Robert Satloff: U.S.-Syria Relations and the Peace Process

Prepared remarks for delivery at debate with Syrian ambassador Imad Moustapha, American University, November 11, 2009.

We should begin by noting the empty chair that sits next to the platform. That is for the Israeli
representative who, in any normal situation, would be here to respond to the many charges and
accusations that have been raised about his country. It is not my place, as an American, to speak
for Israel, especially when Israel has its own able representatives in its embassy just minutes
from this auditorium. I asked that a representative of the State of Israel be permitted to join this
program—after hearing the Syrian ambassador, you can understand why that is so important.
Regrettably, that request was not accepted because, as I understand it, it is the policy of the
Syrian government not to permit its representatives to meet, talk, discuss, and debate with
Israeli representatives, even here in a great American university. Eighteen years after Syria’s
foreign minister first launched direct negotiations with Israel at the Madrid peace conference,
Syrians refuse to talk with Israelis. This is a very sad reality.

Syrian spokesmen make three arguments, much of which we heard here today:

1. There is nothing inherently or structurally wrong to prevent cooperation between
America and Syria.

2. Syria can play a useful mediation role in the region, especially with Iran and Hamas.

3. Syrian support for “resistance” would vanish with peace, which Syria supports with all
its heart and effort.

The regrettable reality beneath this happy “only if” picture is what I will call “Syria’s paradox”—
its influence, such as it is, comes from being exactly the opposite of a constructive, helpful player
in the Middle East; indeed, its influence comes from being a spoiler, a troublemaker, a source of
mischief. Otherwise, it is a relatively small, weak player in the wider Middle East arena.
Let me focus on several aspects of Syria’s role as a “spoiler”:

Middle East peace process. Syria’s main role in the peace process is to serve as host, patron,
and supporter of the most radical opponents of peace, i.e., Hamas, Palestinian Islamic Jihad,
PFLP-GC, and other groups. At times, Syria says it uses its influence to moderate these
organizations. In fact, the evidence works in the opposite direction. Just take a small issue, but
one that is emblematic of the problem: Last summer, the United States asked Syria to use its
influence with Hamas to allow Fatah members in Gaza to participate in the Fatah conference in
Bethlehem that would endorse peacemaking and bolster Mahmoud Abbas. With all its vaunted
influence with Hamas, Syria couldn’t—wouldn’t—deliver. So in the end, they provide cover
and support for the radicals but either can’t or won’t deliver on the restraint over the radicals
they promise us.

Lebanon. Syria is a major benefactor, supporter, and supplier of Hizballah, an organization
that, until September 11, was responsible for the murder of more Americans than any other
terrorist group in the world. The arms flow from Syria to Lebanon is breathtaking. In the “good
old days,” Syria only used to transship weapons from Iran to Syria, playing the middleman. That
has changed. There is incontrovertible evidence from the 2006 war that Syria took its own arms
off the shelf to send to Hizballah—such as Russian-made Kornet antitank weapons, 220 mm
antipersonnel rockets. On top of this, Syria refuses international resolutions calling for
international effort to demarcate its border with Lebanon so that the UN can stop this flow of
illegal weapons. Syria has even threatened that UN-sponsored border demarcation and
international participation in border control would be viewed as a hostile act. And then there is
the most recent scandal regarding the Iranian shipment of more than 300 tons of weapons to
Hizballah, intercepted at sea by the Israelis. Let us remember that the boat was headed to a
Syrian port, where—undoubtedly—the weapons would have been unloaded and trucked into
Lebanon. What the international community—especially the UN—needs to take special note
of is the fact that the weapons included short-range missiles that could only be usefully
deployed by Hizballah south of the Litani River, in direct violation of UN Security Council
resolutions. What does all this say about Syria’s commitments and intentions? How can anyone
trust a Syrian regime that talks peace but illegally ships arms for war and terrorism?

Iraq. There is a very serious issue of Syrian official support and facilitation for the flow of
jihadis across the border to kill Americans. Indeed, a U.S. court recently delivered a $415
million civil judgment against the government of Syria for its responsibility in the murder of
Americans. Today being Veterans Day, it is important we take time to focus on this critical
issue. Let me quote our top commander in Iraq, Gen. Ray Odierno, September 11, 2009—that
is just two months ago, not two years or four years ago: “During the past years, Syria was lending
indirect support to some of the fighters, on top of financial support. Syria has not changed this
type of interference.” He also said: “Syria continues to allow the facilitation of foreign fighters
through Syria that come both into Iraq as well as, I believe, into Afghanistan.” Just at the
moment when America was hoping for a three-way U.S.-Syria-Iraq understanding on this issue
last summer, immense bombs went off in Baghdad, killing hundreds of people. The Iraqi
government accused Syria of complicity in this and to this day demands that Syria turn over the
dozens of ex-Saddam supporters and henchmen still in Damascus and that the UN launch a full
international inquiry, which the United States supports.

It is against this backdrop that we should look at U.S.-Syrian relations. The Obama
administration has pursued its policy of engagement with Syria quite prudently, cautiously, and
so far, in my view, quite wisely. Because of certain campaign rhetoric, Syria may have thought
that Barack Obama himself was going to land in Damascus soon after inauguration. Well, that
didn’t happen. Washington has been certainly willing to engage, but on issues that matter—and
every time we focus on an issue that matters, the Syrians disappoint us, whether it is the Middle
East peace process, Lebanese government formation, Iraqi insurgents, etc. The result is that
under the Obama administration—yes, the Obama administration—sanctions on Syria were
renewed, the state of emergency regarding Lebanese sovereignty was renewed, and U.S.-Syria
engagement is nowhere close to a breakthrough.

Interestingly, our European allies can’t even get “yes” for an answer when they decide to make a
major concession to Syria. The European Union actually wants, for its own reasons, to sign an
Association Agreement with Syria, and it offered Syria a huge concession this summer to do so
when it proposed to remove the customary human rights elements of its agreement and move
them from the body of the main text to an annex where they would be declarative but have no
legal or regulatory impact on the agreement. In order words, precisely at a time when the
Syrians were throwing more dissidents in jail, the EU was willing to strip the Association
Agreement of its human rights content. And precisely at a time when you would have expected
Syria to hurry and sign the deal that it too good to be true, the Syrians said, “Wait a minute, we
need to think about this.” And so, that’s the situation as of today. The Syrians won’t even take
yes for an answer.

There are, of course, two other issues that hover above everything I’ve mentioned so far, issues
that hang like a sword of Damocles over the Syrian regime: the UN investigation of the
assassination of former Lebanese prime minister Rafiq al-Hariri and the IAEA investigation of
Syria’s al-Kibar nuclear reactor destroyed by the Israeli Air Force two years ago. These things
clearly take time—time as measured in years. But they are huge issues. Did the Syrians play a
role in the murder of Hariri? Right now, speculation ranges from whether it was the Syrians or
the Syrians’ local allies, Hizballah. Either way, Syria will get its fingers burned, and either way,
Syria has already paid a huge price for the perception of involvement. On the nuclear issue, even
the IAEA, which normally can’t say a bad word about anyone, has roundly criticized Syria for
its lack of cooperation in investigating the site that Syria has since paved over like a parking lot.
What is remarkable about the nuclear issue is what it says about the Syrian regime: with few
assets at its disposal, it jumped into bed with North Korea, one of its few allies, in a vain effort
to gain leverage in the region.

This is my closing point. Syria has a very weak hand that it knows to play only one way. It is a
poor state, with few resources, a weak economy. It has an authoritarian regime that smothers
the entrepreneurship of its people, so that it can’t be like Lebanon; it has a regime that smothers
the curiosity of its people, so that it can’t be like Turkey; it has a regime that smothers efforts to
take advantage of its rich history and antiquities for tourism, so that it can’t be like Egypt. Syria
has a lot in common with its neighbor Jordan, but whereas Jordan made a choice for peace,
stability, and constructive partnership relations with the world, Syria continually chooses
conflict, troublemaking, brinksmanship, and mischief—mischief that at times leads to the
death of Americans. There isn’t a structural reason why Syria can’t have better relations with
America and the world—on this point, the ambassador is correct. It is a matter of choice, a
matter of how Syria has chosen to play its weak hand. In my view, it is played it poorly.

But we—being Americans—will continue to try. We will most likely send a new ambassador to
Damascus soon, which is probably a good idea. Having an American ambassador in Damascus
will provide a more direct and clearer way to communicate to Syria than has been the case in
recent years. But the real issue is the choices that Syria makes—as the old saying goes, you are
either part of the problem or part of the solution. For years we have tried to get Syria to make a
choice. Until it does, the chances that the United States will use its influence to press Israel to
talk about peacemaking with Syria are pretty low. After all, our equities are being damaged by
Syria’s actions—in Iraq, in Lebanon, in terms of nuclear proliferation, on human rights— and
until those are addressed, the Syrians will need to knock on Israel’s door because they won’t find
a welcome mat in front of ours.

Will Israel open the door? I do not discount some tactical tango with Damascus, especially if
the Palestinian track remains in a deep freeze. But as a strategic choice for Israel, taking the road
to Damascus only makes sense if Israelis are convinced—without fog or obfuscation—that Syria
has itself made a different choice about its own role in the region. Without change in Syria—
real, verifiable, substantive change in behavior—I don’t think we should expect a breakthrough
on that front either.

Robert Satloff is the executive director of the Washington Institute
for Near East Policy.

The Washington Institute