In the recent meeting of Christian leaders at Bkerke, a majority opinion
has emerged favoring the “Greek Orthodox proposals” regarding the
parliamentary elections law. These proposals can be summarized as
follows: The voters of each community elect only the members of
parliament from their own community and the voting will abide by the
principle of proportionality.
This stand has provoked strong reactions. Most critics emphasize the
following points: The implementation of this proposal would create a
polarized parliament, cutting of the bridges between communities. The
generated momentum would stir up sectarian conflicts rather than reduce
them. Lebanese society would be in continual danger of breaking apart.
Sectarian leaders would emerge strengthened. The application of this
law would result, at the regional level, in the isolation of Christians.
These fears are certainly justified, but to better appreciate their import, it
is necessary to elucidate which features of these proposals contribute to
political introversion and the dangers they involve, and which may have
positive aspects.
The downside of these “proposals” lies in the fact that communities
would be restricted to selecting only representatives from their own
communities. The opposite, namely to deny a community the ability to
significantly influence its representation within the political power, would
be just as dangerous. The ensuing frustration and marginalization would
cause a depression (ihbat), a sense of ostracism, which could easily
degenerate into a search for solutions outside any legal or institutional
framework with the risk of violence that this entails.
We must therefore seek to avoid both these extremes. The “Greek
Orthodox proposals” are a reaction to one of them: the marginalization of
the Lebanese Christians, partly resulting from the misinterpretation of the
Taef Agreement in the electoral laws of 2009 and the preceding ones,
which gave the demographic factors in the elections a weight that Taef
was supposed to have neutralized.
The truncated interpretation of the Mounassafeh (principle of equality
between Muslims and Christians stipulated by Taef and explicitly stated –
in the Constitution) reduces this equality to the simple rule that the
parliamentary seats should be divided equally between Muslims and
Christians. But this interpretation falsely assumes that Christians or
Muslims duly represent the historical aspirations of their community even
if elected by the votes of another community. The fact remains that a
large proportion of Christian members of parliament are elected by
Muslim votes, while the contrary is not true.
A true Mounassafeh should give the Christians the same elective power
as the Muslims. In other words, it should allow the Christian voters to
elect the same number of members of parliament as Muslim voters do.
The ‘Greek Orthodox theses’ satisfy this condition, and they apply it
consistently and clearly, which is necessary to make it reassuring to the
minority communities. However, the ‘theses’ present the condition of
equal elective power in a context of sectarian self-isolation. This
disfigures the Mounassafeh, and introduces a harmful dynamic in
Lebanese society.
One should note that the electoral laws of 2009 and the preceding ones
were already applying weighting factors that gave the individual Christian
vote a greater weight than the Muslim vote. However, this was
implemented in a very irregular manner, and with the net outcome that
20 Christian members of parliament were elected in constituencies with
large Muslim majorities while only 3 Muslims were elected in
constituencies with a Christian majority, thus breaking the balance
intended by Taef between the two major religious groups. Furthermore,
the principle of ‘equal elective power’ was not formally recognized, which
reduced its intended desirable quality of reassuring the minorities.
The number of Muslim voters in Lebanon in 2009 was 1.52 times higher
than the number of Christian voters. In the redistricting of 2009, the
deviations from this average ratio were sometimes very large. In the
district of Kesrwan, for example, the number of Christian voters per MP
was around 17,470, whereas in Bint Jbeil the number of Shia voters per
MP was more than double that number. Lebanese lawmakers have
therefore introduced in previous election laws, a principle of adjusted
elective powers’, but with the net result that Christian representation
remained tributary of the Muslim vote. An electoral system based on an
explicit acceptance of the formula of ‘equal elective powers’ does not
therefore constitute a step backwards, since it was already being
implemented, albeit partially and unevenly, in previous legislations. Such
a system should, however, attempt to apply an average weighting factor
of 1.52, without any significant deviations, in all districts, and it should
apply it explicitly, consistently and impartially.
It is also important to note that the electoral laws of 2009, 2005 and
those that precede them all practiced a redistricting which, in many
constituencies, created the same dynamic of introversion that are
inherent in the Greek Orthodox proposals. For example, in 2009, the
electoral districts of Batroun, Zgharta, Bcharré, Koura, Jezzine, the Metn
and Beirut-1, were districts where an overwhelming majority of Christian
voters selected Christian members of parliament. Beirut-3, Tripoli,
Minnyeh-Dunnyeh, Saida city were almost homogeneous Sunni areas
electing Sunni MP’s, while in Tyre, Bint Jbeil and Nabatyeh, very large
Shiite majorities selected only Shiite MPs.
The current electoral system has largely the same negative aspects that
have been criticized in the ‘Greek-Orthodox theses’. Both systems
should therefore be equally rejected.
What other alternatives are available today? The most concerted efforts
have been made by the Boutros Committee. The main recommendation
of the committee was to adopt a system of proportional representation,
while simultaneously respecting the community quotas. This created a
very complex system that it is not understood in its details by the vast
majority of the electorate. The government who has adopted a variant of
the Committee’s proposal has campaigned at length in favor of the
proportional system, but without going into the details of their plan.
The government’s proposed system operates on the principle of closed
electoral lists. The electors can not pick and choose candidates from
different electoral lists and have to vote for one entire list. Once the vote
for the lists are counted, each list is apportioned a number of
parliamentary seats. So far, so good. The problem appears at the level of
selecting the members from within each list.
An example will help understand the difficulties in this part of the
selection process. Suppose List A gains 40% of the votes in a district
where 10 deputies are to be elected. This means that 4 deputies ought to
be selected from List A. This is generally understood and is not
problematic. The complexity is in determining which four of the ten
candidates from List A ought to be chosen. The ten have all received the
same number of votes and belong to a mix of sects. The general public is
at a loss to understand how the system will proceed from here. The –
government has merely mentioned that preferential votes would be used
to complete the selection process.
There are numerous ways to use preferential votes. Unfortunately, under
certain circumstances, this might lead to incongruous results such as a
situation where members of a minority community in a district, would find
that the best way to favor the selection of their community candidate, is
to vote for a list they oppose. Nizar Younes even argued that this system
is mathematically indeterminate (see ‘The Parliament of Tomorrow’ Al-
Massar Editions, 2006. pp.193-208).
The proportional system’s forte is that it increases representation by
removing the trap of the lesser evil theory, or ‘useful vote’ that constrains
the decisions of the voters in the majoritarian systems. Is more
representation always a good thing? Communities have been well
represented in Lebanon since its formation. What the proponents of the
proportional system are hoping for is that it will allow the emergence of
new leaders from the civic society that could gradually replace the
traditional sectarian leaders. These moderate leaders, however, are
already present in the large sectarian formations, and should they leave
these formations, the latter would likely move towards a more sectarian
discourse.
There is another factor that weighs heavily on the negative side of
greater representation: The proportional system will facilitate the growth
of the extremist religious groups much more than they will the secular
ones. We have seen the growth dynamic of the religious groups in the
Arab spring. Israel has a proportional system, and its religious groups
have, through their rapid growth, completely marginalized the secular
Labor Party.
The proportional system has pretty much the same effect on countries as
Freudian analysis has on persons. They both bring into the open the
hidden frustrations or unsettling motivations that a healthy person or
society would normally repress. Freudian therapy was a complete failure,
as it deconstructs personalities and is unable to reintegrate them.
Similarly a proportional electoral system would not help a country in crisis
but precipitate its fall into a quasi-permanent failed-state condition.
There is a final argument against the use of the proportional system
under the present conditions in Lebanon. Whole regions have fallen
under the control of armed groups that have repressed by force or
threats any organized form of opposition. Other areas enjoy more
freedom and opposing political forces compete in these areas unheeded.
An example would clarify why the proportional system under these
conditions is unfair.
Assume that Group A has ‘homogenized’ Area A by force or threat of its
use. Group B is democratic and allows opposition to develop in its Area
B. The proportional system would allow Group A to win a significant
share of representation in Area B. Group B, however, would find it very
difficult to pierce in Area A. It would be a very twisted sense of justice to
propose a system that rewards those who use repressive tactics to
secure almost total control over their areas, and punish groups that
allows opposition groups to operate without restrictions in their midst.
The proportional system was presented by its advocates as the most
modern and most commonly used today, as if it was the latest fashion to
be followed. The most advanced and most experienced democracies that
should serve as a model, however, do not use it. The United States and
England both have uninominal electoral systems (small districts where
only one MP is elected by district with a simple majority). The French
Parliament uses the same type of uninominal system after unsuccessful
past attempts at using a proportional system. As for the election of the
French Senate, it is based on a mixed system (uninominal majoritarian in
half the districts and proportional representation in the other half).
The uninominal system, therefore, has strong partisans. This system,
however, is also problematic when sectarian quotas are included. A
uninominal system was suggested by Nizar Younes (op. cit.).
Unfortunately, this proposal leads in practice to voters choosing only
members of their own religious groups and reintroduces a variant of the
Greek-Orthodox theses with the same negative dynamic that pushes
each community to curl-up on itself. On this subject, please refer to my
article in The Daily Star, April 4, 2008, where I discuss the Younes
project, and propose a variant that would ensure a true Munassafeh,
create bridges between communities and produce a strong moderate
center in the Parliament.
It is important, before detailing the “Partnership” proposal, to justify
maintaining the sectarian quotas and an equal elective power between
the two major religious groups, as these two issues continue to raise
objections on the basis of democratic principles (see, i.e., Michael
Young’s editorial in The Daily Star of December 22, 2011, where the
author describes these ideas as ‘profoundly undemocratic’).
There are no absolute principles that define electoral rules. The principle
of democracy is constrained by a constitutive convention, which, if freely
accepted, will legitimately determine the specific rules of the democratic
game even if these rules are not egalitarian. The Norwegian constitution,
for example, states that over half of government members must belong
to the Lutheran sect (This is in the process of being changed, but only
now. And this is a Scandinavian democracy. Remember the expression
‘Going to Denmark’?).
The most relevant example regarding the situation in Lebanon is the U.S.
Senate. Each U.S. state has two senators regardless of the size of its
population. California had in 2011 more than 37,691,000 inhabitants,
around 66 times more people than Wyoming, which had only 568,000.
The vote of an elector in Wyoming had, therefore, the same political
weight as that of 66 Californians. There is therefore, in the U.S. Senate
elections, equal numbers of representatives and equality in the “elective
power’ of the states, irrespective of their populations, and it is the equality
in elective powers that is crucial to the Wyoming electors.
The equal elective power status was granted to the states of America by
the ‘Connecticut Compromise’ of 1787. It is the Taef compromise of 1989
that, in Lebanon, formalized the principle of equality between Christians
and Muslims in the legislative and executive branches. It is not possible
to evaluate the legitimacy of the democratic rules in Lebanon without a
clear understanding of the terms of the Taef Agreement.
Taif was meant to convince Christians of the Eastern Sector to reunite
with the rest of the country. They had opted for secession because they
felt that their partners in the management of the country preferred
regional solutions to the co-management of an independent Lebanon.
Muslims criticized the anti-Arab ‘Christian positions’, accusing them of
dominating the state apparatus and insisted they submit to the central
authority of a unified state. The fundamental compromise of Taef
regarding inter-community problems was based on three main
conditions:
1 -Christians were to submit to the central authority and accept the
country’s Arab identity. This condition has been met. The mini-Christian
state was dissolved, and the political discourse of Christian factions is
now in harmony with its Arab environment.
2 – In return, the Islamo-progressive groups had to give their allegiance
to the integrity, unity and independence of Lebanon, considered as the
final homeland. This condition, however fundamental, and stated in the
preamble of the constitution, has not been fulfilled: Lebanon after Taef
was delivered to the Syrians and important Lebanese groups today have
abandoned their Lebanese perspective to submit to the authority of
regional power poles.
3 -The acceptance by both parties of the Mounassafeh: equal shares in
the legislative and executive powers for the two religious groups. This
was in response to the legitimate claims of the Muslims who complained
about the Christian domination of the state apparatus (before the Taef
Accord, the Christians were reserved a majority in parliament and the
executive was a strong presidential system in the hands of the
Maronites). At the same time, the Mounassafeh was to protect the
Christians from any future demographic changes to their detriment. But
the cardinal rule of Mounassafeh was implemented superficially,
unequally and only partially.
Several comments are in order here.
1. The concessions required from the Christians by the Taef agreement
have been implemented. The Islamo-progressive’ groups of the time did
not meet their commitments, neither in regard to the Mounassafeh, nor,
and that is fundamental, in regard to the preamble of the constitution:
allegiance to a free and independent Lebanon. These two terms of their
obligations in the Taef Agreement are connected, because it is
historically in the Christian community that the Lebanese independence
movement is anchored. Giving the Christians more political weight than
their proportion in the population today would strengthen the nationalist
movement in the country, and help fulfill the wish of the Lebanese of all
communities who aspire to live in a free and independent country. It is
within this historical reality that the justification for the Mounassafeh
resides.
2. Article 24 of the Constitution refers to the implementation of the
‘principle of equality between Christians and Muslims’. The Mounassafeh
is therefore more than a simple electoral formula: It is a principle that
must guide the elaboration of the electoral law, and the division of power
within the executive branch. The condition of ‘equal elective power’ is,
therefore, in harmony with the spirit and letter of the Constitution derived
from the Taef Agreement, and it only requires the adoption of an
appropriate electoral law for its implementation.
3. The Lebanese Constitution provides several measures to ensure that
the application of Mounassafeh does not result in socio-economic
inequalities between members of different communities. Needless to say,
it is necessary to respect faithfully the clauses of the constitution that
give all individuals the same democratic freedoms and equal
opportunities for social and economic development.
4. The Lebanese Constitution provides a mechanism that is intended to
eliminate political sectarianism in Parliament, while simultaneously
reintroducing it in a newly formed Senate. So there is no intention in the
Constitution to completely eliminate political sectarianism. Moreover, the
constitution stipulates that the process of shifting sectarianism from the
Parliament to a Senate would be implemented in stages. The most
fundamental stage, the one that must precede all the others, the one
emphasized in the preamble to the Constitution is, however, far from
being implemented. This stage is to establish the foundations of a state:
the allegiance of all factions to Lebanon, the ‘final homeland’, and the
submission to a Lebanese state that would have a monopoly on foreign
relations and armed forces. It would be unthinkable to proceed any
further in the abolition of sectarian quotas before achieving this
fundamental step.
Sectarian quotas, as well as equal elective powers, remain therefore
today essential conditions for the unity and independence of the country.
Once the allegiance of all factions to a ‘final homeland’ is engrained and
consolidated, then the sectarian system will lose its ‘raison d’être’.
The purpose of this paper is to present a draft electoral law that places
the condition of ‘equal elective power’ in a dynamic of openness and
participation in building a democratic, unified and independent state, as
well as a more vibrant Christian-Muslim partnership—a dynamic that
would develop the human and political bases for the eventual elimination
of political sectarianism.
Electoral law Proposal
The introduction of the condition of ‘equal elective powers’ in an electoral
system can take many forms, depending on the size of the districts and
the sectarian mix within them. The following conditions are the basis for
the ‘Partnership’ proposal:
1) The districts where Christians vote will be separate from the
districts where Muslims vote. The Muslim districts will elect half the
members of parliament, the Christian districts will elect the other
half, thus ensuring an exact Mounassafeh.
2) In each Christian district, there will be an equal number of Muslim
and Christian deputies. The same will be true for Muslim districts.
Thus in a Christian district in Kesrwan that elects 2 deputies, one
has to be Muslim and the other Christian. Similarly, in a Muslim
district in the North, where 6 deputies are to be elected, three of
them will have to be Christians, and the other three Muslim. There
are no closed lists: voters can pick and choose candidates from
more than one list. Their votes will be accepted, however, only if
they contain an equal number of Christians and Muslims. This will
help build bridges between communities, and change the tone of
the political discourse by creating a moderate center in Parliament.
3) The redistricting law should ensure that minorities in a given district
are not tributary of the majority sect in this district.
4) To the extent possible, the weight factor (Muslim/Christian electors
per MP) should be as close as possible to the average of 1.52 in all
Mohafazat.
An objection has often been raised with respect to the homogeneous
regions of the country. How would the electors in homogeneous districts,
such as one in the Kesrouan, for example, elect both a Muslim MP and a
Christian MP to represent them? Where would you find the Muslim
candidates? The answer to the first question is yes, and to the second
question, that those candidates can be from any region of the country. In
Lebanon, candidates to parliamentary elections can run in any district,
even if they neither reside nor are born there. Furthermore, Article 27 of
the constitution states:
“A member of the Parliament represents the whole nation. No imperative
mandate can be requested from him to fulfill by his electors. ”
It is therefore not necessary that members of parliament be closely
involved in the local issues of the region that elected them. As a matter of
principle, it is even bad practice for them to provide services to individual
electors to secure their future votes, particularly if they do it by using
undue influence in the state.
The most advantageous redistricting, one that would help the
reintroduction of accountability in the system, and promote the renewal of
the political class, would be one based on small districts where electors
would vote for only two deputies: one Muslim and one Christian.
Unfortunately the security conditions in some areas in Lebanon render
the generalized use of small districts inequitable. In these areas, political
opposition to the locally dominant party has been muted or completely
erased, making it very difficult for a candidate from the opposition to
succeed. In the regions where there is relative freedom and that remain
firmly under the control of the government security forces, the electoral
results would be mixed, and opposition parties will be able to make gains
in some small districts. It would be unfair to reward parties who repress
opposition in their midst and punish those who allow democratic
opposition in their areas. The variant of the Partnership project that is
presented in the Appendix, uses small districts (2 deputies per district) in
the “democratic” areas, and larger districts where armed groups
dominate.
Conclusion
The positive aspects of the Partnership Project and the small electoral
districts in particular, are discussed below.
1) The principle of equality between Christians and Muslims referred to
by Article 24 of the constitution will actually be respected. This will
reduce the friction among the various sects caused by the continuous
bargaining about redistricting, about the issue of minimum age of voters,
and the inclusion of Lebanese living abroad. An electoral law that really
respects the Mounassafeh will provide reassurance to the Christians and
defuse sectarian attitudes. The two main religious groups will feel as
equal partners in building institutions that will defend the freedom and
dignity of all its citizens.
2) The sole political act at the national level that all Lebanese citizens of
age are allowed to carry out, that of selecting their representatives, will
exemplify Christian-Muslim partnership. This will disrupt sectarian
attitudes and prepare the minds for the elimination of political
sectarianism. It should be noted here that the ballots that contain only
one name should not be accepted, in order to force voters to be
represented by equal numbers from the two religious groups.
3) In the small districts areas, the number of MP’s to be elected in each
electoral district will be limited to two, which facilitates the decision of the
voters, thus allowing an easier evaluation of the candidates, a better
monitoring of the performance of elected members, and the
reintroduction of accountability in politics. The small size of the districts
will allow independent candidates to compete more easily with large
10
–
electoral machines controlled by sectarian leaderships. The last
municipal elections, held in small districts, showed that local alliances
have often challenged the boundaries between the two major political
parties. This will help to renew the political class.
4) A quarter of the parliamentary seats will go to Christians and another
quarter to Muslims elected by members of their own community. These
members will be the ‘voice’ of their communities and will express their
aspirations, fears and frustrations within the parliament where these will
be heard, taken into account and contained. This will prevent the
radicalization of extra-parliamentary actions by community members who
feel they are inadequately represented in Parliament.
5) A quarter of parliamentary seats will go to Christians and another
quarter to Muslims elected by voters belonging to another religion. These
members will represent the moderate middle of the parliament. This
represents the most direct blow against the grip of sectarian leaderships
over their communities. This will change the general political
environment, and will raise the level of maturity of the political debate
which can then focus on the needs of the citizens and on the socioeconomic
development.
6) The feeling that Christians and Muslims shall have of a certain degree
of mutual control, will mitigate the mindset that ‘demonizes the other’,
and will reduce the strong anxieties of minorities that could degenerate
into violent and other self-destructive behavior.
7) The use of quotas for women in Parliament is not a satisfactory
measure to increase women’s participation in the political life. Women
placed on an electoral list dominated by men, without having their own
independent electoral base, will be relegated to a secondary role. This is
also true of junior members of parliament in general, who have little
media presence, except for rare moments and a few exceptions. Many of
them are not known to the public and are restricted to the passive role of
voting along party lines. The role and image of women in politics will be
much more significant if quotas were enforced in the Cabinet rather than
in Parliament. A quota of thirty per cent of women ministers, of women
with direct and quasi-independent responsibility for their ministries, will
have a more profound and powerful impact on the image of women. As
to parliamentary elections, a better way to promote women participation
would be to encourage them to participate by giving them financial and
logistics support, and providing them with the cadres to manage their
electoral campaigns.
8) The various UNDP reports on Arab human development highlighted
the deficiencies of Arab political elites, especially regarding their
vulnerability to foreign pressures and influences. This problem is
particularly acute in Lebanon, where regional influences were often not
the consequences of major crises, but their detonators. The historical
reasons for this lack of immunity to external factors, is that the will to
autonomous rule has been erased from the minds of major factions of
those Lebanese communities that represented the greatest threats to the
dominance of the region by foreign invaders (Seljuks, Mongols,
Mamelukes, Fatimids or Ottomans). Lebanon was for over a thousand
years before its independence, under the yoke of one conqueror or
another. This policy of serving the’ Sultan’ rather than seeking
independence, may have been a good strategy of survival in the past for
these communities. It has become, however, a strong impediment to the
consolidation of modern Lebanon.
These elites, often the best organized within their own communities,
have often found it more comfortable to submit to the authority of
external powers, rather than defend their interests within the Lebanese
national framework. The ‘Partnership Project’, will allow the communities
with the Lebanese nationalism deeply rooted in them, to elect leaders
who share the same nationalist conceptions, but who belong to those
communities dominated by organizations with regional perspectives.
Once the number of these new nationalist leaders reaches a critical
mass, they will be able to organize themselves to confront and replace
the elites who continue to follow a strategy of survival which places them
in a state of dependence vis-à-vis external forces. Only then can a new
intercommunity compromise (such as Taef), but reached among
politically independent factions, stand a chance of being stable and
sustainable, as it will be better prepared to contain the external shocks
coming from a region in full upheaval.
9) In seeking to restore the state’s total control on foreign relations and
armed forces, the fundamental issues should be kept in mind. The
current crisis which revolves around the existence of an armament
parallel to that of the state, as painful and dangerous as it might be, is
not the in itself the endemic Lebanese problem but merely one of its
manifestations. This problem has its roots in the deficiency of political
elites who have been castrated of any autonomous will by campaigns of
terror that have been carried out for hundreds of years by the numerous
invaders of the area against any resistance to their rule. The strategy of
survival of these elites is still to seek a larger share in the Lebanese
power structure only to offer it as a pledge of fealty to regional centers of
influence from who they expect in return privileges and protection. Within
this perspective, the primary task is the development of Lebanese
nationalist elites and leaderships in all the communities. A set of
administrative decrees and laws should be enacted to severely regulate
the relations between all political actors and foreign countries in order to
consolidate the state monopoly on foreign relations and constrain
political competition between Lebanese factions within the Lebanese
national framework. The issue of parallel armament should be treated as
part of a comprehensive political settlement that would define the role of
Lebanon in regional problems. The degree of severity of the laws
regulating the relations with foreign countries and groups will be a good
gauge of the seriousness and durability of the political compromise.
10) It is not expected that an electoral law it alone would solve
fundamental problems. The Partnership Project is merely a step in the
right direction, but it addresses the Lebanese problematic on several
levels. Applying the principle of equality between Muslims and Christians
in a fair and systematic manner, the project provides reassurance to
minorities and gives a better guarantee for the country’s independence
and individual liberties. It disrupts sectarian attitudes and ties,
reintroduces accountability, directly weakens the grip of sectarian leaders
over their communities and helps renew the political class. The most
important political aspect of the project resides in the development of
nationalist elites in all communities.
Tables 1 to 10
The Electoral Partnership Proposal
The following proposal is based on the electoral lists of 2009, since at the time of the
writing the 2013 lists had not been made available to the public.
Tables 1 and 2 show numbers of districts and numbers of deputies per Mohafazat, in
2009 and as proposed.
Table 3 shows the distribution of the electorate by sect in 2009.
Tables 4 and 5 show the global view of the proposed redistricting by Mohafazat.
Tables 6 to 10 show for each Mohafazat the distribution by sect of the electorate and
the deputies within each of the proposed districts.
January 2012, Revised January 2013.
paulmourani@gmail.com
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