Syrian Protests Are Intensifying, Reminiscent of the Early Days of the 2011 Civil War

The two-week-long protests and mass demonstrations unfolding in Syria are starting to be reminiscent of the events that marked the beginning of the Syrian civil war in 2011.

The scenes taking place in the southern provinces of Sweida and Daraa, and even in the northern city of Latakia, include protesters burning tires, striking shopkeepers, closed roads, and violent confrontations between civilians and the Assad regime’s forces. There are new Twitter accounts, or X as it’s now known, with videos and slogans shaking the country calling for President Bashar Assad’s removal, and has people wondering what the consequences will be.

The most immediate reason for this new outbreak of protests is Assad’s decision to eliminate fuel subsidies, which within days resulted in massive price increases of between 15 and 20 percent. This followed his order to double the salaries of public sector employees causing a spike to an already high level of inflation.

Fuel prices have caused widespread protests also in Egypt, Lebanon, and Jordan, and it usually forces the authorities to withdraw their decision in a bid to restore peace and quiet to the streets. The only president to have relative success in managing to weather such price increases is Egyptian president Abdel Fattah al-Sissi, who eliminated a large portion of fuel subsidies but simultaneously created a system of compensation that cushioned the blow.

Assad doesn’t have the resources with which he could balance the needs of his deficit-ridden budget against cost-of-living protests. Most of his country’s oil fields are under the control of Kurds in the north who are protected and assisted by American forces. Syria also doesn’t have the same sort of international economic support that Egypt or Jordan do.

Economic aid from Russia, which in the past was limited in scope, has almost completely dried up following the outbreak of war in Ukraine. Iran has also reduced its credit and direct assistance to the Assad regime with the hope that with Syria’s return as a member of the Arab League in May (after its membership had been suspended), wealthy oil countries such as Saudi Arabia, the UAE, and Bahrain would begin directing funds to Syria, at least for reconstruction purposes.

Other than limited assistance to victims of February’s devastating earthquake in Syria and Turkey, this has yet to occur. In addition with that assistance, the United Arab Emirates has agreed to build around 1,000 housing units in northern Syria, at the ridiculously paltry cost of about $17 million. And the expectations that the agreement to resume diplomatic relations between Iran and Saudi Arabia in March would provide financial benefits to Syria has not been realized. It’s also doubtful that they will be anytime in the near future since Syria is subject to international sanctions limiting its ability to obtain assistance from foreign governments and corporations.

This results in more than 90 percent of Syria’s citizens living under the poverty line. The United Nations estimate that around 12 million people, including hundreds of thousands of children, suffer from food insecurity.

In this respect, there are also disparities between the autonomous provinces in northern Syria under Kurdish control which are not subject to sanctions, and the provinces under Assad’s control. Russia, in response to American sanctions, refuses to allow the passage of international aid convoys headed for Syria’s northern provinces via Turkey, but at least in the north, the population can benefit from “organized” smuggling to meet its immediate needs and has use of its oil revenues.

A growing problem

Jordan and Syria maintain normal trade relations, however, following increased drug smuggling through Jordan and into the Gulf states, Jordan imposed a series of travel limitations including the careful inspection of every truck that crosses the border. This resulted in the delay of hundreds of Syrian trucks at the Jordan border in August, including some carrying fresh produce destined for markets in Gulf countries.

A shipment of drugs that fell from a drone in Jordan, in July.

Amphetamine production has long since become a major industry in Syria bringing the Assad regime between $5-10 billion a year. Most of the production is done in the southern provinces such as Sweida and Daraa, where militias and regular Syria forces have opened mass production laboratories despite protests by residents. These Syrians have also become the main victims of blocked trade with neighboring states.

Drug smuggling became a central issue for Jordan after it began posing a threat to its economy. In May 2022, King Abdullah met with U.S. President Joe Biden and asked for his help in stopping the illegal trade. Biden responded and ordered U.S. government agencies to come up with a comprehensive plan to combat the amphetamine trade, but eventually, these plans brought nothing new to the table. They rely on the sanctions that are already imposed on Syria and focus on figures in the Syrian government who are suspected of being involved in the industry. The plan also relies on international cooperation that is unlikely to deter drug manufacturers and certainly not a regime that relies so much on this source of income.

Not wanting to rely solely on Biden, King Abdullah also spoke with Russian President Vladimir Putin in January, explaining to him the danger that lies if the illicit drug trade continues. Putin understood the danger of narcotics facing Jordan was also an obstacle for Syria’s return to and normalization with the Arab League, which Russia had been promoting.

Even though Russia reduced the scope of its forces in Syria following the war in Ukraine, it moved its remaining forces from the center of the country to the south, established patrols and monitoring checkpoints along the Jordanian border. They also tried recruiting Druze volunteers for policing and supervision operations. Among other things, Russia appealed to the commander of the large Druze militia, Yahya al-Hajjar, with a request to join the fight against smuggling.

Here, however, the Russian representatives encountered determined Druze resistance, declaring that they won’t cooperate with any country or organization that has military or economic interests in Syria. This position prevented the Druze from joining the Russian move. In the past, it was actually convenient for Assad – and for Russia – because Syria could portray it as Druze support for its regime.

The Druze leadership, however, isn’t homogenous. The Syrian Druze have at least three spiritual leaders, and there isn’t much love between them. For example, Hikmat al-Hijri, the most noted spiritual leader among the three heads of the Syrian Druze community, stated earlier this week that he supports the protesters’ “just demands” and that whoever “wants to sell his honor should go ahead and do so, but he isn’t authorized to sell the honor of another.”

These words were said in response to the statement of the second Druze leader, Sheikh Yousef al-Jerboa, who stated that some of the protesters’ demands to remove Assad “are wrong demands… The state’s flag unites us and supporting the regime is the right strategic and national choice.”

This isn’t simply a personal dispute. It concerns the Druze community’s fundamental political outlook, according to which as long as they don’t aspire to their own state, they must be loyal to the government, so they can ensure their existence. This attitude has allowed Druze around the world to adopt a political approach that changes in accordance with geography, even if it sometimes contains contradictions. This approach maintains, for example, that the Druze in Syria won’t interfere in decisions made by Druze in Israel or Lebanon, and that each Druze community will be able to determine its political position in accordance with local interests and subject to the local regime.

But political disputes, and not for the first time, between the leaders of the Syrian Druze community, can cause the regime to exploit these cracks to its advantage. This is why the regime is rethinking how exactly to handle the protest in Sweida and Daraa – two districts with a Druze majority.

But as happens in Syria, and not for the first time, a political dispute between the leaders of the Druze community can cause the Syrian regime to exploit these cracks to its advantage. This is why the regime is rethinking how exactly to handle the protest in Sweida and Daraa – two districts with a Druze majority. A brutal repression could cause a serious rift with the regime and possibly bring about a reaction from the Druze living in Lebanon, despite the community’s geography-oriented position mentioned above. On the other hand, a soft hand will oblige the regime to comply with at least some of the demands – a move that may be seen as weak, thus encouraging violent protests in other districts.

In the meantime, it seems that even if the demonstrations manage to catch the media’s attention, they’re geographically limited. Syrian commentators estimate that this is not a new popular uprising (intifada), mainly because the Syrians are tired, beaten and depressed, and aren’t ready for a new anti-regime mobilization. But things in this spirit were written and said also before the civil war, and we should remember that such events have their own dynamics which mainly depend on the regime’s response.