of al-Sauds to younger ones is another challenge facing Saudi Arabia. A demand for a popularly elected prime minister are not yet a priority among Saudi activists, but by the end of this decade, it should not come as a surprise if Saudis begin asking for the constitutional rights that others are currently seeking in the region. What happens in Jordan and Kuwait will have an impact on the Saudi political system.

Other influences:

The region and in particular the GCC countries will also witness changes in the relationship between government and religion. In Egypt and Syria, religion will become less about authority or the repression of minorities or obedience to a ruler. In contrast to the ultraconservative format of religious interpretations in the Gulf, a different, more libertarian form of Islam is likely to emerge as deeper discussions about religion and democracy, electoral politics, and minority rights take place across the Gulf and the Arab world.

Furthermore, having Islamists in power around the broader Arab world makes Gulf governments uneasy. GCC Islamists might feel more empowered and become further politicized and demand changes in power sharing and constitutional arrangements. However, this will transform the way Islamists think and could lead more of them to accept newer interpretations Islamic pluralism and of the relation of state and religion.

The regional domino effect is contributing to the most profound transformation of the Arab world since the end of colonial rule. The Monarchies of the region are not immune. They are as well part of a new regional transformation that cannot be avoided. In order to avoid instability the Monarchies of the region will need to initiate long term reforms that will lead to democratization, political rights for citizens, power sharing arrangements, and far reaching changes in governance.

Twitter: @shafeeqghabra

* Professor of Political Science at Kuwait University

Arab Times